Territory Hawai`i v. Joaquin

• Decision Date: 05 February 1952
• Docket Number: NO. 2740.,2740.
• Parties: TERRITORY OF HAWAII v. LIBERATO GUILLERMO JOAQUIN.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

39 Haw. 221

TERRITORY OF HAWAII

v.LIBERATO GUILLERMO JOAQUIN.

NO. 2740.

Supreme Court of the Territory of Hawai‘i.

Argued February 15, 1951.

Decided February 5, 1952.

ERROR TO CIRCUIT COURT FIRST CIRCUIT, HON. C. H. BUCK, JUDGE.

Syllabus by the Court

A confession, not shown to have been induced by coercion, is not rendered inadmissible by fact that accused was not represented by counsel, or in contact with relatives or friends when made. To render a confession involuntary as being “inherently coercive,” facts or circumstances establishing physical or psychological coercion must be shown.

Admission in evidence of photographs of victim of a homicide and of locus in quo rests in discretion of trial judge, and that exercise will not be disturbed in absence of showing of abuse thereof. Photographs allegedly gruesome or inflammatory in nature, but cumulative of other evidence, are not inadmissible upon that sole ground, if they otherwise possess probative relevancy to the issues.

Where instruction upon a lesser included offense to that laid in the indictment is required, statutory definition is sufficient.R. R. Kemble (also on the briefs) for plaintiff in error.

A. R. Hawkins, Assistant Public Prosecutor ( C. M. Hite, Public Prosecutor, with him on the briefs), for defendant in error.

LE BARON AND TOWSE, JJ., AND CIRCUIT JUDGE SAPIENZA IN PLACE OF KEMP, C. J., RETIRED.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY TOWSE, C. J.

The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to death.

The record is before this court on writ of error. Eight assignments are specified. The first two allege error in the admission of evidence. The sixth and seventh allege error in the refusal to give instructions. The third, fourth and fifth challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict.

Supplementing the errors assigned, this court is mandated to review the evidence to determine if the interests of justice require a new trial. (R. L. H. 1945, § 9564.)

The defendant was born in the Philippines and migrated to the Territory in 1922. His wife resides in the Philippines. He was employed as a doorman at a theater in Honolulu at the time of the homicide and was the paramour of the deceased, a taxi dancer. For twenty–two months preceding the homicide he courted her and was a constant habitue of the dance hall at which she was employed, there spending liberally for the privilege of her exclusive company during working hours. At times voluntarily, and at times upon her demands and insistence, he gave her gifts of cash totalling approximately $8,000 and personal jewelry. At her request he provided an initial payment of $1,800 for the purchase of a new car for her use. Reciprocity in the circumstances consisted of engaging in illicit relationship from time to time at a hotel. The deceased represented that she was a divorcee and promised to marry the defendant, but postponed setting of the wedding date several times. At her request he consented to a delay of the wedding until July and again to October. On October 23 the defendant saw the deceased in company with another man, causing him to become suspicious of her promises of marriage. That evening he called at her home during her absence and there found men's clothing in a closet. This confirmed his suspicions that her promises of marriage had been insincere, and that he had been deceived and victimized by her demands for money and gifts. His savings were exhausted and he had borrowed sizable sums to satisfy her artful demands. These realizations precipitated progressive moods of emotional depression, despair and anger. On October 25 the defendant purchased a hunting knife with five–inch blade, dulled its brilliance, and concealed it upon his person by strapping it to his right leg. On October 27 he typed two letters to his brother. The first letter recited his design to take her life; the second to take his own. Excerpts from the first letter are of pointed significance to the crime laid in the indictment: “I hate to do this but this only my way I can see to make her even with me * * *. Only to night she told me the truth that she is married and stay with the husband and she can not make her promised to merry me * * *. This is the main reason that makes me mad * * *. I do not like the idea that she lie to me that's why I kill her without mercy * * *. I will meet her in thy Kingdom of God in heaven.”

