Teris, LLC v. Chandler
| Decision Date | 13 November 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 08-692.,08-692. |
| Parties | TERIS, LLC; Op-Tech Environmental Services, Inc.; CSX Transportation, Inc., Appellants, v. Harold CHANDLER; Connie Chandler; Jerry Fifer; Pearline Fifer; Benito Glosson; Latoria Glosson; Jimmie Lark; Mildred Lark; Alvin McGhee; Sheila McGhee; Carolyn Yarbrough; Eddie Yarbrough, Jr., Appellees. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, L.L.P., by: Thomas W. Fee, Howard J. Klatsky, and P. Wes Black; Compton, Prewett, Thomas & Hickey, L.L.P., by: Matt Thomas, for appellant Teris, L.L.C.
Mitchell, Williams, Selig, Gates & Woodyard, P.L.L.C., by: Sherry P. Bartley, for appellant Op-Tech Environmental Services, Inc.
Friday, Eldredge & Clark, LLP, by: Kevin A. Crass and R. Christopher Lawson, for appellant CSX Transportation, Inc.
Allen P. Roberts, P.A.; John W. Walker, P.A.; Vickery & Carroll, P.A.; and McMath Woods, P.A., for appellees.
This appeal of a class-action certification is before us again after we reversed and remanded the matter due to the fact that the certification order contained two different class definitions. See Teris, LLC v. Golliher, 371 Ark. 369, 266 S.W.3d 730 (2007) (Teris I). Appellants Teris, LLC, Op-Tech Environmental Services, Inc., and CSX Transportation, Inc., again argue that the trial court erred in granting Appellees' request for class certification. As this is a second appeal, our jurisdiction is pursuant to Ark. Sup.Ct. R. 1-2(a)(7). We find no error and affirm.
The underlying facts of this case are sufficiently set forth in Teris I. Suffice it to say, Appellees, who are individuals who were within the mandatory evacuation area following an explosion and fire at the Teris facility, filed suit against Appellants and sought class-action status. Upon an order by the trial court granting class certification, Appellants appealed to this court, arguing that class certification was not warranted in several respects. See Teris I. Because the trial court's order contained differing class definitions, we reversed and remanded the matter for clarification as to the appropriate class definition.
Upon remand, Appellees filed a motion submitting an amended and substituted order granting class certification. In the proposed order, four plaintiffs were removed from the case caption and the class was defined as follows:
(a) All adults;
(b) Who as of January 2, 2005;
(c) Resided or occupied a business premise in Areas A, B, or C, as shown on Exhibit "1"; and
(d) Who, in fact, physically evacuated from Areas A, B, or C, as shown on Exhibit "1" because of the fire and explosion event at Teris on that date.
In addition to removing certain named plaintiffs and modifying the class definition, the proposed order sought the following additional changes:
(b) Clarifies that the damages issue to be resolved in a common trial is limited to the value of the discomfort, disruption and inconvenience proximately caused due to each class member being evacuated from his or her home or business premises due to the January 2, 2005 event that gives rise to this action, and further sets out that these claims may be tried in two subclasses of those who returned the evening of January 2, 2005, and those who were allowed to return the following day (c) Provides that the court will determine the issue of strict or absolute liability, not the jury; and
(d) Provides that individual trials will be held, if necessary, on elements of damages that are not common to each member of the class. These trials will be limited to elements of damages proximately caused by the January 2, 2005, incident that are not common to the entire class, including, without limitation, (i) actual medical expenses associated with physician visits; (ii) actual expenses related to meals, lodging, and travel resulting from being evacuated; (iii) lost income, earnings, or wages; (iv) expenses actually incurred, or compensation for, removing soot and smoke residue from real and personal property.
The trial court held a hearing on the proposed amended order on May 2, 2008. Thereafter, the court entered of record the amended and substituted order granting class certification. This appeal followed.
