Territory Hawai`i v. Santana, 2653.

• Citation: 37 Haw. 586
• Decision Date: 01 October 1947
• Docket Number: NO. 2653.,2653.
• Parties: TERRITORY OF HAWAII v. DAVID HERBERT SANTANA.
• Court: Supreme Court of Hawai'i

37 Haw. 586

TERRITORY OF HAWAII

v.DAVID HERBERT SANTANA.

NO. 2653.

Supreme Court of the Territory of Hawai‘i.

Argued September 16, 1947.

Decided October 1, 1947.

ERROR TO CIRCUIT COURT FIRST CIRCUIT, HON. W. C. MOORE, JUDGE.

Syllabus by the Court

Where the words of a statute defining a criminal offense do not include the word “knowingly” or words of similar import but its terms imply that guilty knowledge is a necessary ingredient of the offense, a complaint in the words of the statute inferentially alleges guilty knowledge and is sufficient.

An assignment of errors which is too general will not be considered.

Upon writ of error the only errors that can be relied upon under rule 3 (1) of this court are those assigned conformably to the provisions of Revised Laws of Hawaii 1945, section 9558.

S. Landau ( F. Patterson with him on the briefs) for plaintiff in error.

Moon Chan, Assistant Public Prosecutor, for the Territory.

KEMP, C. J., PETERS AND LE BARON, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY PETERS, J.

This is a prosecution initiated under the provisions of Revised Laws of Hawaii 1945, section 11674, the text of which with the succeeding section, 11675, to which it refers, is quoted in the margin.¹ The defendant was charged with violating a provision of the statute making it an offense to “lead, conduct or drive any person to such place.” The charge is extremely brief, alleging merely that the defendant, at the time and place alleged, “did lead, conduct and drive persons to a place where a prostitute resides and carries on her business, to wit: did lead, conduct and drive [here follow the names of two male persons] to the place known as 3454. Alani Drive in said Honolulu, a place of one Barbara Rogers, did then and there and thereby violate the provisions of Section 11674 RLH.”

The specifications of error relied upon are:

“A. That the charge did not state facts sufficient to constitute a criminal offense.

“1. A charge, alleging the commission of the offense of driving people to a place where a prostitute resides and carries on her business, without alleging in some form that the defendant knew that the place to which he drove people was the home of a prostitute or a place where a prostitute carries on her business, is defective and cannot sustain a conviction.

“2. That the charge is insufficient to sustain a conviction in that it failed to allege that Barbara Rogers was a prostitute.

“B. That that portion of the Statute requiring the forfeiture of a driver's license, if the defendant is a licensed person, is unconstitutional. Further, even if it were constitutional, that portion of the Statute has been repealed by Act 234, Chapter 83, Session Laws of Hawaii, 1937.”

The statute does not expressly require that the acts condemned should be done “knowingly” but the context of the statute and the use of the words “lead, conduct and drive” imply the necessity of prior knowledge on the part of the defendant of the character of the place to which he leads, conducts or drives another. The statute is directed against soliciting to unlawful sexual intercourse, either directly or indirectly. The prohibition against solicitation is in general terms. But the statute also descends to particulars and condemns as public offenses divers means by which solicitation to unlawful intercourse might be effected, including leading, conducting or driving a person to a place where a prostitute resides or carries on her business. The words “lead, conduct and drive” import an objective. An objective to which one leads, conducts or drives another connotes prior knowledge of its attributes. Hence it is that knowledge of the character of the place to which a person leads, conducts or drives another is an essential ingredient of the offense and must be alleged and proved.

By the same token, however, knowledge on the part of the defendant of the character of the place to which he led, conducted or drove another may be alleged inferentially as well as directly. If, as we hold, the words “lead, conduct and drive” import prior knowledge on the part of the defendant of the character of the place, such knowledge may be inferred in the mere use of those terms. An essential ingredient of an offense may be alleged inferentially as well as directly and when so alleged is sufficient.² Where the words of a statute defining a criminal offense do not include the word “knowingly” or words of similar import but its terms imply that guilty knowledge is a necessary ingredient of the offense, a complaint in the words of the statute inferentially alleges guilty knowledge and is sufficient.

On the other hand, the absence from the complaint of an allegation that Barbara Rogers was a prostitute, if a defect, was a mere defect of form. The complaint describes the place in the words of the statute as one “where a prostitute resides and carries on her business” and employs the additional meaningless phrase “of one Barbara Rogers.” Barbara Rogers may have owned the place and not occupied it and if a prostitute might have carried on her business elsewhere. Even if the complaint also alleged that Barbara Rogers was a prostitute, the uncertainty of the identity of the prostitute who resided in the place and carried on her business remained. Barbara Rogers, even if allegedly a prostitute, was not necessarily the prostitute that resided and carried on her business at that place. Even so, if the defendant desired further information of the absence of which he now complains, he should have taken the necessary steps to...