He visited her that evening but made no attempt to execute his declared intentions. Instead, he made an engagement for the next evening, at which time they proceeded to a hotel, where, at the suggestion of the deceased the defendant had registered that morning as husband and wife. She had requested him to bring $100. The defendant was able to produce only $85. At this the deceased became enraged, cursing and kicking the defendant and striking him about the face. He left the bed, walked to the bathroom, secured the knife which he had placed there on entering the suite, and returning to the bedroom where the deceased lay upon the bed, stabbed her repeatedly about the body and face inflicting the wounds resulting in death. The deceased's body fell to the floor during the stabbing. The defendant replaced it upon the bed, washed himself, dressed and departed from the hotel grounds, and proceeded by taxi to the home of his brother at Wahiawa. There he unsuccessfully attempted suicide by taking a quantity of sleeping tablets, awakening the following night in a hospital under police custody.

The first assignment alleges error in the admission into evidence of a written statement or confession of the defendant on the ground that it was not voluntarily made. It is alleged that the trial court erred in failing to recognize its involuntary nature; that the conditions surrounding the taking of the confession were “inherently coercive”; that the requisite of voluntariness was not satisfied in the circumstances by merely establishing that no promise or threat was made to induce the confession; that the conditions and circumstances surrounding the defendant's confession made at the time he was a patient in the mental ward of a hospital under police guard without a doctor or nurse present and recovering from an attempted suicide, and not being represented by counsel nor in contact with friends or relatives, rendered the confession involuntary.

Section 9846 of Revised Laws of Hawaii 1945 provides, inter alia, that “No confession shall be received in evidence unless it shall first be made to appear to the judge before whom the case is being tried that such confession was in fact voluntarily made * * *.”

The record bears the following material facts established at trial relative to the confession. While the defendant was in the mental ward of the Queen's Hospital recovering from his attempted suicide he was interviewed by police officers. The interview was recorded in shorthand and later reduced to a typewritten statement. The homicide and attempted suicide occurred on the evening of October 28. Dr. Bryant Wedge, a psychiatrist, attended the defendant, who told him that he desired to see a police officer; and on the second day following his admission that he desired to make a statement. The interview commenced at approximately 10:00 o'clock a. m. on October 31 and was concluded in fifty minutes. It was read by the defendant who initialed each page and signed the final page at 1:45 o'clock p. m. the following day at the police station. Dr. Wedge testified that 1 1/2 grains of seconal had been prescribed and administered to the defendant to induce sleep the evening prior to the taking of the statement; that the ordinary period of reaction to the dose prescribed was approximately five to eight hours; that he conversed with the defendant the following morning at least twelve hours after administration of the seconal; and that at the time the statement was taken the seconal would have had no effect upon the defendant's mental faculties. He further testified that the defendant appeared to be in possession of his faculties and was alert; and though appearing somewhat preoccupied, did not appear physically weak.

At the interview, one uniformed police officer, two detectives and a shorthand reporter were present. The interrogation was in English. The defendant was reasonably literate and possessed a fair knowledge of the English language. One of the detectives, a Filipino, was present at the interview at the request of the defendant. Upon entering the room, this officer inquired of the defendant's health. He replied, “A little weak, but I feel all right”; adding later, that he did not want to give a statement or read or sign “anything” unless the Filipino detective was present. Another detective testified that he asked the defendant how he felt, and that “he said he felt better, he felt all right and that he was very anxious to get this off his chest.” At no time did the defendant indicate or express any difficulty in understanding the questions asked of him. Defendant's comprehension of the English language is attested by the necessity for an interpreter at the trial on only several occasions. At no time prior to or after making his statement did he request representation of counsel, or that relatives or friends be summoned. Prior to signing the statement he initialed each of its thirteen pages, directing attention to ten corrections and changes he desired made, initialing each correction. The statement was pointedly detailed. It recounted the relationship of the defendant and the deceased in minute detail as to time, place, circumstances and other matters.

That a confession secured under circumstances amounting to inherent coercion is involuntary and inadmissible, is recognized in Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143. None of the elements of inherent coerciveness present in that or other precedent urged by the appellant was established at the trial. In Ashcraft v. Tennessee, supra, the...