Tenon v. Dreibelbis, CIVIL NO. 1:12-CV-1278

Decision Date07 June 2016
Docket NumberCIVIL NO. 1:12-CV-1278
Parties Anthony L. Tenon, Plaintiff v. William Dreibelbis, et al., Defendants
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

Angus R. Love, PA Institutional Law Project, Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiff.

John J. Hatzell, Jr., Philadelphia, PA, Jeffrey J. Wetzel, Dickie, McCamey, & Chilcote, P.C., Pittsburgh, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

William W. Caldwell, United States District Judge

I. Introduction

We are considering a motion to dismiss. (Doc. 93). This case relates to a civil rights action in which Plaintiff, Anthony Tenon, alleges that Defendants subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. 90). On December 17, 2012, based on a report and recommendation of then-Magistrate Judge Blewitt, we dismissed Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Dr. Ramesh Agarwal. (Doc. 20; Doc. 23). Plaintiff appealed and the Third Circuit vacated our dismissal. Tenon v. Dreibelbis, 606 Fed.Appx. 681, 688 (3d Cir.2015). On remand, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. (Doc. 89; Doc. 90). Defendant Agarwal, making several arguments, seeks to dismiss portions of the amended complaint. (Doc. 93). For the reasons discussed below, we will deny the motion.

II. Background1

Plaintiff is an inmate within the Pennsylvania correctional system. (Doc. 90 at 2). On July 16, 2010, while housed at the State Correctional Institute at Smithfield, Plaintiff suffered a diabetic seizure, causing him to fall and hit his head on the toilet in his cell. (Id.). On July 19, 2010, X-rays were taken of Plaintiff's head and he was examined by Physician's Assistant Josh Mahute. (Id. at 3). Mahute informed Plaintiff that his left jaw was fractured

and that it would need to be surgically repaired by a specialist. (Id.). In the interim, Mahute prescribed pain medication and a soft diet. (Id.). Plaintiff was given enough pain medication to last a week, but the prescription was not refilled once it was exhausted. (Id.). He never received the soft diet. (Id.).

The week of July 30, 2010, Plaintiff submitted a sick-call slip requesting pain medication. (Id.). He was examined by Defendant Agarwal, who again advised Plaintiff that his left jaw was broken

and that he would be referred to a different doctor for surgery. (Id.). Between August 5, 2010 and August 19, 2010, Plaintiff submitted three additional sick-call slips. (Id. at 3–4). Each requested pain medication and inquired about the delay in obtaining the required surgery. (Id.). All went unanswered. (Id.). Plaintiff was transferred to the State Correctional Institute at Pittsburgh on August 26, 2010. (Id.). On September 17, 2010, two months after he was injured, Plaintiff was examined at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center by a maxillofacial specialist. (Id.). The specialist determined that Plaintiff suffered two fractures to his left jaw and one fracture to his right jaw. (Id. at 5). He repaired the left fractures, but was unable to surgically repair the right fracture because it had begun to fuse on its own. (Id.).

On July 3, 2012, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). He filed an amended complaint on August 13, 2012. (Doc. 10). The amended complaint alleged that Dr. Agarwal, among others,

had personal knowledge and direct responsibility to the treatment of the plaintiff's broken jaw

, his chronic care diabetic condition, the lack of liquid diet, and numerous sick call requests pleading for treatment of his broken jaw, and treatment for his pain and suffering, yet ... repeatedly and consciously denied and ignored treatment of plaintiff's serious medical injury.

(Doc. 10 at 8-9). Accordingly, Plaintiff claimed that Defendant Agarwal, "in denying the plaintiff's requests for medical treatment of severe pain[ ] and knowingly failing to provide a liquid diet," was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, a violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. 10 at 9-10).

