Teran v. Reg'l Transp. Dist.
| Decision Date | 29 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals No. 19CA1162 |
| Citation | 477 P.3d 799 |
| Parties | Maria TERAN, Plaintiff-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Appellee. |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
Muhaisen and Muhaisen, LLC, Mark J. Malone, Wadi Muhaisen, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee and Cross-Appellant
James Stadler, Marisela D. Sandoval, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Appellee
Opinion by JUDGE TOW
¶ 1 Defendant, Regional Transportation District (RTD), appeals the trial court's judgment entered for plaintiff, Maria Teran, on a jury verdict finding RTD negligent. RTD also appeals the trial court's order denying its post-trial motions for relief from the judgment, in which it claimed RTD was entitled to immunity under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA), §§ 24-10-101 to - 120, C.R.S. 2019.
¶ 2 To resolve RTD's appeal, we explore the breadth of the CGIA's provision waiving immunity "in an action for injuries resulting from ... [t]he operation of a motor vehicle." § 24-10-106(1)(a), C.R.S. 2019. In doing so, we conclude that Teran's injuries "result[ed] from" an RTD driver's sudden stop within the meaning of the provision, even though the driver's actions may not have been the most direct cause of her injuries, because Teran claimed, in part, that (1) the handle she had been holding had been negligently maintained; and (2) the sudden stop dislodged the handle, leading to her fall. Because RTD's immunity was thus waived under section 24-10-106(1)(a), we affirm the trial court's order denying RTD's post-trial motions. We also affirm the trial court's judgment against RTD.
¶ 3 Teran cross-appeals the trial court's order denying, in part, her motion to amend the judgment for costs and interest. We affirm the order.
¶ 4 In July 2016, Teran was a passenger on an RTD bus travelling eastbound on Evans Avenue in Denver. As the RTD bus was proceeding on its route, a vehicle suddenly, and apparently in violation of traffic laws, emerged from a cross street and began driving across Evans Avenue toward the left side of the bus. The bus driver slammed on the brakes, narrowly avoiding a collision and bringing the bus to an abrupt stop.
¶ 5 Teran, who was standing up and holding on to one of the bus's handrails, fell when the bus driver suddenly stopped the bus. She claimed that the handrail she was holding came loose when the driver braked, and thus failed to prevent her from falling. Teran sustained injuries to her back and shoulder as a result of the fall.
¶ 6 Teran filed suit against the bus driver and RTD asserting two distinct claims of negligence. The first claim alleged that RTD was negligent in failing to properly maintain the handrail that Teran was using for support. The second claim alleged that the bus driver was negligent in suddenly stopping the bus without warning. Teran's second claim also asserted that RTD was liable for the bus driver's negligence under a theory of respondeat superior.
¶ 7 Following a trial, the jury found that the bus driver had not acted negligently. However, as to Teran's first claim, the jury found that RTD was negligent in maintaining the handrail and that RTD's negligence had caused Teran's injuries. Accordingly, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of Teran and against RTD for its negligent maintenance of the handrail.
¶ 8 RTD then filed two separate, but nearly identical, post-trial motions seeking relief from the judgment — one under C.R.C.P. 12(h)(3) and one under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(3). Specifically, it argued in each motion that it was entitled to immunity under the CGIA, and thus the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Teran's claim. The trial court, however, found that RTD's negligent maintenance of the handrail constituted the "operation of a motor vehicle" and thus RTD's immunity was waived under section 24-10-106(1)(a). Accordingly, it denied each of RTD's motions.
¶ 9 RTD maintains that it has immunity from Teran's first claim under the CGIA. Thus, it argues, the court erred by denying its Rule 12(h)(3) and Rule 60(b)(3) motions challenging the court's jurisdiction to hear the claim. We disagree.1
¶ 10 A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(h)(3) challenges whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction — a question of law. See, e.g. , Lee v. Banner Health , 214 P.3d 589, 594 (Colo. App. 2009) (). Thus, where, as here, there are no factual disputes relevant to the issue of jurisdiction, we review a trial court's ruling on a Rule 12(h)(3) motion de novo. See id. ; see also Tulips Invs., LLC v. State ex rel. Suthers , 2015 CO 1, ¶ 11, 340 P.3d 1126. We also review de novo a trial court's ruling on a Rule 60(b)(3) motion. Oster v. Baack , 2015 COA 39, ¶ 11, 351 P.3d 546.
¶ 11 Additionally, whether the trial court erred by denying RTD's post-trial motions turns on the interpretation of section 24-10-106(1)(a), which we also review de novo. Robinson v. Ignacio Sch. Dist. , 2014 COA 45, ¶ 8, 328 P.3d 297.
