Terrell v. State

Decision Date15 November 1978
Docket NumberNo. 12767,12767
Citation574 S.W.2d 616
PartiesJames M. TERRELL et al., Appellants, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Marvin S. Sprain, Billy John Edwards, Whitten, Sprain, Price, Wagner & Edwards, Abilene, for appellants.

John L. Hill, Atty. Gen., Jack Sparks, Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, for appellee.

SHANNON, Justice.

This appeal involves construction and application of the Texas Tort Claims Act, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6252-19, § 14(8) and (9) (1970).

James M. Terrell sued highway patrolman James E. White and the State of Texas in the district court of Runnels County for personal injuries resulting from an automobile collision near Rowena. The district court severed Terrell's cause against White from his cause against the State and entered summary judgment that Terrell take nothing against the State. We will reverse the judgment.

The summary judgment proof showed that the collision happened on December 18, 1975, at about 6:00 P.M. on Highway 67. Highway 67 is divided and at the place of collision runs east and west. White's patrol car was parked on the paved shoulder of the westbound lane of Highway 67 where White was operating radar for the detection of speeding eastbound traffic. To overtake an eastbound speeder it was necessary for White to drive about one hundred-fifty feet west on Highway 67 to a crossover and then turn back east to pursue the speeder.

The patrol car, while parked on the shoulder, had no lights burning. The proof was conflicting as to whether most moving traffic had lights on because of impending darkness.

Just before the collision, White's radar detected a speeding eastbound pickup. White claimed that he started his vehicle, turned on its headlights, looked to the rear, and pulled onto the westbound lane of Highway 67.

Terrell testified by deposition that he was driving his vehicle westbound on Highway 67. Terrell saw the patrol car stopped on the right shoulder of the road. The patrol car taillights came on briefly. Then the patrol car started up suddenly and pulled in front of Terrell's vehicle. The right front fender of Terrell's vehicle collided with the left side of the patrol car. It was undisputed that at the time of the collision, White had not turned on the "red lights" or the siren of the patrol car.

The Texas Tort Claims Act waives the doctrine of governmental immunity in certain respects. Section 3 is the general provision establishing governmental liability in the operation of motor vehicles. Section 3 provides in part as follows:

"Sec. 3. Each unit of government in the state shall be liable for money damages for personal injuries or death when proximately caused by the negligence or wrongful act or omission of any officer or employee acting within the scope of his employment or office arising from the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle . . . under circumstances where such officer or employee would be personally liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of this state . . . Such liability is subject to the exceptions contained herein . . ."

Section 14 of the Act specifically enumerates twelve "exemptions" from application of the Act. Section 14 provides in part:

"The provisions of this Act shall not apply to:

"(9) Any claim based on an injury or death connected with any act or omission arising out of . . . the method of providing, police or fire protection."

As primary ground for its motion for summary judgment, the State contended that Terrell's injuries were connected with an act arising out of the method of providing police protection, and for such reason the State was not liable.

In County of Brazoria v. Radtke, 566 S.W.2d 326 (Tex.Civ.App.1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the Ninth Court of Civil Appeals construed § 14(9). The facts in that case are similar in many respects to those in the case at bar. In Radtke the deputy sheriff of Brazoria County, while engaged in the investigation of a criminal offense, was involved in an automobile collision with Radtke. The officer was not on an emergency call when the collision occurred. The County argued that Radtke's injuries were connected with an act arising out of ". . . the method of providing police . . . protection," and, as a result, it was not responsible for Radtke's damages.

In rejecting the County's argument the Court wrote:

"In determining the meaning of this section (§ 14(...

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2 cases
  • State v. Terrell
    • United States
    • Texas Supreme Court
    • September 19, 1979
    ...the suit against the State. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case against the State for trial. 574 S.W.2d 616. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Civil The summary judgment proof shows that the collision in question occurred on December 18, 1975,......
  • Langley v. City of Amarillo
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • March 26, 1979
    ...of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by a police officer in a non-emergency situation. See also Terrell v. State, 574 S.W.2d 616 (Tex.Civ.App. Austin 1978, writ pending). We conclude that the defendant City did not sustain its burden of establishing as a matter of law that the caus......

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