Temple v. Marlborough Div. of Dist. Court Dept.

• Decision Date: 10 June 1985
• Citation: 479 N.E.2d 137,395 Mass. 117
• Parties: . 2 Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 137

479 N.E.2d 137

395 Mass. 117

Richard W. TEMPLE ¹ v. MARLBOROUGH DIVISION OF the DISTRICT COURT DEPARTMENT et al.²

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

Middlesex.

Argued Feb. 6, 1985.

Decided June 10, 1985.

William T. Harty, West Medway, for plaintiff.

Francis G. Chase, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendants.

Steven J. Schwartz and Robin L. Stolk, Northampton, for Center for Public Representation & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and WILKINS, LYNCH and O'CONNOR, JJ.

LYNCH, Justice.

Richard W. Temple brought suit in August, 1983, in Superior Court claiming that the proceedings leading to his involuntary commitment in 1980 pursuant to court order under G.L. c. 123, § 12(e) (1984 ed.), violated his rights under G.L. c. 123 (1984 ed.), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. He alleges furthermore that certain events occurring at the hospital during his temporary commitment violated his rights under State and Federal law. The plaintiff is suing the District Court judge who signed the order of commitment, the court psychiatrist who examined him, two court clerks, Fuller Memorial Hospital (hospital), the Commissioner of Mental Health (Commissioner), and the Governor of the Commonwealth (Governor). He seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, money damages, attorneys' fees, and costs. A Superior Court judge granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, ³ and the plaintiff appealed to the Appeals Court. We transferred the case to this court on our own motion.

The plaintiff argues on several grounds that he has stated claims against the defendants upon which relief can be granted, so that the judge erred in granting the defendants' motion to dismiss under Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974). First, he contends that the judge, the court psychiatrist, and the two court clerks are not immune from this suit because of the doctrine of judicial immunity. Second, he argues that, even though the Commissioner and the Governor were not in office at the time the cause of action arose, they are nevertheless properly named in their official capacities in this action. He contends that all these defendants, individually and severally, acted under color of Massachusetts law to deprive him of certain rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution and G.L. c. 123. Finally, the plaintiff argues that his release from confinement has not rendered the case moot because of the continuing consequences of the involuntary commitment on his ability to pursue his occupation.

We affirm the judgment in part and reverse it in part. We conclude that the judge properly dismissed all claims against the two court clerks, the Commissioner, and the Governor because the plaintiff failed to allege any action by these defendants which deprived him of rights under State or Federal law. Furthermore, we affirm the judge's dismissal of the claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the United States Constitution against the defendant judge and the court psychiatrist. We reverse the dismissal of the plaintiff's claim that the court psychiatrist acted in violation of his rights under G.L. c. 123. We conclude that the gravamen of the plaintiff's complaint is that the judge and the psychiatrist failed to follow an otherwise proper State commitment procedure under G.L. c. 123, § 12 (1984 ed.). The judge, however, is immune from liability under c. 123 because the alleged acts were committed in a case concededly within his jurisdiction. On remand, the plaintiff may seek relief under G.L. c. 123, § 22 (1984 ed.), against the psychiatrist, and may file a motion pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 60(b), 365 Mass. 828 (1974), for relief from the order of commitment. Since we conclude that redress under G.L. c. 123 provides an adequate postdeprivation remedy for the alleged violation of due process rights, it was appropriate to dismiss the claims under § 1983. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984). ⁴

The plaintiff alleges in his complaint that on the morning of August 13, 1980, he was apprehended by the Marlborough police at his residence in Marlborough pursuant to a warrant of apprehension issued by a District Court judge on August 12, 1980 under G.L. c. 123, § 10(a) (1984 ed.). ⁵ The plaintiff was then transported to the Marlborough District Court where he was taken to the office of the defendant court psychiatrist, who interviewed him for approximately ten minutes. The plaintiff alleges that the psychiatrist denied his requests during the interview for voluntary hospitalization, an independent medical evaluation, representation by an attorney, and a hearing before a judge. After the interview, the plaintiff waited in the corridor for approximately thirty minutes and then was taken by two men to the hospital pursuant to an "Order of Commitment," No. 4-1980, signed by the defendant District Court judge. The plaintiff was detained at the hospital until his release on August 23, 1980.

