Temple Community Hospital v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 27 May 1999
• Docket Number: No. S049103,S049103
• Citation: 976 P.2d 223,20 Cal.4th 464,84 Cal.Rptr.2d 852
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 976 P.2d 223, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3993, 1999 Daily Journal D.A.R. 5073, 1999 Daily Journal D.A.R. 5137 TEMPLE COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent; Sandra Ramos, Real Party in Interest

Page 852

84 Cal.Rptr.2d 852

20 Cal.4th 464, 976 P.2d 223, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3993,

1999 Daily Journal D.A.R. 5073,

1999 Daily Journal D.A.R. 5137

TEMPLE COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent Sandra Ramos, Real Party in Interest

No. S049103.

Supreme Court of California

May 27, 1999.

O'Flaherty & Belgum, O'Flaherty, Cross, Martinez, Ovando & Hatton and Robert M. Dato, Anaheim, for Petitioner.

Musick, Peeler & Garrett, R. Joseph De Briyn; Ginsburg, Stephan, Oringher & Richman, Harry W.R. Chamberlain II; and Marcus M. Kaufman, Los Angeles, for American Insurance Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.

Horvitz & Levy, David S. Ettinger and Julie L. Woods, Encino, for California Medical Association, California Healthcare Association and California Dental Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.

Paul N. Halvonik, Berkeley; and Fred J. Hiestand, Sacramento, for the Association for California Tort Reform as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Mazursky, Schwartz & Angelo, Christopher E. Angelo, Los Angeles, and Anthony Kornarens, for Real Party in Interest.

Ian Herzog, Santa Monica; Douglas Devries, Sacramento; Leonard Sacks, Granada Hills; Bruce Broillet, Santa Monica; Harvey Levine; Roland Wrinkle, Woodland Hills; Steven Kleifield, Los Angeles; David A. Rosen, Los Angeles; Tony Tanke, Redwood City; Mary E. Alexander, San Francisco; David Casey; Robert Steinberg; William Turley and Associates, William Turley, San Diego and Deborah A. Walker, for Consumer Attorneys of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party In Interest.

GEORGE, C.J.

In Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 248, 954 P.2d 511 (Cedars-Sinai ), we concluded that no tort cause of action will lie against a party to litigation for the intentional destruction or suppression of evidence when the spoliation was or should have been discovered before the conclusion of the litigation. This case presents a related issue not resolved in Cedars-Sinai, namely whether a tort cause of action will lie against a person who is not a party in a lawsuit but who intentionally destroys or suppresses evidence that would be relevant in the lawsuit.

As we shall explain, many of the considerations that led us in Cedars-Sinai to decline to recognize a tort cause of action for spoliation apply with equal weight when the spoliation is committed by a third party. The doubtful benefit of the proposed tort remedy is outweighed by the prospect of a spiral of litigation giving rise to verdicts based upon speculation. In addition, it would be anomalous for a nonparty to be liable in damages, including punitive damages, for conduct that would not give rise to tort liability if committed by a party. We conclude that no tort cause of action will lie for intentional third party spoliation of evidence.

I

The present lawsuit arose out of surgery performed on January 16, 1995, on plaintiff Sandra Ramos at Temple Community Hospital (Hospital) in Los Angeles. Anesthesiologist K. Jackson placed Ramos under general anesthesia, and surgeon Jamshid Nazarian applied an electrocautery tool to Ramos's right eyebrow. In her complaint in the underlying action, plaintiff alleges that the electrocautery tool caused oxygen used in the anesthesia to ignite, causing a fire that severely burned her face. She also alleges that Dr. Nazarian's records indicate that the electrocautery tool "failed" when a flame emerged from it, and that the flame ignited the oxygen.

Ramos alleges that her counsel made various efforts, beginning on January 23, 1995, to ensure the preservation of evidence. Specifically, she alleges that counsel requested that Hospital and the physicians retain the cautery instrument and "any other evidence that is relevant to causing this severe facial injury," and further alleges that counsel requested permission to inspect that evidence and certain documentary evidence. Defendants, it is alleged, refused to permit inspection of the equipment used in the surgery.

