Territory Hawai`i v. Morita
| Decision Date | 12 March 1955 |
| Docket Number | NO. 3027.,3027. |
| Parties | TERRITORY OF HAWAII, BY ITS ATTORNEY GENERAL, EDWARD N. SYLVA v. JAMES M. MORITA, TERRITORY OF HAWAII, BY ITS ATTORNEY GENERAL, EDWARD N. SYLVA v. ARTHUR Y. AKINAKA, TERRITORY OF HAWAII, BY ITS ATTORNEY GENERAL, EDWARD N. SYLVA v. DR. THOMAS M. MOSSMAN. |
| Court | Hawaii Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
APPEAL FROM CIRCUIT COURT FIRST CIRCUIT, HON. H. R. HEWITT, JUDGE.
Syllabus by the Court
Statutes are open to construction only where the language used in the statute requires interpretation, that is, where it is ambiguous. Rules of interpretation are resorted to for the purpose of resolving an ambiguity and not for creating one.
Legislative intent is the guiding star in the interpretation of a statute.
In construing a statute the court must look to the object to be accomplished, the evils and mischiefs to be remedied, and place on the statute a reasonable construction that will best effect its purpose.
The reports of committees of the legislature may be considered where there is doubt as to the proper meaning of the statute.
The amendments of section 1788, Revised Laws of Hawaii 1925, by Act 57 of the Session Laws of Hawaii 1925, is a clear manifest of the intent of the legislature that municipal officers shall not hold over after the expiration of the term of office of the appointive and approving officials.
In a proceeding in quo warranto instituted by the Territory through its attorney general to determine the respondent's title to an office, the burden is upon respondent to show a good legal title and a de facto status is no defense.
When a proceeding in the nature of quo warranto is instituted in behalf of the sovereign by the attorney general, there is no discretion in the courts to grant or withhold leave; the discretion is that of the attorney general over which the courts have no control.
M. Watanabe and Y. Fukushima (also on the brief) for respondents–appellants.
C. R. Ashford, Deputy Attorney General ( E. N. Sylva, Attorney General, with him on the brief), for petitioner–appellee.
Separate quo warranto proceedings were instituted by the Territory of Hawaii through its attorney general on January 14, 1955, against James M. Morita, on January 17, 1955, against Arthur Y. Akinaka and Dr. Thomas M. Mossman to try title of Morita to the office of city and county attorney, title of Akinaka to the office of superintendent of buildings, and title of Dr. Mossman to the office of city and county physician.
Inasmuch as the three cases involve the same point of law they were consolidated below for hearing and decision and are before this court in such form.
The substance of the several petitions is that the several respondents were duly appointed and confirmed to their respective offices on January 2, 1953, for the term of two years by the then Mayor, John H. Wilson, and the then board of supervisors consisting of M. D. Beamer, Mitsuyuki Kido, Matsuo Takabuki, Noble K. Kauhane, Nicholas T. Teves, Samuel K. Apoliona, Jr., and John M. Asing; that the terms of John H. Wilson as mayor and the above named supervisors expired on January 3, 1955; that Neal S. Blaisdell was duly elected to the office of mayor and Samuel K. Apoliona, Jr., Mitsuo Fujishige, Noble K. Kauhane, Mitsuyuki Kido, Herman G. P. Lemke, Matsuo Takabuki and Richard Kageyama as supervisors of the City and County of Honolulu for a term commencing January 3, 1955, and duly qualified and took office on said date; that the offices of city attorney, superintendent of buildings, and city and county physician are not included within the civil service nor is there any specific provision in the laws of the Territory of Hawaii contrary to the provisions in the laws of the Territory of Hawaii prohibiting the extension of the term of office of the respective respondents beyond the term of his appointing and approving powers; that the terms of the several respondents expired at twelve o'clock meridian on January 3, 1955, and since said twelve o'clock meridian on January 3, 1955, the several respondents have usurped, intruded into and held, and do now unlawfully usurp and hold their respective offices as above set forth and have unlawfully exercised and do now unlawfully exercise the powers and functions of the said offices without authority of law.
All of the allegations in the petition were admitted by respondents save and except as to the illegality of the respondents exercising the functions of the several offices, appellants claiming that their tenures of office had not terminated; that they had the legal right and duty to hold over until their various successors were appointed, confirmed and qualified; that they had a moral duty to remain in office until they were duly succeeded, and that they were required to remain in office by resolution number 916 of the former mayor and board of supervisors and were holding over to insure continuity of the municipal administration and in the public interest, convenience and welfare in the absence of duly appointed, confirmed and qualified successors.