Class actions are governed by Rule 23 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure which provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Prerequisites to Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties and their counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. At an early practicable time after the commencement of an action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained. For purposes of this subdivision, "practicable" means reasonably capable of being accomplished. An order under this section may be altered or amended at any time before the court enters final judgment. An order certifying a class action must define the class and the class claims, issues, or defenses.
Our law is well settled that the six requirements for class-action certification include: (1) numerosity, (2) commonality, (3) typicality, (4) adequacy, (5) predominance, and (6) superiority. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Bryant, 374 Ark. 38, 285 S.W.3d 634 (2008).
The determination that the class-certification criteria have been satisfied is a matter within the broad discretion of the trial court, and this court will not reverse the trial court's decision absent an abuse of that discretion. ChartOne, Inc. v. Raglon, 373 Ark. 275, 283 S.W.3d 576 (2008); Ark. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Hicks, 349 Ark. 269, 78 S.W.3d 58 (2002). In reviewing a class-certification order, this court focuses on the evidence in the record to determine whether it supports the trial court's conclusion regarding certification. Hicks, 349 Ark. 269, 78 S.W.3d 58. Neither the trial court nor this court shall delve into the merits of the underlying claims when deciding whether the Rule 23 requirements have been met. Id. In this regard, our court has said that "`a trial court may not consider whether the plaintiffs will ultimately prevail, or even whether they have a cause of action.'" Bryant, 374 Ark. at 42, 285 S.W.3d at 638 (quoting Carquest of Hot Springs, Inc. v. Gen. Parts, Inc., 367 Ark. 218, 223, 238 S.W.3d 916, 920 (2006)). We, thus, view the propriety of a class action as a procedural question. See id.
In the present appeal, in addition to challenging the class definition, Appellants also challenge the trial court's findings with regard to typicality, predominance, and superiority, as well as some procedural aspects of the certification order. Remaining mindful of our standard in reviewing class-certification orders, we now turn to the issues on appeal.
The first argument on appeal is whether the trial court erred in certifying this as a class action because of an insufficient class definition. Teris1 argues that the class as defined by the amended and substituted order does not provide sufficiently objective criteria with which to identify class members. Specifically, Teris contends that the class definition fails to define the phrase "occupied a business premises" or the term "evacuated" and further avers that in order to ascertain class membership, the trial court will necessarily have to engage in an individualized inquiry as to whether a person evacuated and the subjective reasons for doing so. Appellees counter that the terms utilized in the class definition are normal, everyday terms and that the definition provides a feasible manner for determining class membership.
In addressing the issue of class definition, this court has recently said:
It is axiomatic that in order for a class action to be certified, a class must exist. The definition of the class to be certified must first meet a standard that is not explicit in the text of Rule 23, that the class be susceptible to precise definition. This is to ensure that the class is neither "amorphous," nor "imprecise." Concurrently, the class representatives must be members of that class. Thus, before a class can be certified under Rule 23, the class description must be sufficiently definite so that it is administratively feasible for the court to determine whether a particular individual is a member of the proposed class. Furthermore, for a class to be sufficiently defined, the identity of the class members must be ascertainable by reference to objective criteria.
Van Buren Sch. Dist. v. Jones, 365 Ark. 610, 613-14, 232 S.W.3d 444, 448 (quoting Hicks, 349 Ark. 269, 280-81, 78 S.W.3d 58, 64-65). This court further elaborated that a class must be susceptible to definition and cannot be amorphous or imprecise. Hicks, 349 Ark. 269, 78 S.W.3d 58; Ferguson v. Kroger Co., 343 Ark. 627, 37 S.W.3d 590 (2001). In Ferguson, this court pointed out that clearly defining the class insures that those people who are actually harmed by the defendant's wrongful conduct will participate in the relief ultimately awarded.
The present case is distinguishable from Ferguson and Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages v. Pipkin Enterprises., Inc., 359 Ark. 402, 198 S.W.3d 115 (2004), two notable cases where this court found that a class was not...
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