In May 1995, Ramos filed a complaint in the Los Angeles County Superior Court, alleging tort causes of action against Hospital, the two physicians, and various manufacturers and distributors of medical equipment, as well as entities responsible for inspection and maintenance of medical equipment. Plaintiff alleged four causes of action against Hospital, which included professional malpractice, intentional and negligent spoliation of evidence, and general negligence. She also named her treating physicians in the first three of these causes of action. The remaining causes of action alleged various product liability, breach of warranty, and negligence claims against a number of other defendants. These claims involved the design and maintenance of medical equipment used in plaintiff's care. In particular, plaintiff alleged a product liability cause of action against Valleylab, Inc., the manufacturer of Plaintiff alleges in the cause of action for intentional spoliation that Hospital knew of the existence of evidence such as the oxygen tank and mask, and the electrocautery tool used in the surgery, as well as related written records, knew that these items might constitute relevant evidence in potential litigation, knew of plaintiff's potential products liability claims, and knew that Hospital was engaging in acts likely to cause the loss or concealment of such evidence. Plaintiff also alleges that Hospital caused the loss or concealment of this potential evidence by failing to provide plaintiff with timely access to this evidence, despite numerous requests by counsel, and that Hospital disposed of the oxygen tank that was the source of the explosion. Plaintiff alleged that this conduct "caused the Plaintiff to sustain damage, namely that Plaintiff's opportunity to discover and then prove her entitlement to compensation for injuries sustained as a result of the Accident was substantially interfered with. Because of this lost opportunity, Plaintiff has been deprived of the opportunity to establish her right in a judicial forum to receive reimbursement from the Defendants for such injuries." Plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive damages in connection with this cause of action.

the electrosurgical device used in plaintiff's surgery. The trial court subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of Valleylab because there was no evidence the electrosurgical device was defective, and because Valleylab had provided adequate warnings regarding the use of the device. ¹

Defendant Hospital moved to strike portions of the complaint as irrelevant, particularly the references to plaintiff's alleged attempts to obtain informal discovery before the filing of the complaint. Defendant Hospital also moved to strike plaintiff's prayer for punitive damages in connection with the cause of action for intentional spoliation, because of plaintiff's failure to comply with the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.13, subdivision (a) (hereafter section 425.13(a)), which provides that in medical malpractice actions, no claim for punitive damages shall be included in a complaint unless the court has determined there is a substantial probability the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.

Plaintiff opposed the motion, contending that her second cause of action for intentional spoliation of evidence was not subject to section 425.13(a), that there was no basis for striking other allegations contained in the complaint, and that her allegations were sufficient to state a claim for punitive damages in connection with the alleged intentional spoliation.

On September 5, 1995, the trial court denied Hospital's motion to strike, concluding the alleged spoliation of evidence did not occur while Hospital was rendering professional medical services to plaintiff, thus rendering section 425.13(a) inapplicable.

On September 21, 1995, Hospital filed a petition for writ of mandate in the Court of Appeal, contending that the trial court had erred in determining that section 425.13(a) did not apply to plaintiff's claim for punitive damages in connection with the cause of action alleging intentional spoliation of evidence. Hospital sought a writ of mandate to compel respondent court to vacate its order denying Hospital's motion to strike and to enter a new order granting the motion. The Court of Appeal summarily denied the petition. Hospital petitioned this court for review of the order denying writ relief, and we granted review, transferring the matter to the Court of Appeal with directions to vacate its order and issue an alternative writ to be heard before that court.

Having issued the alternative writ, the Court of Appeal denied the petition for writ of mandate, concluding that section 425.13(a) does not apply to the intentional spoliation of evidence alleged in the complaint. Thereafter, we granted Hospital's petition for review to decide whether a tort cause of action should lie for intentional spoliation of evidence, and -- in the event such a tort action We observe that plaintiff's spoliation claim is a hybrid. She alleges that Hospital caused the loss of evidence relevant to all her claims -- those against Hospital as well as those, for example, against Valleylab, Inc. To the extent plaintiff's spoliation claim is based upon the allegation that Hospital intentionally destroyed or suppressed evidence relevant to plaintiff's claims against Hospital, her claim is barred by our recent decision in Cedars-Sinai, and despite plaintiff's disagreement with the holding in that recent case, we conclude there is no reason to reconsider it at this time. Assuming the remainder of the claim properly may be characterized as a third party spoliation claim because it involves spoliation of evidence relevant to plaintiff's causes of action against the other defendants, we consider whether...