Templeton v. State
| Decision Date | 09 November 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 45144,45144 |
| Citation | 447 P.2d 158,202 Kan. 89 |
| Parties | In the Interest of Brian TEMPLETON, a Boy Under 18 Years of Age, Appellant, v. STATE of Kansas, Appellee. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. An order of the juvenile court waiving its exclusive original jurisdiction over a child pursuant to K.S.A. 1967 Supp. 38-808(b) is a final order appealable to the district court under the provisions of K.S.A. 38-834(b).
2. When an appeal to the district court is taken from a waiver order entered by the juvenile court pursuant to K.S.A. 1967 Supp. 38-808(b), the district judge must hear the case de novo, subject to the same limitations as to jurisdiction and issues applicable to the juvenile court.
3. The three findings required by K.S.A.1967 Supp. 38-808(b)-(1) the offense alleged is punishable as a felony under the general law; (2) the child was sixteen years of age or older at the time of the alleged commission of the offense; and (3) the child would not be amenable to the care, treatment and training program available through the facilities of the juvenile court-form the jurisdictional basis for the juvenile court's entering a valid order waiving its exclusive original jurisdiction over a child and authorizing his prosecution as an adult under applicable criminal statutes.
4. The provisions of K.S.A.1967 Supp. 38-808(b) provide clear standards and guidelines which satisfy the requirements of due process and equal protection when applied in accordance with Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84.
5. In a waiver proceeding under K.S.A.1967 Supp. 38-808(b) where the child has a prior juvenile record and the court files in the previous proceedings contain information indicative of the success or failure of earlier rehabilitative efforts by the juvenile court, such files are relevant to the issue of whether or not the child would be amenable to the care, treatment and training program available through the facilities of the juvenile court.
6. To provide for a meaningful review of a waiver order entered pursuant to K.S.A.1967 Supp. 38-808(b), the reviewing court must have a record containing the formal journal entry incorporating the three jurisdictional findings required by the statute, and in addition, either a transcript of the waiver hearing disclosing the evidence upon which the court relied in relinquishing its jurisdiction, or, the journal entry itself must contain a summary of such evidence.
7. In a waiver proceeding under K.S.A.1965 (now 1967) Supp. 38-808(b), wherein the district court heard the matter de novo and entered an order waiving juvenile court jurisdiction over a child and authorized his prosecution as an adult, the record is examined, and it is held, that there was substantial evidence before the district court to support the findings required by the statute (38-808(b)) and the proceedings in district court satisfied the requirements set forth in Kent v. United States, supra.
Richard F. Waters, Junction City, argued the cause, and was on the brief for appellant.
Richard A. Medley, County Atty., argued the cause, and Robert C. Londerholm, Atty. Gen., and Richard H. Seaton, Asst. Atty. Gen., were with him on the brief for appellee.
This appeal involves the validity of an order entered by the district court of Geary county pursuant to K.S.A. 1965 (now 1967) Supp. 38-808(b), finding that Brian Templeton was not a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the Kansas juvenile code, and directing the county attorney to prosecute him as an adult under applicable criminal statutes.
The county attorney initiated these proceedings by a petition filed in the juvenile court of Geary county, alleging that on or about March 17, 1967, Templeton, being over the age of sixteen but under the age of eighteen years, committed two separate felonious assaults contrary to K.S.A. 21-431, and requested that he be prosecuted as an adult. A hearing on the petition was held in juvenile court, at which Templeton and his court-appointed guardian ad litem, William F. Stahl, a practicing attorney in Junction City, were present. We are told no transcript of the juvenile court hearing was made, and the only record of what transpired is reflected in the journal entry, which recites that evidence was presented by the state from which the court made findings substantially in the words of the statute (38-808(b)) and directed that further proceedings be had against Templeton as an adult in the criminal case then pending in county court. Templeton's present attorney, Richard F. Waters, was appointed to represent him in the county court proceedings. Mr. Waters then perfected an appeal to the district court from the waiver order entered by the juvenile court.
