TERESE B. v. Commissioner of Children & Families

• Decision Date: 12 February 2002
• Docket Number: (AC 21570)
• Citation: 68 Conn. App. 223,789 A.2d 1114
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: TERESE B. v. COMMISSIONER OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES

68 Conn. App. 223

789 A.2d 1114

TERESE B. v. COMMISSIONER OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES¹

(AC 21570)

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued October 31, 2001.

Officially Released February 12, 2002.

Foti, Schaller and Peters, Js.

Peter M. Berry, for the appellant (plaintiff).

John E. Tucker, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, and Susan T. Pearlman, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (defendant).

Opinion

SCHALLER, J.

The plaintiff, Terese B., a foster parent, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing on jurisdictional grounds her appeal from an administrative decision by the department of children and families (department) upholding the removal of a minor child from her home. The sole issue on appeal is whether the court properly granted the motion to dismiss filed by the defendant commissioner of children and families (commissioner) on the ground that the administrative proceeding was not a "contested case" within the meaning of the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA), General Statutes § 4-166 et seq., because the plaintiff did not have a statutory right to a hearing. Because we determine that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction concerning the plaintiffs appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the plaintiff's appeal. In 1996, the department placed the child in the plaintiff's foster care. The parental rights of the child's parents later were terminated, and the department became the child's statutory parent. Subsequently, the marriage of the plaintiff and her husband was dissolved. Upon the recommendation of health professionals who evaluated the plaintiff after the dissolution, the department removed the child from her care pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-100.²

The plaintiff requested and received a hearing to challenge the department's removal of the child in accordance with § 17a-100-3 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies.³ The hearing officer concluded that the removal was appropriate. The plaintiff next appealed to the Superior Court from the department's decision.⁴ In response, the commissioner filed a motion to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The commissioner argued that the administrative proceeding was not a "contested case" within the meaning of the UAPA because the plaintiff did not have a statutory right to a hearing.⁵ The court granted that motion and this appeal followed.

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly granted the department's motion to dismiss. Her argument is best explicated if divided into its component parts. First, the plaintiff asserts that as a foster parent, she has a liberty interest in matters of family life.⁶ She further states that the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution and article first, § 10, of the constitution of Connecticut protect her from a violation of that liberty interest without due process of law.⁷ Relying on those assertions, the plaintiff argues that § 17a-100, the statute pursuant to which the department removed the child, is unconstitutional because it does not guarantee a hearing before removal. She argues that § 17a-100-3 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, which allows for a hearing, must be incorporated into General Statutes § 17a-100 and read as a part of the statute itself because without that regulation, no hearing would be provided to the foster parent, thereby rendering General Statutes § 17a-100 unconstitutional.

On the basis of those assertions, the plaintiff maintains that "to find that General Statutes § 17a-100 does not contain an inherent statutory right to a hearing as expressed in § 17a-100-3 [of the regulations], would be to set up § 17a-100 as a statute that unconstitutionally deprives foster families their liberty rights without due process of law. It is only through the saving regulation, § 17a-100-3, with its express hearing requirement, that General Statutes § 17a-100 can maintain its constitutional validity."⁸

As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the plaintiff has standing to pursue her claim. In her brief, the plaintiff argues that she has standing because of her liberty interest in family life. The commissioner rebuts that contention. Although the court did not decide that issue, we note that the question of whether the plaintiff has standing properly is before us because she has raised and argued the issue in her brief.

At the outset, we note the applicable section of the UAPA that applies to judicial review of administrative decisions. General Statutes § 4-183 (a) provides in relevant part that "[a] person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available within the agency and who is aggrieved by a final decision may appeal to the Superior Court as provided in this section...."⁹ Although § 4-183 (a) includes several significant terms that will be discussed, as matters of standing, the term "aggrieved" in § 4-183 (a) is critical.

We further note the applicable law of standing, which we reviewed in Lewis v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 62 Conn. App. 284, 771 A.2d 167 (2001). In Lewis, the plaintiffs appealed from the judgment of the trial court dismissing their administrative appeal because they lacked standing. Id., 285. Though Lewis involved an administrative appeal from the decision of a planning and zoning commission to amend its regulations, our discussion in that appeal about the well established principles of standing is equally applicable to the present case involving the department.

In Lewis, we stated that "[a]s a jurisdictional matter, an appellant must demonstrate aggrievement to maintain an administrative appeal. Aggrievement is essentially a question of standing; without it, a court must dismiss an action for want of jurisdiction.... Two broad yet distinct categories of aggrievement exist, classical and statutory....

"Classical aggrievement requires a two part showing. First, a party must demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision, as opposed to a general interest that all members of the community share.... Second, the party must also show that the agency's decision has specially and injuriously affected that specific personal or legal interest.... Aggrievement does not demand certainty, only the possibility of an adverse effect on a legally protected interest....

"Statutory aggrievement exists by legislative fiat, not by judicial analysis of the particular facts of the case. In other words, in cases of statutory aggrievement, particular legislation grants standing to those who claim injury to an interest protected by that legislation." (Citations omitted.) Id., 288. Applying that law to the present case, we conclude that the plaintiff did not have standing because she failed to establish either classical or statutory aggrievement. The court, accordingly, did not have jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claim.

To establish classical aggrievement, the plaintiff must meet the previously articulated two-pronged test. The first part of the test requires the plaintiff to demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest. In the present case, the plaintiff argues that she has a fundamental liberty interest in matters of family life. We are not persuaded by that contention, however, because the plaintiff has failed to inform us of any legal authority that states that a foster parent has a liberty interest in the maintenance of the foster family unit.

There is, in fact, authority to the contrary, namely, Nye v. Marcus, 198 Conn. 138, 502 A.2d 869 (1985). In Nye, the plaintiff foster parents appealed from the judgment of the trial court, claiming that the court improperly quashed their habeas corpus petition on the ground that they lacked standing as foster parents to bring that action. Id., 139. The foster parents argued that their interest in protecting their foster parent relationship with the child was sufficient to grant them standing. Id., 142.

In addressing that claim, our Supreme Court noted that the plaintiffs' argument was based on their emotional relationship with the child as opposed to a biological or legal guardian relationship. Id., 143. The court proceeded to distinguish the rights of foster and biological families. It stated that "[f]oster families differ from biological families in that they have their source in state law and contractual arrangements.... Foster families do not have the same rights as biological families or adoptive families. Rather, the expectations and entitlements of foster families can be limited by the state. ... Biological and adoptive families have a liberty interest in the integrity of their family unit which is part of the fourteenth amendment's right to familial privacy.... Foster care arrangements of the nature and duration considered in the present case do not have this constitutionally protected liberty interest."¹⁰ (Citations omitted.) Id., 143-44.

The Nye court continued, stating that "the plaintiffs had no basis for a justifiable expectation that their relationship with [the foster child] would be anything but temporary.... We hold, therefore, that under these circumstances the [plaintiffs] do not have standing as foster parents to assert their own interest in the maintenance of their family relationship with [the foster child]. They do not have a liberty interest and their emotional relationship with the child, which was acquired through the temporary foster placement, is too tenuous a basis to afford standing to institute a habeas corpus proceeding against the child's statutory parent and legal guardian."¹¹ (Citation omitted.) Id., 144. Subsequent to its decision in Nye, our Supreme Court ruled on this issue again in Hunte v. Blumenthal, 238 Conn. 146, 680 A.2d 1231 (1996). In Hunte, the issue was whether foster...