Tennant v. The Cnty. of Georgetown
| Decision Date | 02 November 2006 |
| Docket Number | 2006-UP-374 |
| Parties | James M. Tennant and Charles R. Richards, Appellants, v. The County of Georgetown; Edsel Hemingway, Ronald Charlton, David Hood, Johnny Morant, Helen Rudolph, Thomas Earl Drayton, and Jerry Oakley, in their official capacities; Thomas W. Edwards, Jr., in his individual capacity; James M. Mock, Jr., in his individual capacity; Jack M. Scoville, Jr., in his individual capacity; the Public Service Commission of South Carolina; and the South Carolina Budget and Control Board, Respondents. |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Submitted October 1, 2006
Appeal from Georgetown County James E. Lockemy, Circuit Court Judge
Charles R. Richards, of Murrells Inlet; and James M. Tennant of Georgetown; both pro se Appellants.
Jack M. Scoville, Jr. and William Stuart Duncan, of Georgetown and Edwin E. Evans, David K. Avant, and Paul M. Koch, of Columbia; for Respondents.
Charles R. Richards and James M. Tennant (collectively Appellants) appeal the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to the County of Georgetown (County) and the South Carolina Budget and Control Board in Appellants' suit seeking a declaratory judgment setting aside County's 911 Ordinance. [1] In addition, Appellants appeal the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to Jack M Scoville, Jr. for abuse of process, and Scoville, Thomas W. Edwards, Jr., and James M. Mock, Jr. for intentional infliction of emotional distress. We affirm.
On September 18, 2001, County enacted an ordinance (the Ordinance) authorizing the collection of a $1.00 per month fee (Fee) on each telephone line within its jurisdiction to fund improvements to its Emergency 911 System. The Ordinance does not specifically direct how the Fee will be spent. To authorize expenditures from money raised with the Fee, County created a proposed Enhanced 911 System Plan” (the Plan). On November 16, 2002, the County submitted the Plan, which showed a revenue surplus, to the Office of Information Resource of the State Budget and Control Board (the Board) for approval.
Before the Board approved the Plan, Appellants filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment of the illegality of the Fee, arguing it would be used to fund a radio communications system allegedly unauthorized by statute. While the record shows the County considered funding this system using the Fee, the Plan submitted to the Board contained no such provision. Scoville, the County's attorney, moved for sanctions, alleging the frivolity of the suit. Appellants filed a cross-motion for sanctions against Scoville. The circuit court did not grant either motion.
The County moved to dismiss the action. The circuit court held a hearing and dismissed Appellants' case without prejudice, basing its decision on the fact the Board had not considered or approved the Plan, and therefore, the controversy lacked ripeness.
In the ensuing months, the County and the Board engaged in a healthy dialogue regarding the Plan. Specifically, the County indicated it would seek approval for future expenditures not included in the Plan and would lower the Fee if a revenue surplus occurred. Appellants also contacted the Board with respect to the Plan. On July 12, 2002, the Board approved the Plan.
On September 24, 2002, the County held a meeting at which it approved the expenditure of Fee revenues on the contemplated radio communications system. The parties do not dispute that this radio system would be used to contact emergency response personnel after the County received a 911 call. Mock, the Director of Emergency Services for the County, requested the Board's approval for this expenditure. The Board approved the proposal.
In response, Appellants filed an amended complaint seeking to set aside the Fee and the Plan because the County's expenditure of funds on a radio system allegedly violated statutory authority. [2] Appellants named Mock and Edwards, County's Administrator, as parties for their role in obtaining the Board's approval. Appellants argued Mock and Edwards falsified the original, unedited Plan by failing to include the proposal to use part of the funds to pay for the radio system. In addition, Appellants sought a declaratory judgment that the County acted outside their statutory authority in authorizing the expenditure of the Fee on the radio system, the Board illegally approved of this expenditure, and the Public Service Commission (PSC) failed to regulate this expenditure. [3]
Moreover, Appellants alleged County violated the prior circuit court order by collecting the Fee before seeking Board approval for the radio system. Furthermore, Appellants sought damages for abuse of process against Scoville and for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Scoville, Mock, and Edwards. The Board answered and moved to dismiss the amended complaint. Subsequently, the County, Scoville, Edwards, and Mock also answered. Scoville and Edwards also filed counterclaims for libel, slander, and civil conspiracy.