In addition to the stipulations of fact filed herein admitting the allegations in the petition, respondents offered certain testimony showing that Mayor Blaisdell on the day he took office submitted to the board of supervisors for approval the appointments of one Takashi Kitaoka as city and county attorney, one Yoshio Kunimoto as superintendent of buildings, and one Dr. David I. Katsuki as city and county physician; that on the same day the board by motion duly made and seconded “laid the appointments on the table”; that since such date the board has neither accepted nor rejected said appointments nor taken any further action thereon.
There was testimony of the mayor that if the appointments were rejected by the board he was prepared to make new appointments and submit the names of such appointees to the board for approval, and to do so again if such new appointments were rejected.
Six members of the board of supervisors each testified that he would not take any action on the appointments submitted by the mayor until these quo warranto proceedings had been finally determined and that he would resist any efforts which might be made by any person not approved by the board to take over the powers, duties and functions of the offices to which appointments might be made; and five of the six testified they considered the respondents to be properly in office.
Evidence was also given as to the scope and magnitude of the duties and functions of the respective offices and the volume of the pending business in the departments.
The trial court held that the respondents had no legal title to office, that they have held office without lawful authority since the expiration of their respective terms at noon on January 3, 1955, and that the respondents had failed to justify their continuing in office; that “If judgments of ouster are entered against respondents in these actions, there will be an interruption of performance of duties and functions of the City and County Attorney, Superintendent of Buildings and City and County Physician until the performace of such duties and functions is undertaken by an appointee of the Mayor to said offices or such an appointee approved by the Board, and that such interruption need not necessarily continue for such period of time as to cause any substantial damage or prejudice to the municipal government, the Mayor and Board having the power and duty to fill said offices.” In accordance with its decision the court entered a judgment of ouster against the three respondents but stayed execution pending appeals to this court provided the appeals were diligently taken and prosecuted.
The principal, if not the only, question involved in these appeals is whether appellants have the right to hold over in the offices after the expiration of their statutory terms until their successors are appointed, confirmed and qualified.
Appellants contend that the limitation of the terms of appointive officers of the City and County does not preclude holdovers; that it limits the “terms” of the offices as distinguished from the “tenure”; and that such officers have a right and duty to remain until their successors are duly appointed, confirmed and qualified. They further contend that should the question be decided against appellants, there is an additional question of whether the court should not refuse to oust appellants for reasons of public interest and welfare until such officials are lawfully succeeded.
The cases have been well and carefully briefed and excellently argued by counsel on both sides.
The section of the law pertinent to the appointment and term of office of the respondents is section 6575, Revised Laws of Hawaii 1945, which reads in part as follows: * * *” (Emphasis added.)
Counsel for appellants claims that the general doctrine of American decisions which in substance holds that “in the absence of express provision and unless the legislative intent to the contrary is manifest, municipal officers hold over until their successors are provided” applies. (3 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 12.110, pp. 400, 401.)
The question is: What is the proper interpretation of ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
84 Hawai'i 138, Gray v. Administrative Director of the Court, State of Hawaii
...intent of the law-making body must prevail. Legislative intent is the "guiding star" in the interpretation of a statute. Territory v. Morita, 41 Haw. 1 [ (1955) ]. Id. at 79, 361 P.2d at 1059.18 Thus, § 286-E(c) was the progenitor of HRS § 261(d) in its current form. The provisions of HRS §......
-
State v. Hawaiian Dredging Co.
...so construed as to carry out the intent of the legislative body enacting them. In re Chung's Appeal, 44 Haw, 220, 352 P.2d 846; Territory v. Morita, 41 Haw. 1. The plain language of Sections 95 and 96 of the Organic Act demonstrates that a person claiming a vested right was required to regi......
-
Morita v. Gorak
...also enacted various holdover provisions, including those set forth in HRS §§ 26-34 and 296-2. See, e.g., Territory v. Morita, 41 Haw. 1, 16 (Haw. Terr. 1955) (Towse, C.J., dissenting) ("[C]ourts generally indulge in a strong presumption against a legislative intent to create, by statute, a......
-
Dawson v. Lanham, 5191
...and Ind., etc., Bd., 52 Haw. 577, 580, 482 P.2d 151, 153 (1971); Public Utilities Comm. v. Narimatsu, 41 Haw. 398 (1956); Territory v. Morita, 41 Haw. 1 (1955); Kauai v. McGonagle, 33 Haw. 915 (1936).2 Pillsbury v. United Engineering Co., 342 U.S. 197, 72 S.Ct. 223, 96 L.Ed. 225 (1952); Lev......
-
Quo Warranto in Hawai'i
...the petition is lodged by the attorney general, the court has no discretion and must issue the writ of quo warranto. Territory v. Morita, 41 Haw. 1 (Haw. Terr. 1955). When issued, the writ is issued in the name of the State of Hawai'i. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 659-1. It is addressed to the person ......