Terrence Newman v. State

Decision Date04 April 2018
Docket NumberNo. 2629, Sept. Term, 2016,2629, Sept. Term, 2016
Citation236 Md.App. 533,182 A.3d 281
Parties Terrence NEWMAN v. STATE of Maryland
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

Argued by: James Moore III (Tiffany R. Rohrbaugh, on the brief), Washington, D.C., for Appellant.

Argued by: Carrie J. Williams (Brian E. Frosh, Atty. Gen., on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for Appellee.

Panel: Beachley, Fader, Charles E. Moylan, Jr. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.

Moylan, J."Foul Deeds Will Rise, Though All The Earth O'erwhelm Them To Men's Eyes"1

For three weeks, it seemed that the appellant, Terrence Omar Newman, Jr., may well have committed a perfect crime. One relentless nemesis he could not shake off, however, turned out to be his own still voice of conscience. As a direct result of his own unsolicited revelations, he was ultimately convicted by a Baltimore County jury, presided over by Judge Ruth Ann Jakubowski, of the first-degree murder of Carlita Coleman. He was sentenced to life imprisonment.

Two Contentions

With a troubled psyche that might have led a psychiatrist to suspect that he, subconsciously, wanted to be caught, the appellant's chosen contentions are relatively small bore. He asserts

1. that a photograph of him used in his initial identification by the police, albeit unquestionably relevant, was so unfairly prejudicial that it should not have been received in evidence; and
2. that, in jury instructions, the jury should never have been invited to consider his state of possible inebriation.

A Tale Of The Macabre

The statement of facts could have been written by Edgar Allan Poe. The time was Thursday, October 15, 2015. The place was Catonsville. A small neighborhood Gilston Park was the site for an informal gathering of the extended Archibald family for a leisurely afternoon of drinking and listening to music. The park was generally wooded but included a pavilion with several picnic tables on its periphery. The gathering convened shortly after 2:00 p.m. Initially in attendance were 1) Reba Archibald; 2) Reba's brother, Dustin Archibald; and 3) Dustin Archibald's girlfriend, Nicole Hokanson. Within the hour, the group was joined by the appellant. The appellant was the ex-boyfriend of Reba Archibald and a good friend of Dustin Archibald. Another brother, Ronald Archibald, joined the group at about 4:30 p.m. but left the group to go to work shortly before 5 p.m. It was at about 5 p.m. that the ultimate murder victim, Carlita Coleman, joined the group. She had formerly been a close friend of Reba Archibald. Generally speaking, the entire group had known each other for several years, dating back to high school.

"A Jug Of Wine, A Book of Verse, And Thou"2

Throughout the afternoon, it was the appellant who provided beverages for the group. The first serving was from a water bottle filled with slightly watered-down vodka. The appellant shared it with Dustin and Nicole. Reba did not drink. When the threesome had finished the vodka, the appellant repaired to a nearby Walmart and returned with an ill-fated bottle of wine. Ill-fated because the bottle was corked but the revelers had no corkscrew. With the swashbuckling panache of an Anthony Quinn, however, the appellant broke off the neck of the bottle on a nearby tree. The break, unfortunately, came well below the neckline, and a bare pint remained in what had been a receptacle designed for a quart. The final resupply mission eschewed viniculture and produced "two big gallons of vodka." "And the band played on."

And Then There Were Two

Tempting as the vodka may have been, for Dustin Archibald it was no rival for Thursday Night Football, to which he was incorrigibly addicted. By 7 p.m., he and Nicole left the party in order to be comfortably in place for the New Orleans Saints–Atlanta Falcons kickoff. And then there were three.

As the appellant's ex-girlfriend, Reba Archibald was for the next half-hour very much a neglected fifth wheel. The appellant and Carlita Coleman, who had not known each other before that afternoon, were rapidly making up for lost time. As Reba sat, forlorn, at one table, the new acquaintances, both described by Reba as "flat out drunk," adjourned to a separate table for an escalating session of ill-defined but ill-disguised sexual play. Discretion prevailed and Reba left for home. And then there were two.

"Our Revels Now Are Ended"3

With the departure of Reba Archibald at 7:30 p.m., the screen went blank. But for his inner demons, life for the appellant went on as normal for the next three weeks. If Carlita Coleman was missing, the world was unaware of it. As for family, her former foster-mother was not even aware of her current street address. No one else seemed to care. The Archibalds, who had hosted the party of October 15, were oblivious to the fact that their family outing had gone disastrously south. For the appellant himself, October 15 might have been dismissed as nothing more than a drunken nightmare. The appellant had left neither fingerprint nor DNA nor any other personal token at the murder scene. He may have been the last person seen with the victim alive, but the significance of that circumstance, standing alone, would diminish with each passing day. Even murder most foul was on its way to becoming "nameless here for evermore."4 And then there was one.

