Tennant v. Smith
| Decision Date | 17 December 1915 |
| Docket Number | 30185 |
| Parties | MATILDA TENNANT et al., Appellants, v. L. H. SMITH, Administrator, et al., Appellees |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Keokuk District Court.--HENRY SILWOLD, Judge.
ACTION for the construction of a will and for an order on the administrator to distribute in accordance with plaintiffs' claims. The facts appear more fully in the opinion. The trial court held that the four defendants, other than the administrator, were each entitled to one eighth of the estate, or, together, one half, as children of the husband of Mary Duncan, deceased. The plaintiffs appeal.
Reversed.
Eicher & Livingston, for appellants.
Hamilton & Beatty and D. W. Hamilton, for defendants and appellees. Tally & Hamilton, for the administrator.
The part of the will of Mary Duncan, deceased, in litigation is as follows:
"First,--I give and bequeath to my husband, Jonathan Duncan, such share of my estate as he is entitled to have and receive under the laws of the state of Iowa."
This will was executed in 1908. It is admitted that Jonathan Duncan died in 1909, and Mary Duncan died in 1910, and her will has been duly admitted to probate. It is admitted in the answer, or by way of concession on the trial, that Jonathan Duncan, named in Paragraph One of the will was the husband of said Mary Duncan; that Elizabeth Tennant, named as one of the residuary legatees in Paragraph Three of said will, died before the death of said Mary Duncan, intestate and unmarried, and left as her sole and only heirs at law the plaintiffs herein; that Mary Duncan was married to Jonathan Duncan in 1876, and that she had never been married before; that she had no children and had none at the time of her death; that Jonathan had been married before, and had four children; that Matilda Tennant and Christena Tennant are sisters of Mary Duncan; that defendants William A. Duncan, Ida M. Bennett, Mattie M. Greenwood and Charles L. Duncan are the children and only children and heirs at law of Jonathan Duncan, deceased. Defendants deny that plaintiffs are entitled to distribution in the proportions claimed, and they allege that, under the will of Mary Duncan, she devised one half of her estate to her husband, Jonathan Duncan; and that the four defendants, being the children and only heirs of Jonathan, are each entitled to the undivided one eighth of said estate. Plaintiffs ask that the will be construed to give plaintiffs the whole of the estate, and that said defendants, heirs of Jonathan, take nothing.
By the decree, the trial court gave to the four defendants named one half of the estate, and the question is whether the defendants are entitled to anything, under the clause of the will quoted. Appellees cite authority that, where two constructions may be given to the language of a will, the one sustaining the will is to be preferred. And they contend that, because of the provisions of Code Section 3281, one half of the property of Mary Duncan passed to the children of Jonathan, who took as heirs of said Jonathan, devisee under the will. That section of the Code reads:
"If a devisee die before the testator, his heirs shall inherit the property devised to him, unless from the terms of the will a contrary intent is manifest."
Defendants cite, also, In re Hulett's Estate, 121 Iowa 423 96 N.W. 952, which states the purpose of the enactment of said section, and construes the wills in that case. It is conceded by counsel on both sides that they are unable to find a case in point. Appellees contend that there is nothing in the will indicating that deceased did not intend that the defendants should take the property devised to her husband, and they say that it would not be a proper construction to say that deceased intended her husband to have the share the law would give him only in case he should survive her; because, in that event, she did not need to will him anything. Perhaps we should have stated earlier in the opinion, in stating the facts, that Paragraphs Two and Three of the will give all the rest of her estate, both real and personal, to her three sisters named therein. One of said sisters died, leaving a number of heirs, who are also plaintiffs herein. It is contended by appellants that the will speaks from the date of death, citing authority, and that Section 3281 of the statute changes...
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