Temkin v. Rodrigues (In re Rodrigues)
| Decision Date | 13 September 2019 |
| Docket Number | ADV. PRO. NO. 18-02016 (JJT),CASE NO. 18-20095 (JJT) |
| Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | IN RE: FERNANDO P. RODRIGUES, DEBTOR. STEVEN TEMKIN and, GAYLE TEMKIN PLAINTIFFS v. FERNANDO P. RODRIGUES, DEFENDANT. |
David M. S. Shaiken, Esq.
Shipman, Shaiken & Schwefel, LLC
433 South Main Street, Suite 319
West Hartford, CT 06110
Attorney for the Plaintiffs
George I. Roumeliotis, Esq.
Roumeliotis Law Group, P.C.
157 Church Street, 19th Floor
New Haven, CT 06510
Attorney for the Debtor/Defendant
The Plaintiffs, Steven Temkin and Gayle Temkin, filed their complaint ("Complaint," ECF No. 1) against the Defendant, Fernando P. Rodrigues ("Debtor"), on May 3, 2018. In the Complaint, the Plaintiffs asks this Court, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6),1 to deemnondischargeable a debt based on a state court judgment ("Judgment") that the Debtor owes to them.2
On January 24, 2018, the Debtor filed a voluntary petition in this Court seeking relief under Chapter 7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (Case No. 18-20095). Included in the Debtor's schedule of assets and liabilities was the aforementioned Judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs (ECF No. 13, 20). On July 02, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed a timely proof of claim with this Court, and on May 3, 2018, they initiated this adversary proceeding, arguing that the Judgment debt was nondischargeable because the Debtor's conduct giving rise to the Judgment fell within the meaning of "malicious and willful" conduct under § 523(a)(6) (Adv. Pro. No. 18-02016). On July 6, 2018, in a one-page answer, the Defendant denied all allegations of the Complaint and argued as a special defense that the Judgment was improperly decided, and that any determination as to the dischargability of the Judgment debt would be premature while the appeal was pending ("Debtor's Answer," ECF No. 15).3
On May 1, 2019, the Defendant filed pre-trial disclosures consisting of proposed witnesses and exhibits. The disclosures indicated that the Debtor intended to call, among others, the Plaintiffs as witnesses, and would offer certain papers relating to the State Court litigation and subsequent appeal as evidence (ECF No. 27). The Plaintiffs filed a Motion in Limine and Objection to Defendant's Rule 26(A)(3) Disclosure ("Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine," ECF No. 28) arguing that the Defendant was collaterally estopped from offering evidence relating to issues already fully and fairly litigated in State Court. On June 4, 2019, the Court granted the Plaintiffs'Motion in Limine in part and sustained their Objection to Defendant's Rule 26(a)(3) Disclosures in part, (see ECF No. 39) primarily due to the preclusive effect of the State Court decision as to matters relevant to this Court's consideration of whether the Judgment debt was nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6).
This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) and may hear and determine this matter pursuant to the District Court's General Order of Reference dated September 21, 1984. This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I). Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1409(a).
In accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 52 and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7052, after notice and a hearing and the Court's consideration of the record, the Court makes the following findings of facts in addition to those in the Introduction:
Background
1. The litigation between these parties originates with a prior proceeding in State Court, on or about October 19, 2011, that arose out of dispute between neighbors.4 In the preceding years, the owner of the undeveloped property adjacent to the Plaintiffs' property employed the Debtor to develop the lot. In the course of that employment, the Debtor developed an adversarial relationship with the Plaintiffs.
2. In the State Court proceeding, the Plaintiffs filed a cross claim ("Cross Claim") wherein they alleged three separate causes of action against the Debtor and an LLC, of which the Debtorwas the sole member, that sounded in private nuisance, negligent infliction of emotional distress and intentional infliction of emotional distress respectively (Pl's Ex. E, 4-6).
3. The Cross Claim stated that the Debtor intentionally imported landscaping fill onto the adjacent property, and thereafter piled it on or near the property line as to obscure the Plaintiffs' view of the Hartford skyline (Id.).
