Teninty v. Geren

• Decision Date: 03 March 2011
• Docket Number: Case No. 08–CV–5287.
• Citation: 776 F.Supp.2d 725,42 NDLR P 247
• Parties: Kelly TENINTY, Plaintiff,v.Pete GEREN, Secretary of the Army, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

776 F.Supp.2d 725

42 NDLR P 247

Kelly TENINTY, Plaintiff,

v.Pete GEREN, Secretary of the Army, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 08–CV–5287.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

March 3, 2011.

Adam M. Berger, Perry C. Rocco, Menges & Molzahn, LLC, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.Amanda Ann Berndt, AUSA, United States Attorney's Office, Chicago, IL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ROBERT M. DOW, JR., District Judge.

In February 2007, Defendants Secretary of the Army and United States Department of the Army (collectively referred to as “Defendant” or “the Army”) ¹ hired Plaintiff Kelly Teninty, a white female, for a civilian position as a health technician at the Military Entrance Processing Station (“MEPS”) in Chicago. Eight months later, she was terminated. Plaintiff's four-count amended consolidated complaint alleges employment discrimination based on gender, race, and disability and also alleges that she was subject to a hostile work environment created by African–American staff members. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment [52] on all of Plaintiff's claims. For the following reasons, the Court grants Defendants' motion [52].

I. BackgroundA. Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Statement of Facts

It is the function of the Court to review carefully statements of material facts and to eliminate from consideration any argument, conclusions, and assertions that are unsupported by the documented evidence of record offered in support of the statement. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Henry Smid Plumbing & Heating Co., Inc., 2006 WL 980740, *2 n. 2 (N.D.Ill. Apr. 10, 2006); Tibbetts v. RadioShack Corp., 2004 WL 2203418, at *16 (N.D.Ill. Sept. 29, 2004); Rosado v. Taylor, 324 F.Supp.2d 917, 920 n. 1 (N.D.Ind.2004). “Pleadings that do not conform with the local rules may be stricken at the discretion of the court.” Id. at 640 (citing Bell, Boyd & Lloyd v. Tapy, 896 F.2d 1101, 1103 (7th Cir.1990)); Pfeil v. Rogers, 757 F.2d 850, 858 (7th Cir.1985); Graham v. Security Sav. & Loan, 125 F.R.D. 687, 688–89 (N.D.Ind.1989), aff'd, 914 F.2d 909 (7th Cir.1990). The Court's scrutiny of material statements of facts applies equally to the party seeking summary judgment and the party opposing it.

Plaintiff's LR 56.1 response (“Pl.'s 56.1 Resp.”) admits the majority of facts as set forth by the Army, and therefore those facts are deemed admitted for purposes of the summary judgment motion. See Pl.'s 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 1–6, 8–10, 20–21, 23, 32–33, 41, 46–51, 54–56, 57, 59. For a number of additional allegations, Plaintiff admits that the cited evidence supports the fact, but denies the accuracy of the fact, without citing to any evidentiary materials that would support her qualified denial. See Pl.'s 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 11–19, 22, 24–31, 34–36, 38–40, 42–44, 58, 60–61. Finally, Plaintiff denies certain facts without citing to any evidence to refute such facts. See Pl.'s 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 37, 45. In two additional denials, Plaintiff denies the fact as the Army states it, but cites to the same deposition testimony in support of its denial. See Pl.'s 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 52–53.² Such denials, with no evidentiary support, are not sufficient to defeat summary judgment; rather, a nonmovant must support each denial with specific citations to the record or to supporting materials or affidavits that support their denial. See, e.g., Bordelon v. Chicago Sch. Reform Bd. of Trustees, 233 F.3d 524, 527–29 (7th Cir.2000) (affirming summary judgment when district judge struck plaintiff's entire LR 12 (now LR 56.1) statement); McGuire v. UPS, 152 F.3d 673, 675 (7th Cir.1998) (“An answer that does not deny the allegations in the numbered paragraphs with citations to supporting evidence in the record constitutes an admission.”) (internal citations omitted); Malec v. Sanford, 191 F.R.D. 581, 584 (N.D.Ill.2000) (“[A] general denial is insufficient to rebut a movant's factual allegations; the nonmovant must cite specific evidentiary materials justifying the denial.”).

In sum, any statements or responses by either party that contain legal conclusions or argument, are evasive, contain hearsay or are not based on personal knowledge, are irrelevant, or are not supported by evidence in the record will not be considered by the Court in ruling on Defendant's motion for summary judgment. Any paragraph or fact that is not supported by record evidence will be disregarded. Indeed, the Court has not relied on any evidence as to which the admissibility is disputed in its disposition of Defendant's motion for summary judgment.