¶ 12 Under Rule 60(b)(3), "the court may relieve a party ... from a final judgment ... [if] the judgment is void." As relevant here, "[a] judgment is void if the court lacked ... subject matter jurisdiction over the cause of action." Nickerson v. Network Sols., LLC , 2014 CO 79, ¶ 9, 339 P.3d 526. Similarly, Rule 12(h)(3) requires that a court dismiss an action "[w]henever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter."
¶ 13 "[S]overeign immunity is a jurisdictional question, an absolute bar to suit, and prevents the court from maintaining subject matter jurisdiction over the suit." Gallagher v. Bd. of Trs. for Univ. of N. Colo. , 54 P.3d 386, 394 (Colo. 2002), abrogated on other grounds by Martinez v. Estate of Bleck , 2016 CO 58, 379 P.3d 315 ; see also Walton v. State , 968 P.2d 636, 643 (Colo. 1998) (). Hence, in support of its post-trial motions, RTD sought to establish a lack of subject matter jurisdiction by claiming immunity under the CGIA.
¶ 14 The CGIA provides that "[a] public entity shall be immune from liability in all claims for injury which lie in tort ...." § 24-10-106(1). However, the CGIA's grant of immunity is not without exception. Indeed, as pertinent here, "[s]overeign immunity is waived by a public entity in an action for injuries resulting from ... [t]he operation of a motor vehicle, owned or leased by such public entity, by a public employee while in the course of employment." § 24-10-106(1)(a). "Because the CGIA is in derogation of Colorado's common law, the grant of immunity is to be strictly construed against the public entity, and the waiver provisions are to be deferentially construed in favor of victims." Young v. Jefferson Cty. Sheriff , 2012 COA 185, ¶ 8, 292 P.3d 1189 ; accord Corsentino v. Cordova , 4 P.3d 1082, 1086 (Colo. 2000) (); Springer v. City & Cty. of Denver , 13 P.3d 794, 798 (Colo. 2000) (same).
¶ 15 To determine whether the trial court erred by denying RTD's post-trial motions, we must examine whether RTD's governmental immunity was waived under section 24-10-106(1)(a) as to Teran's first claim of negligence. We conclude that it was.
¶ 16 RTD argues that its negligent maintenance of the handrail cannot be construed as "the operation of a motor vehicle." Accordingly, it argues, Teran's injuries did not "result[ ] from" the operation of the bus. Moreover, RTD points out that Teran alleged that RTD itself, not a specific public employee, failed to maintain the handrail at issue. Thus, RTD contends that section 24-10-106(1)(a) does not apply. But RTD, in our view, reads the statute too narrowly, ignoring that it was the bus driver's sudden stop that led to Teran's injuries.
¶ 17 First, RTD concedes, and we agree, that the bus driver's sudden stop constituted "[t]he operation of a motor vehicle ... by a public employee while in the course of employment." § 24-10-106(1)(a) ; see Harris v. Reg'l Transp. Dist. , 15 P.3d 782, 784 (Colo. App. 2000) (). Whether RTD's immunity was waived, then, turns on whether Teran's injuries can be said to have "result[ed] from" the sudden stop.
¶ 18 Section 24-10-106(1)(a) does not state that the operation of a motor vehicle must be the most direct, proximate, or only cause of an injury for immunity to be waived. Nor does it purport to limit the waiver of immunity to only those causes of action where negligent operation of a vehicle is the basis of the claim. Rather, it states simply that, for immunity to be waived, an injury must "result[ ] from" the operation of a motor vehicle. Construing that language, as we must, broadly and deferentially in favor of victims, see Young , ¶ 8, we conclude that section 24-10-106(1)(a) may waive immunity even where, as here, the operation of a motor vehicle is neither the most direct cause of an injury nor the basis for the cause of action. The pertinent question, to be addressed on a case by case basis, is simply whether an injury is sufficiently attributable to the operation of a motor vehicle to have "result[ed] from" it.
¶ 19 Our reading of the statute is supported by at least one other division of this court. In Harris , a division of this court rejected an argument that there is no waiver of immunity under section 24-10-106(1)(a) for injuries that result from a lack of maintenance. 15 P.3d at 784-85. In doing so, the division noted, in dictum, that "if injuries otherwise result from the operation of a bus, even if the underlying cause may have...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People ex rel. G.C.M.M.
... ... Nistico v. Dist. Court , 791 P.2d 1128, 1129 (Colo. 1990). 16 The UCCJEA is designed to ... ...