The plaintiff alleges that while he was at Marlborough District Court the only person with whom he dealt in an official capacity was the court psychiatrist. The plaintiff asserts that in addition to the denial of the requests set forth above, this defendant prepared a psychiatric report which contains errors, inaccuracies, and factual omissions, is based primarily on hearsay, and presents no diagnosis or support of its conclusion. ^{6 6} The plaintiff alleges furthermore that "[a]t no time prior to or during his commitment was Plaintiff provided with notice of such proceedings nor was he advised of a right to legal counsel, nor was he given or allowed benefit of legal counsel, nor did he see a clerk of the Court, nor did he see or appear before any justice of the Court, nor was he given any hearing before the Court, nor was he permitted an independent medical evaluation, nor was he permitted voluntary admission to a hospital."

The plaintiff also alleges that, as a result of the involuntary commitment, he has suffered physical and emotional damage, and the stigma of an involuntary, court-ordered commitment, and is now unable to pass his flight physical which is a prerequisite to continuing to hold a commercial pilot's license. ⁷ In addition, he claims that certain damage was inflicted upon him by the hospital during his detention. Since we decline to consider whether the plaintiff has stated a claim against the hospital, it is unnecessary to set forth the elements of this claim.

1. Claims under Federal law. The plaintiff alleges under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the defendants deprived him of certain rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. He claims that he was denied due process of law in the procedure leading to his involuntary commitment under G.L. c. 123, § 12, and seeks declaratory and injunctive relief and damages. ⁸ The defendants have argued on appeal in support of the dismissal that the judge, the court psychiatrist, and the court clerks are immune from liability in this case because of the doctrine of judicial immunity. We conclude that it is not necessary to consider whether the doctrine of immunity bars any or all of the claims under Federal law against the defendants. We are persuaded that the plaintiff's allegations do not support a claim for relief under § 1983 and the United States Constitution, so we affirm the judge's dismissal of all claims under Federal law.

a. Fourteenth Amendment due process. "[I]n any § 1983 action the initial inquiry must focus on whether the two essential elements to a § 1983 action are present: (1) whether the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) whether this conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." ⁹ Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1913, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981). The plaintiff alleges that the defendants violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. ¹⁰ He apparently claims therefore that the defendants deprived him of his liberty without due process of law. See note 8 supra. We conclude that, even assuming that one or more of the defendants acted under color of State law to deprive the plaintiff of his liberty, see Parratt v. Taylor, supra; Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), the deprivation did not occur "without due process of law" as that term has been interpreted in cases brought under § 1983. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984); Parratt v. Taylor, supra. The manner in which the plaintiff was allegedly committed was not authorized by an established State procedure, because he was not afforded the option of voluntary admission, so that the Commonwealth could not have provided "due process" prior to the deprivation of liberty. Cf. Parratt v. Taylor, supra 451 U.S. at 538-539, 101 S.Ct. at 1914-1915. In this case, the postdeprivation remedy provided by State law is adequate to satisfy the due process clause. Id. at 538-541, 101 S.Ct. at 1914-1916.

In Parratt v. Taylor, supra, the United States Supreme Court first recognized that a claim that State officers acted under color of State law to deprive an individual of his property does not necessarily rise to the level of a claim under § 1983 that the officers deprived the individual of due process of law. "It seems to us that there is an important difference between a challenge to an established state procedure as lacking in due process and a property damage claim arising out of the misconduct of state officers. In the former situation the facts satisfy the most literal reading of the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition against 'State' deprivations of property; in the latter situation, however, even though there is action 'under color of' state law...