B. Facts

Plaintiff Kelly Teninty, a white female, worked at MEPS, the Army's processing facility for recruits, as a health technician for approximately eight months in 2007.³ On February 5, 2007, Plaintiff was hired by Defendants to work as a health technician at the Chicago Military Entrance Processing Station (“MEPS”) located at 1700 South Wolf Road, Des Plaines, Illinois. The health technician position is rated as a GS–4 position and requires that a candidate perform approximately 20 formal job duties, including the performance of medical and drug testing of applicants for armed forces enlistment, and the performance of health and medical physicals for officer candidates, as well as active and reserve forces personnel. One of the functions of MEPS health technicians is the drawing of Army applicants' blood.⁴ At the time that she was hired by the Army, Teninty did not possess a bachelor or associate degree, but had obtained certification in phlebotomy (the drawing of blood from a vein) from Moraine Valley Community College, and had worked for approximately two years as a phlebotomist. As previously noted, she also had been awarded the Expert Field Medical Badge during her three years of prior military service. The Army hired Teninty at the standard rate of pay for health technicians, which was GS–4, step 1.

Between 2000 and 2008, the Army hired about thirteen GS–4 health technicians, including Teninty: eight males and five females. Of the eight males, three were appointed at pay rates higher than the minimum rate set for the position (GS–4, step 1) after the Army determined that they possessed superior qualifications for the position. Ricky Kirkland was hired at GS–4, step 9. Prior to being hired into the health technician position with the Chicago MEPS, Kirkland had been stationed at the Chicago MEPS as a medic with the Navy. Kirkland retired from the Navy with 20 years of medical experience, including experience as a supervisor at five military medical clinics in the U.S. and Japan. Steven Kulik was hired at a GS–4, step 5. At the time Kulik was hired, he had a bachelor's and an associate's degree. Kulik also had nine years experience performing physical examinations and was a certified EMT. Michael Gamez was hired at a GS–4, step 4. At the time Gamez was hired, he had been a certified EMT for seven years, had served as an army combat medic for four years, and had worked with patients in private clinics and hospitals for over four years.

Another male health technician, Christopher Parks, transferred from a similar federal position with the VA and was appointed to the MEPS position at his current federal rate of pay (GS–4, step 3). With the VA, Parks had been earning a GS–4, step 3 salary. Parks had more than fifteen years of phlebotomy training from his years as an Army combat medical specialist, four years working in a VA hospital as a healthcare technician, and several years working as an EMT with civilian emergency medical services. The four other males hired between 2000 and 2008 were hired as GS–4, Step 1.

After Plaintiff began working at the Chicago facility in February 2007, she was counseled by her supervisors on several occasions. In March 2007, Lieutenant Korljan, a white MEPS operations officer and at the time her interim supervisor, told Plaintiff to resolve any questions or concerns through her section lead and that his door was open as well. In May 2007, Korljan counseled Plaintiff again. The counseling record reflects that Korljan had concerns about how Plaintiff was adjusting to the section and “at times demonstrated a very aggressive and stand offish attitude to both the section leads and [her] co-workers.” Korljan wrote that Plaintiff seemed “content not being part of the team.” He also observed that she was often very angry with co-workers and did not receive instructions well.

Two weeks after Plaintiff's May 2007 performance counseling, Korljan counseled Plaintiff again, along with two other employees, regarding an incident between the three employees that Korljan observed. At the time, he spoke with each individually and informed them that they were expected to work out any differences in a professional manner. Also during Plaintiff's employment, Alphonso Jones, one of the medical section's lead health technicians, spoke to Korljan about Plaintiff, expressing his opinion that she was unteachable, rude, and would not listen.

In June 2007, Mary Walker, an African–American female, began working at Chicago MEPS as the supervisor for the medical staff and thus Plaintiff's immediate supervisor. Walker testified that she was not aware that Plaintiff had been diagnosed with an anxiety disorder. Walker testified that she observed Plaintiff on a number of occasions being rude to other staff members, shouting and yelling at co-workers, and getting into disputes with the Chicago MEPS chief medical officer. Walker also observed that Plaintiff had difficulty working as a team member and tried to give Plaintiff tasks that would allow her to work alone, away from other staff. On August 24, 2007, Walker issued Plaintiff a written counseling form, in which Walker requested that Plaintiff not concern herself with other employees, that she keep her focus, and that she request a break from either the lead technician or the supervisor if she felt upset or anxious.

On September 8, 2007, Korljan again counseled Pla...