Temple v. State

• Decision Date: 19 December 1978
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 813
• Citation: 366 So.2d 740
• Parties: Herbert TEMPLE v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 740

366 So.2d 740

Herbert TEMPLE v. STATE.

6 Div. 813.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

Dec. 19, 1978.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 16, 1979.

Stephen R. Arnold of Jones, Arnold & Roden, Birmingham, for appellant.

William J. Baxley, Atty. Gen., and James L. O'Kelley, Birmingham, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State, appellee.

BOWEN, Judge.

The appellant was indicted and convicted for the unlawful possession of cocaine in violation of The Alabama Controlled Substances Act. Section 20-2-20, Code of Alabama 1975. Sentence was set at thirty months' imprisonment.

The only question presented on appeal is the legal sufficiency of the State's evidence in proving the appellant's possession of cocaine. The only disputed fact is the appellant's knowledge of the presence of the cocaine. The remaining facts are undisputed.

The appellant resided with his wife and four children at 2001 16th Avenue North, Birmingham, Alabama. On August 12, 1977, several officers of the Birmingham Police Department executed a search warrant at this address. Entry was gained only after four series of knocks and a three or four minute waiting period. Mrs. Temple opened the door. The only occupants in the house were Mrs. Temple and her children. The appellant was at work.

A small amount of cocaine (1.153 grams) was found in a Goody's Headache Powder packet located in the freezer compartment of the refrigerator in the kitchen. Though the search was not limited to the kitchen no other drugs were found. Four days later the appellant was arrested. These facts constitute the entire case of the State. No information concerning the search warrant or the basis for probable cause was introduced or offered.

The appellant testified that he had no knowledge of the presence of the cocaine; that his kitchen had been recently remodeled and that several workmen had access to the refrigerator.

The specific question is whether the presence of a prohibited drug located in the refrigerator in the kitchen of the residence of the accused and his family constitutes evidence of constructive possession by the accused?

Knowledge by the accused of the presence of the controlled substance is an essential element and prerequisite to conviction for the offense of illegal possession of a controlled substance under The Alabama Controlled Substances Act. Walker v. State, 356 So.2d 672 (Ala.1977). Such guilty knowledge may be established by circumstantial evidence. Walker v. State, 356 So.2d 674, 675 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 356 So.2d 677 (Ala.1978). It may be proved by evidence of acts, or conduct of the accused, from which it may be fairly inferred that he knew of the existence of the narcotics at the place where they were found. Walker, 356 So.2d at 676. Where constructive possession is relied on the State must also prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knew of the presence of the prohibited substance. Daniels v. State, 49 Ala.App. 654, 275 So.2d 169 (1973). Proof of constructive possession alone will not justify a conviction. Cook v. State, 341 So.2d 183 (Ala.Cr.App.1976); Coker v. State, 25 Ala.App. 191, 143 So. 206 (1932).

In McHellen v. State, 351 So.2d 689 (Ala.Cr.App.1977), this Court held that the evidence presented a jury question on the issue of the knowledge of the accused of the presence of heroin.

"We think the evidence sufficiently supported an inference for the jury's consideration that appellant knew the controlled substance was in his house:

(a) Appellant was home when the search was made and had lived at such address since 1938.

(b) Even though appellant testified that he rented one bedroom to a young lady, the heroin was found in the kitchen area, a neutral part of the house.

(c) The heroin was found underneath a loose piece of linoleum tile in front of a refrigerator, A place which is not easily unnoticed."

McHellen, 351 So.2d at 692. (Emphasis added)

McHellen does not stand for the proposition that the mere fact that narcotics are found in a "neutral" area of a house jointly occupied by the accused and another person will support an inference that the accused had knowledge of the presence of the controlled substance. McHellen coupled ownership and occupancy with the relatively obvious location of the drugs to supply the inference of knowledge.