4. The Cross Claim also stated that the Debtor engaged in a course of harassing behavior that included, but was not limited to: (1) standing on the Plaintiffs' property line for extended periods of time, while staring into their home or backyard where their children played; (2) openly photographing the Plaintiffs, their children, and their home from the adjacent property; (3) following the Plaintiffs in his vehicle as they came and went from their home, sometimes purposefully obstructing their way; and (4) saying to the Plaintiffs in a threatening manner on at least one occasion that he would "finish [them] off" and that he would "take care" of them (Id., 3, 5).
5. On June 7, 2017, after a bench trial, the State Court, Epstein J., issued a memorandum of decision (Pl's Ex. A) adjudging that the Debtor and the LLC were both liable under all three causes of action. The State Court further concluded that the Debtor's actions "were malicious, knowing and intentional, and caused significant distress that continue[d] to persist," and "parallel[ed] the definition of stalking in the criminal statutes . . . when one follows, lies in wait for, monitors, observes, surveils, threatens, or harasses another person and/or interferes with a person's property" (Id., 19).
6. The State Court found, inter alia, the following additional relevant facts: The Debtor engaged in piling fill on the Plaintiffs' property line on multiple occasions, which consisted not onlyof dirt, but also large amounts of "tree branches, rocks, pieces of broken concrete, garbage, bottles, and trash bags," which were so high at one point, a person could stand on top of a pile and look directly into the third floor of the Plaintiffs' home (Id., 9, 11).
7. The piles of fill became so high that they fell onto the Plaintiffs' property and against their newly built home, forcing them to install frames in front of their basement windows to prevent damage (Id., 9).
8. The Debtor regularly parked bulldozers, dump trucks, and other vehicles on or near the property line for no apparent reason (Id., 11).
9. The Debtor would stand on top of the piles of fill, with his arms folded, starring directly into the Plaintiffs' home for long periods of time (Id.).
10. The State Court further concluded that both "cross-claim defendants [(Debtor and the LLC )] [were] liable under all three causes of action," (Id.) and awarded the Plaintiffs $150,000 for the private nuisance claim, $500,000 for emotional distress, and punitive damages in the form of attorney's fees (Id., 20).
11. On June 27, 2017, the Defendant appealed the State Court's decision; and on January 24, 2018, the Debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Petition in this Court (Case No. 18-20095).
12. On May 3, 2018, the Plaintiffs commenced this Adversary Proceeding against the Debtor (Adv. Pro. No. 18-02016).
13. The State Court appeal was dismissed on February 1, 2019 (Pl's Ex. C); and on March 20, 2019, after the last remaining issues before the State Court was withdrawn by the Plaintiffs,5 the case was removed from the docket and assigned it final disposition number (Pl's Ex. D).
In the Complaint (ECF No. 1) the Plaintiffs argue that they have proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the Debtor's conduct that gave rise to the Judgment debt constituted malicious and willful conduct under § 523(a)(6), and, therefore, is a nondischargeable. In response, the Defendant essentially argues that: (1) the Judgment's apportionment of liability between the respective the Debtor and the LLC was unclear; and (2) a thorough review of the State Court proceedings would better help this Court in determining how much of the underlying conduct was malicious and willful, as opposed to merely negligent, and thus aid the Court in its determination of whether a portion of the Judgment was, in fact, dischargeable under § 523(a)(6).6 For the reasons stated herein, the Court agrees with the Plaintiffs.
"[A] federal court must give to a state court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered." O'Connor v. Pierson, 568 F.3d 64, 69 (2d Cir.2009) (alteration in original) ). Under both Connecticut and federal law, the doctrine of res judicata provides that "a final judgment, when rendered on the merits, is an absolute bar to a subsequent action, between the same parties or those in privity with them, upon the same claim." Dontigney v. Roberts, 73 Conn. App. 709, 710 (2002); Mazziotti v. Allstate Ins. Co., 240 Conn. 799, 812 (1997). "This doctrine means that once a case reaches a final judgment on the merits, the parties cannot later relitigate the issues that were raised or could have been raised in that earlier case." Vandever v. Emmanuel, 606 F.Supp.2d 253, 254 (D. Conn. 2009). See also Chien v. Skystar Bio Pharmaceutical Co., 623 F.Supp.2d 255, 260 (D. Conn. 2009) () (internal quotation marks and...
To continue reading
Request your trial