"Out, Damned Spot!"5

The allusion to Lady Macbeth is not inapt. When the appellant three weeks later brought his unsolicited confession of guilt to Dustin Archibald, his pursuit by his inner demons had become truly Shakespearean. As Dustin recounted:

At first he was telling me that he needed hand sanitizer and he needed to wash his hands. And he kept going on about needing to wash his hands. Needing to wash his hands, over and over again.

(Emphasis supplied).

When the appellant arrived at the Archibald home at about 11 a.m. on November 5, 2015, his hand, according to Dustin, "smelled like a dead skunk." That was the hand that could not be washed clean and that apparently "could the very seas incarnadine." The appellant was wrestling unsuccessfully with troubled flashbacks. There were maggots, moreover, crawling over his lower pants and shoes. Dustin Archibald's recounting of the appellant's initial confession was sketchy and in extremely general terms.

He told me that he did something bad.
....
He said that he didn't mean to do it.

(Emphasis supplied).

With respect to the maggots, Dustin recounted the appellant's explanation.

MR. ARCHIBALD: He told me that he went back at the spot in the park. And this is after he admitted to me. He told me he went back and he checked and he buried it back with more leaves. He said, he saw maggots all over the, all over it everywhere. He was wanting me not to go to the park because "the smell is getting stronger. The smell is getting stronger."

(Emphasis supplied). The antecedent of the grim pronoun "it" was clearly "Carlita Coleman." With respect to the murder itself, the confession was in frustratingly general terms.

[PROSECUTOR]: Now, I'm going to back you up a little bit. When he tells you that he—what is the word the defendant used about hurting Carlita Coleman?
MR. ARCHIBALD: He said that he "strangled" her.
[PROSECUTOR]: Okay. What did the defendant say about strangling Carlita Coleman?
MR. ARCHIBALD: He said, at first he said that the defendant [sic] hit him in the nose and he strangled her, and then he said he saw her take her last breath.

(Emphasis supplied).

In terms of the homicidal narrative provided by the appellant's confession, Dustin's direct examination effectively concluded:

[PROSECUTOR]: After she took her last breath what did the defendant tell you that he did?
MR. ARCHIBALD: He, he told me that he dragged her to the woods and walked on home. Went, went home.

(Emphasis supplied).

Dustin then acknowledged a frisson of personal fear at the appellant's expression of buyer's remorse about having incautiously confessed to Dustin.

[PROSECUTOR]: Okay. What if anything did the defendant say to you about regret?
MR. ARCHIBALD: He told me that he don't [sic] think he should have told me.

(Emphasis supplied). That worried Dustin. Did he now know too much for his own good?

Dustin on cross-examination essentially regurgitated what he had earlier said on direct examination.

[DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: Okay. So when you say, and based on my question I'm asking you, if he told you that she attacked him you said, that's what he said, correct?
MR. ARCHIBALD: Correct.
[DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: Just like he said that he didn't mean to do it, correct?
MR. ARCHIBALD: Correct.
[DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: Just like he said that he did something wrong, correct?
MR. ARCHIBALD: Correct.
[DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: Just like he said he strangled her, correct?
MR. ARCHIBALD: Yep.
[DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: And he was specific that he said he did that after she attacked him, correct?
MR. ARCHIBALD: Correct.
[DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: He also said that he blacked out, didn't he?
MR. ARCHIBALD: Yeah.

(Emphasis supplied).

The redirect examination of Dustin added little:

[PROSECUTOR]: .... [Defense Attorney] was asking you about the defendant's statements regarding Carlita attacking him. Did he use the word "attack"?
MR. ARCHIBALD: He said hit him in the nose.

(Emphasis supplied).

Had there been no more than the above, it would have been painfully thin gruel with which to nourish the infinite nuances of the homicidal mens rea—the specific intent to kill, premeditation, perfect self-defense, imperfect self-defense, hot-blooded response to legally adequate provocation, mutual affray, response to an unprovoked battery, depraved heart murder, gross criminal negligence, voluntary inebriation.

Dustin Alerts The Police

Fearful that the appellant might be seriously reconsidering the wisdom of having made Dustin privy to the final climactic scene between the appellant and Carlita Coleman, Dustin took his concern to his girlfriend, Nicole, at her place of work. She convinced him that, for his own protection, he needed to bring the matter to the attention of the police. He did...

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