When the accused does not have the exclusive possession of the premises where a controlled substance is found, some other corroborating circumstance must exist before he can be convicted of illegal possession. This is clearly demonstrated in the situation where drugs are found in an automobile occupied by several persons. The mere presence of an accused in an automobile containing drugs is not sufficient to establish that the accused had knowledge of their presence. Roberts v. State, 349 So.2d 89, 91 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 349 So.2d 94 (1977); Parks v. State, 46 Ala.App. 722, 724, 248 So.2d 761 (1971); Pryor v. State, 48 Ala.App. 465, 265 So.2d 907 (1972). However knowledge of the presence of drugs may be inferred from the accused's possession, control and ownership of the vehicle. Roberts, supra; Kinard v. State, 335 So.2d 916, 920 (Ala.Cr.App.), reversed on other grounds, 335 So.2d 924 (Ala.1976).

The well established rule in cases involving possession of prohibited liquors is that where illegal beverages are found on the premises of an accused during his absence, and other persons also occupy the premises, then the circumstance of the beverage being found on the premises is not sufficient, without more evidence, to establish scienter to the degree required to support a conviction for illegal possession. Clayton v. State, 22 Ala.App. 276, 114 So. 787 (1927) (Liquor found in the back part of a pressing shop owned by accused and evidence that others had recently been in back of shop was insufficient); Huckabaa v. State, 23 Ala.App. 333, 125 So. 202 (1929) (Fact that whiskey was found in the home of the accused when he was absent, but his wife was present, in a receptacle in the dining table and under one of the leaves will not support a conviction); Duncan v. State, 25 Ala.App. 197, 143 So. 201 (1932) (Evidence that accused came from bathroom where whiskey container had been broken in commode was insufficient); Cunningham v. State, 26 Ala.App. 312, 159 So. 267 (1935) (Evidence disclosed that defendant was very old, sick, and bedridden for two months before raid and did not know of presence of whiskey in an old trunk, while only evidence tending to connect him with whiskey was that those who attended him occasionally gave him from a cup some eggs with whiskey in them, insufficient); Pate v. State, 27 Ala.App. 73, 165 So. 783 (1936) (Whiskey found in the home of accused in a secret and hidden device under a table, which belonged to another who had recently left and had been unable to take his table with him in his car, insufficient); Bivens v. State, 27 Ala.App. 304, 171 So. 755, cert. denied, 233 Ala. 304, 171 So. 756 (1936) (Whiskey found in a sack of peanuts in one of the back rooms of the house when the accused was not home and evidence disclosed that two other men lived in the same house was insufficient); Wilbanks v. State, 28 Ala.App. 456, 185 So. 770 (1939) (The bare fact that the accused was the husband of the woman who owned and occupied the home in which the beer and whiskey were confiscated was insufficient to support conviction); Lance v. State, 28 Ala.App. 571, 190 So. 108 (1939) (Fact that whiskey found under kitchen floor by means of raising a loose plank standing alone was not sufficient to support conviction); Thurman v. State, 29 Ala.App. 394, 196 So. 748 (1940) (Whiskey and some empty beer cans and bottles found in different places, adjacent to defendant's home and premises, while defendant and his wife were absent therefrom was insufficient); Grimes v. State, 38 Ala.App. 94, 97, 76 So.2d 684 (1954) (Whiskey found in a churn under a table in kitchen of house where the accused, his wife, and another lady lived is insufficient to show knowledge by accused. Grimes listed other factual situations as we have done here. The court noted that, "A four gallon churn in a kitchen, a domain A review of these and numerous other cases convinces this Court that the law in Alabama is clear that where a person is in possession, but not exclusive possession of premises, it may not be inferred that he knew of the presence of any controlled substance found there unless there are other circumstances tending to buttress this inference. 56 A.L.R.3d 948, 957 (1974). See also Mulligan v. State, 513 P.2d 180 (Wyo.1973); Feltes v. People, 178 Colo. 409, 498 P.2d 1128 (1972). This holding is simply a corollary of the presumption of innocence and the rule that to convict a person on circumstantial evidence it is necessary that the evidence exclude all rational conclusions except that of the defendant's guilt. Campbell v. State, 28 Ala.App. 240, 182 So. 89 (1938); Copeland v. State, 23 Ala.App. 91, 121 So. 445 (1929). While nonexclusive possession may raise the suspicion that all occupants had knowledge of the contraband found,...