Following an initial screening under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, we dismissed Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Agarwal, finding that Plaintiff failed to allege enough facts to support the deliberate indifference standard. (Doc. 23; Doc. 20 at 15). Plaintiff appealed the dismissal. (Doc. 76). The Third Circuit held that in the face of Defendant Agarwal's knowledge that Plaintiff required surgery "and the knowledge that it had been nearly two weeks since the injury, yet the prescribed soft diet had not been provided, [Plaintiff's] allegations that Agarwal failed to respond to his claims for stronger pain medication for his ‘excruciating pain’ are sufficiently serious to support an Eighth Amendment claim." Tenon, 606 Fed.Appx. at 686. Accordingly, the Third Circuit "vacate[d] the dismissal of the claims against Dr. Agarwal." Id. at 688.

On remand, we issued an order on September 30, 2015 directing the United States Marshal to serve Defendant Agarwal with the amended complaint. (Doc. 82). In January 2016, Plaintiff, represented by counsel for the first time, filed a motion seeking leave to file a second amended complaint. (Doc. 88). We granted the motion. (Doc. 89). In the second amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that "Defendant Agarwal's failure to provide necessary oral surgery in a timely manner, his failure to provide a soft diet, and his failure to provide pain medication exhibits a deliberate indifference to a serious medical need," in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. 90 at 5). As in the first amended complaint, the relief Plaintiff seeks includes compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and declaratory relief. (Doc. 10 at 11; Doc. 90 at 6).

On March 15, 2016, Defendant Agarwal filed a motion to dismiss portions of the second amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. 93). First, he argues that Plaintiff's allegation that he failed to provide necessary oral surgery in a timely manner is a new, and therefore time-barred, claim. (Doc. 94 at 3-6). Second, he argues that we should dismiss Plaintiff's claim that he failed to provide Plaintiff with a soft diet because the Third Circuit did not permit such a claim to proceed. (Doc. 94 at 6-8). Last, he argues that Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages should be dismissed because the second amended complaint lacks allegations that, if true, would warrant punitive damages. (Doc. 94 at 8).

III. Discussion
A. Standard of Review

Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes the dismissal of a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Under Rule 12(b)(6), we must "accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.2009) (quoting Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir.2008) ). While a complaint need only contain "a short and plain statement of the claim," FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2), and detailed factual allegations are not required, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), a complaint must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. "The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). "[L]abels and conclusions" are not enough, and a court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

B. Failure to Provide Necessary Surgery

Defendant Agarwal first argues that Plaintiff is time-barred from claiming that he failed to provide necessary surgery. (Doc. 94 at 3-6). He posits that it is a new claim—asserting that neither the original complaint nor the first amended complaint alleged that he failed to provide necessary surgery in a timely manner. (Id.). Although he recognizes that Plaintiff may, with leave of court, file an amended complaint to add new claims, Defendant argues that in order for any new claim to be timely it must either be within the two-year statute of limitations or it must relate back to the original pleading. (Id.). Defendant argues that neither condition is satisfied with respect to this claim. He asserts that it is not within the statute of limitations because Plaintiff's injuries occurred over five years ago, and it does not relate back because he was not given the requisite fair notice. (Id.). Plaintiff, conversely, points to language in both prior complaints and asserts that it is not a new claim. See(Doc. 1 at 8) ("The (5) five week denial of medical treatment of the Plaintiff's fractured jaw

, by ... Medical Doctor Agarwal, violated the Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment Rights ...."); (Doc. 10 at 10) (stating that Dr. Agarwal denied medical treatment). Moreover, he argues that the claim relates back. (Doc. 95 at 9-10).

While we agree that it is a new claim against Defendant Agarwal,2 we find that it does relate back to the first amended complaint. Pursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "[a]n amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading when ... the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted to be set out—in the original pleading." FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(B). As interpreted by the Supreme Court, this requires "the existence of a common ‘core of operative facts' uniting the original and newly asserted claims." Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 659, 125 S.Ct. 2562, 162 L.Ed.2d 582 (2005). A common core of operative facts exists if "the opposing party has had fair notice of the general fact situation...

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