Temples v. Cent. Of Ga. Rt. Co
Decision Date | 16 February 1917 |
Docket Number | (No. 7507.) |
Citation | 19 Ga.App. 307,91 S.E. 502 |
Parties | TEMPLES v. CENTRAL OF GEORGIA RT. CO. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
(Syllabus by the Court.)
Error from City Court of Albany; Clayton Jones, Judge.
Action by W. H. Temples against the Central of Georgia Railway Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.
See, also, 15 Ga. App. 115, 82 S. E. 777.
John Henry Pool, of Albany, for plaintiff in error.
Pottle & Hofmayer, of Albany, for defendant in error.
WADE, C. J. [2-4, 7] The fourth, fifth, sixth, and eighth grounds of the motion for a new trial are expressly abandoned in the brief of counsel for the plaintiff in error. No review of the evidence developed at the trial of this case is necessary, nor is it necessary to amplify any of the rulings in the head-notes, except those in the first, fifth, and sixth headnotes, referring to the seventh, twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth grounds of the motion for a new trial.
The seventh ground of the motion for a new trial assigns error on the following excerpt from the charge of the court:
It is clear that there is no substantial merit in this exception. Under the allegations of the amended petition of the plaintiff and the admissions made in the plea of the defendant, the plaintiff was employed by the defendant in interstate commerce at the time he suffered the alleged injury, and the federal Employers' Liability Act of 190S (Act April 22, 1908, c. 149, 35 Stat. 65 [U. S. Comp. St. 1913, §§ 8657-8665]) therefore governs, to the exclusion of the state statute. Landrum v. Western & A. R. Co., 90 S. E. 710 (1).
"As the action is under the federal Employers' Liability Act, rights and obligations depend upon it and applicable principles of common law as interpreted and applied in federal courts. Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Horton, 233 U. S. 492, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 635, 58 L. Ed. 1062, L R. A. 1915C, 1, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 475, 8 N. C. C. A. 834; Central Vermont R. Co. v. White, 238 U. S. 507, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 865, 59 L. Ed. 1433 [Ann. Cas. 101GB, 252] 9 N. C. C. A. 265; Great Northern R. Co. v. Wiles, 240 U. S. 444, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 406 [60 L. Ed. 7321." Southern Ry. Co. v. Gray, 241 U. S. 334, 36 Sup. Ct. 558, 60 L Ed. 1030.
This being true, no presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant was created by proof of the injury resulting to the plaintiff while so engaged in interstate commerce. Ivey v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 18 Ga. App. 434, 89 S. E. 629. It was held by the United States Supreme Court in Southern Ry. Co. v. Prescott, 240 U. S. 632, 640, 36 Sup. Ct. 469, 473 (60 L. Ed. 836), in passing upon the liability of a carrier under a bill of lading for an interstate shipment, that the question as to responsibility under the bill of lading was a federal question, and that:
This is equally true in a personal injury suit brought under the federal Employers' Liability Act. The charge of the court complained of amounted to no more than a mere statement of the law that the burden of proof rested upon the plaintiff, or that he must prove his case by a preponderance of evidence, and was equivalent to the final instruction, "If you believe by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff should prevail, " etc., given by request of counsel for the plaintiff. As was said by Justice Lumpkin in Hawkins v. Davie, 136 Ga. 550, 552, 71 S. E. S73:
"Where the presiding judge, in an ordinary action at law, correctly charges the jury in regard to the general burden of proof, he is not required, as an essential part of his charge, to discuss the shifting of the burden of introducing evidence on special points which may arise during the progress of the case; and it will not be held error that he omits to do so."
See, also, Martin v. Nichols, 127 Ga. 705, 709, 56 S. E. 995; Brandon v. Pritchett, 133 Ga. 480, 66 S. E. 247 (2); Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Manchester Mfg. Co., 6 Ga. App. 254, 64 S. E. 1128.
There was no request for a charge upon any rule of evidence or upon the shifting of the burden of proof.
The twelfth ground of the motion for a new trial is as follows:
"Because the court erred in appointing Dr. J. C. Keaton [and] Dr. J. M. Barnett to examine the person of plaintiff, to which plaintiff objected at the time of the appointment, upon the ground that said examination caused plaintiff nervous derangement and physical pain and exhaustion; that plaintiff was willing to be examined in the presence of the jury, and expected to be examined that way; that defendant's doctors had already made ample examination of plaintiff—which objections were then and there overruled, and the appointment made, and an examination made, in pursuance thereof."
The thirteenth ground of the motion for a new trial is as follows:
To these two grounds of the motion the trial judge attaches the following note:
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