The appeal was heard de novo by the district court on May 16, 1967. The parties stipulated that Templeton was over sixteen years of age at the time of the alleged offenses. The court, at the state's request, took judicial notice of the court files in three prior juvenile court cases, all dealing with Templeton. The file in the first case disclosed Templeton was found to be a miscreant child (K.S.A. 1965 (now 1967) Supp. 38-802(c)), and the court ordered him placed in the care, custody and control of his father until further order of the court. In the second case Templeton was again found to be a miscreant child, and the court ordered him placed in the temporary custody of the sheriff until further order of the court. Rresumably, the boy was eventually returned to his home. In the third case Templeton was found to be a delinquent child (K.S.A. 1965 (now 1967) Supp. 38-802(b)) and ordered committed to the Boys' Industrial School at Topeka. In the latter case a letter from the Director of Institutions of the State Department of Social Welfare appeared in the court file, stating that Templeton would not be accepted at the industrial school because, 'In view of this boy's age and his past behavior pattern and the overcrowded condition in the Boys' Industrial School, this boy would not benefit from placement in the Industrial School.' Apparently, Templeton was permitted to return to his home. No further evidence was introduced at the hearing before the district court. The transcript discloses the following statement by the district judge at the conclusion of the hearing:
'* * * This court finds specifically that three alternatives were used by the Juvenile Court as to control of this juvenile's activites; that by virtue of all three and by virtue of the non-acceptance, specifically, of the juvenile by the Boys' Industrial School, the Juvenile Court has exercised its discretions as provided for under the Juvenile Code, and that said minor or juvenile is not amenable to the Juvenile Code and its correctional possibilities. * * *'
The court affirmed the judgment of the juvenile court and ordered that further proceedings be had under the criminal statutes. The above findings substantially incorporating Templeton's prior juvenile record and the other findings required by K.S.A. 1965 Supp. 38-808(b) were set forth in a formal journal entry of judgment from which Templeton now appeals.
Preliminarily, we note that appellant in his brief complains of alleged constitutional deficiencies in the proceedings both in juvenile court and in district court. Counsel, however, conceded on oral argument, and rightly so, that appellant's complaints are really confined to the district court proceedings.
The provisions of K.S.A. 38-834(b) permit a child to appeal from any final order made by the juvenile court. Such appeal may be demanded on the part of the child by his parent, guardian, guardian ad litem or custodian, or by any relative of the child within the fourth degree of kinship. An order of the juvenile court relinquishing its exclusive original jurisdiction over a child pursuant to 38-808(b) terminates further proceedings in that court. We hold that such an order is a final order and, therefore, is appealable to the district court.
Once an appeal has been perfected to the district court, the statute (38-834(c)) provides that 'The case shall be heard and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of this act and in the exercise of all the powers and discretion herein given to the juvenile court.' Substantially the same language is found in the earlier appeal statute (R.S.1923, 38-412), and in Hollis v. Brownell, 129 Kan. 818, 284 P. 388, it was held that the district court had no broader jurisdiction than the juvenile court and must try the case de novo, subject to all the limitations as to jurisdiction and issues which apply to the juvenile court. (Also, see, Trent v. Bellamy, 164 Kan. 438, 190 P.2d 400.) Because of the similarity in statutory language, we are of the opinion the legislature contemplated no change in the manner in which the case should be heard in district court. It follows, then, that upon appeal the district judge, in reality sitting as a juvenile judge, must hear the case de novo, subject to the same limitations as to jurisdiction and issues applicable to the juvenile court.
As part of Chapter 278, Laws of 1965, the legislature enacted what is now 38-808(b), which authorizes the juvenile court to waive its exclusive original jurisdiction in any hearing upon a petition alleging a child is, by reason of violation of a criminal statute, a delinquent child, as described in K.S.A. 1965 (now 1967) Supp. 38-802(b)(1), when substantial evidence has been adduced to support findings that (1) the offense alleged is punishable as a felony under the general law; (2) the child was sixteen years of age or older at the time of the alleged commission of the offense; and (3) the child would not be amenable to the care, treatment and training program available through the facilities of the juvenile court. These three findings form the jurisdictional basis for the court's entering a valid waiver order. The...
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