Teren v. City of Chicago
| Decision Date | 17 September 1952 |
| Docket Number | No. 32095,32095 |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
| Parties | TEREN v. CITY OF CHICAGO. |
David Chaimovitz, of Chicago, for appellant.
John J. Mortimer, Corp. Counsel, of Chicago (L. Louis Karton, and Sidney R. Drebin, Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.
This is a direct appeal to this court from the superior court of Cook County. The case is brought here upon the ground that the constitutionality of a statute is involved. Appellee asks that the appeal be dismissed because the record fails to show that the constitutionality of a statute is involved. Our first consideration, therefore, must be directed to the question as to whether we have jurisdiction of this appeal.
Appellant, hereafter referred to as plaintiff, filed a suit in the superior court of Cook County against appellee, the city of Chicago, a municipal corporation, hereafter referred to as defendant, seeking damages for injuries alleged to have been sustained in a fall caused by an alleged defect in a sidwalk of said city on which she was a pedestrian. The alleged injury occurred on January 31, 1946, and her complaint was filed on January 27, 1948, which is four days less than two years after the injury. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, on the ground that the action did not accrue within the time limited by law. This motion was allowed and the suit dismissed. As the basis for its contention that plaintiff's cause of action, if any, was barred by statute, defendant relied on section 1-10 of the Cities and Villages Act, (Ill.Rev.Stat.1951, chap. 24, par. 1-10,) which provides:
'No civil action shall be commenced in any court against any municipality by any person for any injury to his person unless it is commenced within one year from the date that the injury was received or the cause of action accrued.'
Plaintiff's answer to this statute is that it is unconstitutional. Defendant contends that the constitutionality of this statute was not raised in the trial court, and plaintiff contends that since the trial court dismissed the suit on defendant's motion that it was filed too late, it necessarily follows that the trial court found the statute to be constitutional, because if it had found the statute to be unconstitutional it would have denied the motion to dismiss. There is a general statute of limitations allowing suits for damages for personal injuries to be brought at any time within two years of the date of the injury, but the above cited statute is intended to apply only to suits against municipalities.
This court has jurisdiction on direct appeals only in certain specified cases, one of which is when the constitutionality of a statute is involved. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1951, chap. 110, par. 199.) The assertion of counsel that a constitutional question is involved is not alone sufficient to give this court jurisdiction. Before this court will take jurisdiction, upon appeal or writ of error, upon the assertion that a constitutional question is involved, it must appear from the record that such question is actually involved, and it must be a fairly debatable question raised in good faith, and not simply pretendedly, for the purpose of giving this court jurisdiction. Even though it may appear a constitutional question was involved in the trial court, unless such question is preserved in the record and the ruling of the court thereon is assigned as error the question will not be considered by this court, but the appeal or writ of error will be dimissed. Griveau v. South Chicago City Ry. Co., 213 Ill. 633, 73 N.E. 309. All the abstract here shows is the complaint, the motion of the defendant that the complaint be stricken, and the dismissal of the cause for the reason that 'the cause of action did not accrue within the time limited by law for the commencement of an action or suit thereon.' Plaintiff insists that the constitutional question was argued in the trial court and contends that it was because of his holding the statute constitutional that the trial judge allowed the motion to dismiss. The record does not show that, and it must appear of record to preserve such question for appeal to this...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Barber-Colman Co. v. A & K Midwest Insulation Co.
... ... 110, par. 2-615, Historical & Practice Notes, at 408 (Smith-Hurd 1983); see also Teren v. City of Chicago (1952), 413 Ill. 141, 108 N.E.2d 476 ... A motion to dismiss ... ...
-
People ex rel. Adamowski v. Kerner
... ... [19 Ill.2d 508] ... Benjamin S. Adamowski, State's Atty., Chicago (Francis X. Riley, Asst. State's Atty., Chicago, of counsel), for appellant in No. 35744 ... 217, 147 S.W.2d 83, 132 A.L.R. 969; Rogers v. Carleton, 188 Okl. 470, 110 P.2d 908; Rider v. City of [19 Ill.2d 512] Batesville, 220 Ark. 31, 245 S.W.2d 822; Sawyer v. City of San Antonio, 149 Tex ... Village of Lansing v. Hacker, 7 Ill.2d 258, at 260, 130 N.E.2d 265 at page 267; Teren v. City of Chaicago, 413 Ill. 141 at page 145, 108 N.E.2d 476 at page 478; and De La Cour v. De La ... ...
-
Strader v. Board of Ed. of Community Unit School Dist. No. 1 of Coles County
... ... Teren v. City of Chicago, 413 Ill. 141, 108 N.E. 476. The validity of the statute in question was not ... ...
-
City of Chicago v. Shell Oil Co.
... ... While it is enough to say that these purported constitutional issues are not properly before us because they were never raised, passed upon and preserved for review in the trial court, (Group Securities, Inc. v. Carpentier, 13 Ill.2d 41, 147 N.E.2d 360; Teren v. City of Chicago, 413 Ill. 141, 180 N.E.2d 476,) we are of the opinion that defendant's claims rest on insecure foundations. In the absence of pertinent authority or a statement of logical reasons, neither of which have been given us, we are not prepared to say that the removal of the one beam ... ...