On January 21, 2004, the circuit court converted the Board's motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. Appellants moved to amend their complaint a second time, to dismiss Scoville's and Edwards' counterclaims, and to request a discovery conference. The County, Scoville, Edwards, and Mock later moved for summary judgment.
The circuit court held a hearing and granted summary judgment against Appellants on all of their causes of action. In addition, the circuit court dismissed Scoville's and Mock's counterclaims. Appellants, Scoville, and Mock filed motions to reconsider. The circuit court held a hearing on these motions. After the hearing but before the circuit court issued a decision, Appellants filed a motion to stay the case and for recusal of the judge. The circuit court denied all of Appellants' motions but reversed its order dismissing Scoville's and Mock's counterclaims. This appeal followed.
An appellate court reviews the grant of summary judgment under the same standard applied by the circuit court. David v. McLeod Reg'l Med. Ctr., 367 S.C. 242, 247, 626 S.E.2d 1, 3 (2006). The circuit court should grant summary judgment if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(c), SCRCP; Byrd v. City of Hartsville, 365 S.C. 650, 656, 620 S.E.2d 76, 79 (2005). In determining whether any triable issues of fact exist, the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Law v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 368 S.C. 424, 434, 629 S.E.2d 642, 648 (2006).
Appellants argue the circuit court erred in holding the Public Safety Communications Center Act, sections 23-47-10 to -80 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2005) (the Act), allows the County to enact the Fee and use revenues on the radio system. We disagree.
This court may determine the issue of legislative intent as a matter of law. Charleston County Parks & Recreation Comm'n v. Somers, 319 S.C. 65, 67, 459 S.E.2d 841 843 (1995). When the language of a statute is plain unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are unnecessary and the court may not impose another meaning.” S.C. Uninsured Employer's Fund v. House, 360 S.C. 468, 472, 602 S.E.2d 81, 83 (Ct. App. 2004).
A local government, including a county, seeking to impose a fee for its emergency telephone system, or 911 system, ” must submit a 911 system plan” to the Board for approval. S.C. Code Ann. § 23-47-30(A) (Supp. 2005); see also S.C. Code Ann. § 23-47-10 (Supp. 2005) (). A 911 system must include equipment to connect the PSAP [the facility receiving 911 calls] to all law enforcement, fire protection, and emergency medical or rescue agencies, or both....” S.C. Code Ann. § 23-47-20(C)(2) ( Act No. 317, 2006 S.C. Acts 317, effective May 30, 2006).
To help fund its 911 system, a local government may adopt an ordinance imposing a monthly fee on telephone lines within the locality. S.C. Code Ann. § 23-47-40(A) (Supp. 2005). This fee may be used only to pay for certain enumerated items, including items necessary to meet the standards outlined... specifically in Section 23-47-20(C)....” § 23-47-40(B).
In this case, the County adopted an ordinance pursuant to section 23-47-40(A) to establish the Fee. The County then submitted the Plan to the Board to comply with section 23-47-30(A). After the Board approved the Plan, the County sought to spend revenue from the Fee on the radio system to allow its PSAP to directly contact and dispatch local emergency responders. Appellants specifically contend the County cannot spend the Fee on the radio system because (1) the Act only allows this type of revenue to be spent on telephone communications; (2) the radio system might be used for other types of communication apart from contacting emergency response personnel; and (3) the PSC must approve of all equipment upon which the County spends this type of revenue.
Section 23-47-20(C)(2) does not limit the type of equipment required to connect the PSAP to emergency responders. Accordingly, we refuse to read a limitation requiring only telephone equipment be used. We also find no limitation in the Act requiring the equipment used in section 23-47-20(C)(2) be used only to connect the PSAP to emergency personnel. [4] Furthermore, the Act does not require the PSC to...
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