Temple v. Raghunathan

• Decision Date: 09 January 2012
• Docket Number: No. A11A0055.,A11A0055.
• Parties: HINDU TEMPLE AND COMMUNITY CENTER OF the HIGH DESERT, INC. et al.v.RAGHUNATHAN et al.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

311 Ga.App. 109

714 S.E.2d 628

11 FCDR 2110

HINDU TEMPLE AND COMMUNITY CENTER OF the HIGH DESERT, INC. et al.

v.RAGHUNATHAN et al.

No. A11A0055.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

June 30, 2011.Reconsideration Dismissed July 22, 2011.Certiorari Dismissed Jan. 9, 2012.

Jesse W. Hill, for appellants.Mark Edward Scott, Decatur, for appellees.DILLARD, Judge.

The trial court dismissed a lawsuit filed by appellants Hindu Temple and Community Center of the High Desert, Inc. (“Hindu Temple”) and Annamalai Annamalai against appellees Sandhya J. Shastri, Senthil Kumar Kandasamy, and Valmikinathan P. Raghunathan, after concluding that both the lawsuit and accompanying verifications violated OCGA § 9–11–11.1, Georgia's anti-SLAPP (“Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation”) statute. ¹ In addition to dismissing the lawsuit, the trial court ordered that appellants pay appellees' attorney fees and expenses pursuant to OCGA §§ 9–11–11.1(b) and 9–15–14(a), (b). Appellants argue that the trial court erred in ruling that the lawsuit was governed by OCGA § 9–11–11.1 and that their verifications were false, and further erred in calculating the amount of attorney fees owed. We disagree and affirm.

The undisputed evidence shows that in 2008, the Gwinnett County Police Department began receiving numerous complaints from individuals throughout the country against the Hindu Temple and Annamalai (the Temple's founder), alleging that they were victims of credit-card fraud. Specifically, the victims claimed that they contacted the Hindu Temple in order to purchase “religious services,” only to later discover that their credit cards had been charged up to ten times more than the agreed-upon amount. There were also reports that Annamalai had been misrepresenting himself to these purchasers of religious services as a medical doctor.

During the ensuing investigation, the investigator assigned to manage the flood of complaints received statements from Shastri and Kandasamy. Specifically, Shastri reported that her grandmother contacted the Hindu Temple to purchase religious services by Annamalai, who claimed to be a doctor or psychologist, and that thereafter multiple unauthorized charges were run on her credit card.² Similarly, Kandasamy reported that he had also been a victim of credit-card fraud at the hands of the appellants, providing the investigator with a recorded conversation between himself and Annamalai, in which Annamalai held himself out to be a medical doctor.³ It is unclear from the record whether Raghunathan also reported to having been victimized by appellants' alleged criminal conduct, but there is evidence that he referred Kandasamy to the investigator via e-mail after Kandasamy reported the alleged fraud to his bank and other governmental authorities.⁴

Sometime thereafter, Hindu Temple and Annamalai filed the instant complaint against Shastri, Kandasamy, and Raghunathan, alleging malicious prosecution, intentional interference with contractual relations, and defamation, and seeking both compensatory and punitive damages. Appellants' claim for malicious prosecution was based not on direct conduct by appellees, but rather on appellees' “support[ ]” of “false statements” made by two other nonparty individuals (one from New Jersey and one from Illinois),⁵ which resulted in Annamalai's arrest in an unrelated case.⁶ Appellants' claim for intentional interference with contractual relations, lodged only against Kandasamy and Raghunathan, alleged that, by reporting unauthorized credit-card transactions, those appellees interfered with appellants' contractual relationships with their followers, from whom they enjoyed “substantial funds.” ⁷ And finally, appellants' defamation claim, also lodged only against Kandasamy and Raghunathan, claimed that those appellees allegedly made “false and malicious comments” to the police about appellants' unauthorized credit-card transactions and/or encouraged others to do so as well, resulting in the cancellation of payments and appellants' “economic loss.” Appellants have filed similar lawsuits in various courts throughout Georgia against other individuals who likewise reported their alleged criminal conduct to law-enforcement officials.

