Territory v. Field

• Decision Date: 07 April 1916
• Docket Number: No. 926.,926.
• Citation: 23 Haw. 230
• Parties: TERRITORY v. W. H. FIELD.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

23 Haw. 230

TERRITORY

v.W. H. FIELD.

No. 926.

Supreme Court of the Territory of Hawai‘i.

Argued April 3, 1916.

Decided April 7, 1916.

APPEAL FROM DISTRICT MAGISTRATE OF WAILUKU.

Syllabus by the Court

The supreme court of this Territory will entertain an appeal to set aside a void judgment of a district court.

A question of the supposed conflict of a statutory provision with the Constitution will not be considered at the instance of one whose rights do not appear to be affected by such provision.

Certain provisions of ordinance No. 31 of the County of Maui, relating to the registration of motor vehicles and the certification of chauffeurs held not to constitute a prohibition of the operation of motor vehicles upon the highways but reasonable regulations made in the exercise of the police power.

E. R. Bevins, County Attorney of Maui, for the Territory.

D. H. Case ( E. Vincent with him on the brief) for the defendant.

ROBERTSON, C.J., WATSON AND QUARLES, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY ROBERTSON, C. J.

The defendant was charged in the district court of Wailuku, county of Maui, with violating the provisions of ordinance No. 31 of that county by operating upon the public highway a motor car without having obtained a chauffeur's certificate authorizing him so to do. A demurrer to the charge on several grounds was overruled, and, upon the close of the evidence, a motion to discharge the defendant was denied. Upon uncontradicted evidence in support of the charge the defendant was found guilty, the only defense attempted to be made on the facts being that the defendant was possessed of a chauffeur's certificate which had been issued to him on September 10, 1910, under an ordinance passed on October 4, 1906, which was repealed by an ordinance passed on April 11, 1913, and which, in turn, was repealed by the present ordinance No. 31, which went into effect on January 1, 1916. The defendant appealed from the judgment upon points of law, and his counsel have limited their contention in this court to questions touching the validity of the ordinance.

The county attorney contends that as the courts of record of this Territory have power under section 2246 of the Revised Laws “to decide the constitutionality and binding effect of any law, ordinance,” etc. inferentially the district courts, which are not courts of record, have no such power. From this he argues that this court ought not to consider this appeal upon its merits but should dismiss it. But even if the district courts have no power to pass upon the constitutionality of statutes or ordinances, a thing we are unable to concede, yet, in this case, if the ordinance in question is invalid because violative of constitutional inhibitions and the appellant is in position to complain thereof, the ordinance would be declared a nullity by this court, and the judgment below being void it could be reversed on this appeal. This court will entertain an appeal to set aside a void judgment of a district court. Lewers & Cooke v. Redhouse, 14 Haw. 290, 294; Gear v. Henry, 21 Haw. 101, 104. Another reason why this appeal should not be dismissed lies in the fact that all the grounds upon which it is contended the ordinance is invalid do not involve the Constitution.

The contention of the appellant was and is that the ordinance is null and void because (1) it is unreasonable and arbitrary and denies to certain persons the equal protection of the laws by discriminating against certain citizens desirous of securing chauffeurs' certificates in order to drive for public hire; (2) it denies to persons under the age of twenty years, and regardless of their fitness and qualification, the right or privilege of securing chauffeurs' certificates to drive automobiles in public service for hire; (3) it does not equally affect all persons under the age of twenty years who may hold or apply for certificates since those who possessed certificates prior to the passage of the ordinance are not required to obtain new certificates; (4) it invests an arbitrary discretion in the examiner of chauffeurs in the matter of the granting or refusing to grant to applicants therefor permanent chauffeurs' certificates; (5) it empowers the examiner to revoke and cancel temporary chauffeurs' certificates without a hearing and without the right of appeal from his decision; and (6) it vests in the examiner...