Territory Hawai`i v. Merseberg

• Decision Date: 08 November 1939
• Docket Number: No. 2332.,2332.
• Citation: 35 Haw. 248
• Parties: THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII v. JACOB MERSEBERG.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

35 Haw. 248

THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII

v.JACOB MERSEBERG.

No. 2332.

Supreme Court of the Territory of Hawai‘i.

Submitted November 3, 1939.

Decided November 8, 1939.

APPEAL FROM DISTRICT MAGISTRATE OF HONOLULU.

Syllabus by the Court

A statute may be construed contrary to its literal meaning when a literal meaning would result in an absurdity or inconsistency and the words are susceptible of another construction which will carry out the manifest intention.

But it is not allowable to interpret what has no need of interpretation. Where the meaning of a law is evident, to go elsewhere in search of conjecture in order to restrict or extend the Act would be an attempt to elude it. There is no cy pres doctrine in the interpretation of a statute.

Courts will not attempt to enforce a law which, by its terms, is manifestly void.

E. R. McGhee for appellant.

S. B. Kemp, Attorney General, and J. Wiig, Deputy Attorney General, for the Territory.

COKE, C. J., PETERS, J., AND CIRCUIT JUDGE STAFFORD IN PLACE OF KEMP, J., DISQUALIFIED.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY COKE, C. J.

This case comes here on an appeal on points of law pursuant to the provisions of section 3500, R. L. H. 1935, from a decision of the district magistrate of the district of Honolulu finding appellant guilty of the violation of the provisions of section 4 of ordinance 589 of the City and County of Honolulu. One of the several points certified by the district magistrate is to the effect that the magistrate erred in refusing to find that section 4 of the ordinance is void for indefiniteness. The evidence introduced at the trial in the court below was extremely meager but appellant has made no point of the insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the judgment. Appellant was operating a Ford V–8 automobile within the city of Honolulu in the passenger traffic business. His arrest and prosecution arose out of the fact that on the date in question he arrived at Fort Shafter, presumably a stopping point, five minutes ahead of schedule.

In section 1 of the ordinance in question the following definition appears: “An operator of a motor vehicle common carrier shall for the purposes of this Ordinance be termed hereafter ‘Operator’ and the motor vehicle so operated shall be termed ‘Common Carrier.’ ” In section 4 of the ordinance it is provided: “Each and every common carrier shall be so run and operated over a regular route as to maintain a reasonably uniform schedule. * * * All common carriers shall file with the Chief of Police two copies of a tariff showing all the rates, fares, charges, rules and regulations for transportation, and two copies of a time schedule showing the routes, territory, stations, distances, times of arrival and departure of vehicles, and location of depots.” Section 10 of the ordinance provides: “Any person violating any of the provisions of this Ordinance shall, upon conviction thereof, be subject to a fine not exceeding One Thousand Dollars ($1,000) or imprisonment for a period not exceeding one (1) year or both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the Court.”

A common carrier is usually defined as one who, by virtue of his calling, as a regular business, undertakes to transport persons or commodities, offering his services to such as may choose to employ him and pay his charges. (McCoy v. Pacific Spruce Corporation, 1 F. [2d] 853, 855. See also 2 Words & Phrases [[3d ser.], p. 192.) In every law enacted for the purpose of regulating common carriers on the public highways which has been called to our attention, with the single exception of the present ordinance, “common carrier” is a term used to denote the person or firm engaged in the business of transporting persons or commodities for hire. But for some unexplained reason a common carrier is defined in ordinance 589 as a vehicle, following which the ordinance requires the vehicle (not the owner or operator thereof) to file its tariff, schedule, etc., with the chief of police. An inanimate object cannot perform an act. No legislative mandate can...