Contemporaneously with the filing of the complaint, Annamalai (on behalf of both himself and the Hindu Temple), as well as appellants' counsel, Jesse W. Hill, filed sworn verifications pursuant to OCGA § 9–11–11.1(b), in which they certified that (1) the claims were “true and correct to the best of [their] knowledge, information and belief formed after reasonable inquiry”; (2) the claims were well grounded in law and fact; (3) the acts forming the bases of the claims were not privileged communications as defined by the statute; and (4) the claims were not interposed for any improper purpose, including to harass or to cause unnecessary delay.

Appellees moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting that the lawsuit violated Georgia's anti-SLAPP statute and that appellants' verifications were false. The trial court held a hearing on the motion pursuant to OCGA § 9–11–11.1(d), during which it heard testimony from the investigator assigned to receive the complaints.⁸ In addition to assimilating reports from individuals throughout the country complaining about having been victimized by appellants, the officer also learned of numerous individuals who had disputed the allegedly fraudulent charges with their credit-card companies directly but had chosen not to file police reports. The investigator testified that he had no reason to question the veracity of appellees or the other alleged victims' statements or motives, nor did he have any evidence remotely suggesting that any of them were conspiring to harm appellants. The trial court also learned that, in direct violation of a discovery stay in the case, appellants' counsel subjected the investigator, unrepresented by counsel, to a seven-hour videotaped deposition prior to the hearing.⁹

Clearly troubled by what it deemed appellants' “almost criminal behavior” of filing complaints against individuals voicing legitimate legal grievances, the trial court dismissed appellants' complaint. And in so doing, the trial court expressly credited the investigator's testimony that appellees' reports to the police were truthful, made in good faith, and were not malicious in nature, nor made pursuant to any type of conspiracy. The trial court also held that the lawsuit fell within the purview of OCGA § 9–11–11.1, and further concluded that appellants' verifications were false. The court based its ruling on a determination that appellants' claims were not well-grounded in fact or warranted by existing law at the time they were filed; that appellants' statements to law enforcement were privileged; and that neither appellants nor their attorney reasonably believed the claims were filed for a proper purpose. ¹⁰ Finally, the trial court ordered appellants and their counsel, jointly and severally, to pay appellees' attorney fees and expenses in the amount of $8,775, pursuant to OCGA §§ 9–11–11.1(b) and 9–15–14(a) and (b), after concluding that the complaint amounted to abusive litigation. This appeal follows.

The General Assembly adopted the anti-SLAPP statute “to encourage participation by the citizens of Georgia in matters of public significance through the exercise of their ... right to petition government for redress of grievances.” ¹¹ The statute's stated purpose is to prevent a “chill [ing]” of that right “through abuse of the judicial process.” ¹² And to discourage such abuse, the anti-SLAPP statute requires that any claim that could reasonably be construed as infringing upon those rights must be accompanied by a detailed verification attesting that the claim

“is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; that the act forming the basis for the claim is not a privileged communication under paragraph (4) of Code Section 51–5–7; and that the claim is not interposed for any improper purpose such as to suppress a person's or entity's right of free speech or right to petition government, or to harass, or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.” ¹³ If a claim falls within the ambit of OCGA § 9–11–11.1 and the trial court makes a “substantive, evidentiary” determination that a verification is false, the statute demands the imposition of sanctions—up to and including dismissal of the complaint and an award of attorney fees. ¹⁴

With these guiding principles in mind, we now turn to appellants' enumerations of errors, which we will address in turn.

1. First, appellants argue that the trial court erred in ruling that their lawsuit constituted a SLAPP suit under OCGA § 9–11–11.1 because it was filed “months” after appellees' reports were given to the police ¹⁵ and, therefore, “cannot reasonably be construed as an effort” to intimidate appellees or suppress their speech. Appellants' argument is specious at best.

Each of appellants' claims are predicated solely and exclusively upon appellees' statements to police or statements made in furtherance of an ongoing investigation regarding appellants' alleged criminal activity. Suffice it to say, such speech is “in furtherance of the right ... to petition government for a redress of grievances” ¹⁶ and thus represents the type of speech that the anti-SLAPP statute is designed to protect.¹⁷ Moreover, it goes without saying that the perceived (and substantially documented) victimization of individuals throughout the country constitutes “an issue of public interest or concern.” ¹⁸ Indeed, it is hard to imagine a more clear example of the type of “abuse of judicial process” that OCGA § 9–11–11.1 aims to deter than the serial filing of civil complaints against individuals lawfully reporting alleged unlawful activity.¹⁹ We therefore have little trouble...