Teran, In re

• Decision Date: 20 December 1966
• Docket Number: Cr. 10065
• Citation: 421 P.2d 107,65 Cal.2d 523,55 Cal.Rptr. 259
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 421 P.2d 107 In re Ignacio V. TERAN, on Habeas Corpus. In Bank

Page 259

55 Cal.Rptr. 259

65 Cal.2d 523, 421 P.2d 107

In re Ignacio V. TERAN, on Habeas Corpus.

Cr. 10065.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

Dec. 20, 1966.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 18, 1967.

Ignacio V. Teran, in pro. per., and Molly H. Minudri, San Francisco, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for petitioner.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., Albert W. Harris, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Edward P. O'Brien and Charles W. Rumph, Deputy Attys. Gen., for respondent.

BURKE, Justice.

Ignacio V. Teran, represented by retained counsel, pleaded guilty to possession of heroin (Health & Saf.Code, § 11500). In October 1963 he again appeared with counsel, and the court entered a judgment of conviction, found a prior conviction of violating the same section true, and sentenced him to prison. He filed an appeal, but it was dismissed for failure to file an opening brief (rule 17, subd. (a), of Cal.Rules of Court). In 1964 he was again convicted of violating the same section and was sentenced to prison.

In May 1966, while confined at San Quentin, he filed the instant habeas corpus petition complaining solely of matters relating to the 1963 conviction. He contends that the trial court failed to determine whether he was a proper subject for the narcotics rehabilitation program (see former § 6451, Pen.Code), ¹ that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and that he did not have the effective assistance of counsel in the trial court. According to Teran, these contentions were made in habeas corpus petitions which were filed in or after April 1966 in the Marin County Superior Cort and the District Court of Appeal and which were denied. He fails to explain the delay of about two years in presenting the contentions. (See In re Swain, 34 Cal.2d 300, 302, 209 P.2d 793.) We issued an order to show cause and appointed counsel to represent him.

The claim that the trial court failed to determine whether he was a proper subject for the narcotics rehabilitation program could have been raised on appeal from the judgment of conviction. (Cf. People v. Wallace, 59 Cal.2d 548, 551 et seq., 30 Cal.Rptr. 449, 381 P.2d 185; see In re Nunez, 62 Cal.2d 234, 235, 42 Cal.Rptr. 6, 397 P.2d 998.) Whether or not the claim can now be made, it does not warrant relief.

Teran was on parole at the time of the offense charged. The Adult Authority suspended his parole and ordered his return to prison on August 1, 1962, and canceled his parole on January 24, 1963. On September 26, 1963, Teran pleaded guilty to the offense, and the court stated at that time that it had read the probation report, was satisfied Teran was an addict, and 'will * * * recommend at this time that the Adult Authority * * * not violate him on this matter * * * and permit him the opportunity to get treatment at the Rehabilitation Center.' ² Further proceedings in the criminal action were suspended, and the case was transferred to department 95 of the superior court for proceedings under former section 6451 to determine whether Teran was addicted to narcotics or in imminent danger thereof. The sheriff, as ordered by the court, filed in department 95 a petition pursuant to former section 6451.

In department 95 the court told Teran that under the regulations of the Department of Corrections he was ineligible for treatment at the rehabilitation center because he was 'on state parole' and that the court therefore 'cannot commit (him) to the Rehabilitation Center.' ³ Doctors who had been appointed to examine Teran had not done so when the court made the foregoing remarks. The court asked Teran if he used narcotics, and Teran admitted doing so. The court then terminated the proceedings under former section 6451 and remanded Teran to the department in which the criminal action had been suspended.

On October 28, 1963, Teran appeared in the department to which he had been remanded. His counsel requested that he be sent to Atascadero for treatment. The court denied the request, stating that the Adult Authority 'are adamant. They have violated the defendant on his parole, and they are entitled to him.' He was sentenced to prison and immediately appealed from the judgment.

In February 1964 the Adult Authority reaffirmed its prior action canceling Teran's parole, and in March 1964 the Adult Authority revoked his parole. Subsequently, in April 1964, his appeal was dismissed.

Former section 6451, as it read at the time in question, provided: 'Upon conviction of a defendant for any crime in any superior court, if it appears to the judge that the defendant may be addicted or by reason of repeated use of narcotics may be in imminent danger of becoming addicted to narcotics he shall adjourn the proceedings or suspend the imposition of the sentence and conduct proceedings to ascertain if such person is addicted to narcotics or in imminent danger thereof unless in the opinion of the judge the defendant's record and probation report indicates such a pattern of criminality that he does not constitute a fit subject for commitment under this section. If a petition is ordered filed, proceedings shall be conducted in substantial compliance with Sections 5353, 5053, 5054, and 5055 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. ⁴ If, after a hearing and examination, the judge shall find that the person charged is a narcotic addict, or by reason of repeated use of narcotics is in imminent danger of becoming addicted to narcotics, he shall make an order committing such person to the custody of the Director of Corrections for confinement in the facility * * *.'

In the instant case the trial court terminated the proceedings under former section 6451 before Teran was medically examined with respect to the matter of addiction, but Teran is not entitled to relief because the Adult Authority had previously canceled his parole and ordered his return to prison. The power of the Adult Authority to suspend, cancel or revoke a parole is not limited by the statutory provisions governing commitment of persons addicted to the use of narcotics or who by reason of repeated use are in imminent danger of becoming addicted. (People v. Rummel, supra, 64 Cal.2d 515, 517--518, 50 Cal.Rptr. 785, 413 P.2d 673; In re Swearingen, 64 Cal.2d 519, 522, 50 Cal.Rptr. 787, 413 P.2d 675.)

Teran argues that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea since the plea was induced by promises that he would be committed to a hospital. This argument could have been made on appeal from the judgment of conviction. (People v. Caruso, 174 Cal.App.2d 624, 630, 345 P.2d 282; see Witkin, Cal.Criminal Procedure (1963), p. 239.) Whether or not the contention can now be made, it lacks merit.

In March 1963, Teran, who was represented by counsel, pleaded guilty, and the matter was transferred to another department for proceedings to determine if he was addicted to narcotics or in imminent danger thereof. According to Teran, on this occasion 'the Parole Department' prevented his appearance in the department to which the matter was transferred. The record shows that in April 1963 Teran made a motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that he pleaded guilty because Judge Munnell in a conversation with defendant had promised him that the judge 'was going to send (Teran) to the hospital.' In May 1963 the trial judge in a criminal court department, after talking to Judge Munnell, permitted Teran to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court told Teran that Judge Munnell said that he understood how Teran might have been given 'that impression' but that he, Judge Munnell, 'certainly did not tell him that would be the eventual disposition of the case.' In June 1963 Teran pleaded not guilty.

On September 26, 1963, Teran, appearing with counsel, stated that he wanted to withdraw his not guilty plea in order to plead guilty. He was asked whether he was doing so freely and voluntarily after talking to his attorney, and he replied, 'Yes.' He then entered a plea of guilty. On October 28, 1963, he again appeared with counsel. During proceedings on that date the trial court asked if there was any cause why judgment should not be pronounced, and Teran said, 'I didn't want to plead guilty that day. Mr. Caruso (one of his attorneys) told me I was going to go to the hospital, you know. I didn't get to go to the hospital.' Mr. Caruso then stated that he had made 'a full and complete disclosure of all the facts' to Teran and 'explained fully--.' The trial court interrupted him stating, 'I am...