Terry v. Chi. Police Dep't

• Decision Date: 02 August 2016
• Docket Number: Case No: 15 C 2668
• Citation: 200 F.Supp.3d 719
• Parties: Malcolm TERRY (#2013-0324098), Plaintiff, v. CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

200 F.Supp.3d 719

Malcolm TERRY (#2013-0324098), Plaintiff,

v.CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants.

Case No: 15 C 2668

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois.

Signed August 2, 2016

Malcolm Terry, Chicago, IL, pro se.

Maxwell Evan Lisy, Victoria Rose Benson, Marshall Keith Martin, City of Chicago Department of Law, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Virginia M. Kendall, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Malcolm Terry's Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 23) alleges constitutional violations arising out of an arrest on March 22, 2013. Plaintiff alleges that police entered his acquaintance's home without a warrant and subjected him to unlawful arrest, illegal search, and excessive force on arrest. Plaintiff alleges that he was arrested pursuant to an invalid investigative alert and the police personnel who issued the investigative alert subjected him to false arrest. Plaintiff names as Defendants in his amended complaint Chicago Police Officers Levigne, Nesis, Murphy, Munizzi, Fernandez, Gorman, Metcalf, Grimaldo, and Fidler, and Chicago Police Detective Garza.

Defendants move to dismiss the Amended Complaint for failing to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Dkt. No. 30.) In their motion to dismiss, Defendants argue that the claims against all Defendants should be dismissed because they are untimely according to the statute of limitations. They additionally assert that the Court should dismiss any claim of excessive force based upon the force used against Plaintiff's acquaintance, Monet Madkins. Defendants also argue for dismissal of the action asserting that Plaintiff has no free-standing constitutional claim based on his arrest pursuant to an investigative alert or failure to intervene. Based upon the facts pleaded in Plaintiff's amended complaint and the law governing statute of limitations, Defendants' motion is granted.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that on March 22, 2013, at approximately 10:00 a.m., Plaintiff was at a friend's apartment located at 6127 S. Morgan in Chicago, Illinois. Plaintiff alleges that he was in the apartment with an acquaintance, Monet Madkins. Plaintiff further alleges that he heard a loud bang, followed by shouts of "police" and "CPD open up," and he told Ms. Madkins to go into the bedroom to "avoid detection." He alleges that she went into the bedroom and he followed suit.

Plaintiff pleads that the police continued to yell and bang, stating that they had a warrant and threatening to break down the door. At some point, Robert Madkins arrived and opened the door and Defendants, Officers Levigne, Nesis, Murphy, Munizzi, Fernandez, Gorman, Metcalf, and Grimaldo entered the apartment, knocking Robert Madkins to the ground. Monet Madkins then charged out of the bedroom, telling Defendants to get out of the apartment and attempting to prevent Defendants from gaining access to the bedroom where Plaintiff was attempting to avoid detection. Defendants pushed Monet Madkins aside and Plaintiff slammed the bedroom door, placing his back against the door to bar Defendants' entry. Plaintiff alleges he heard the sound of metal banging against the door and he surrendered after police threatened to shoot through the door.

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants had no warrant to enter the Madkins' apartment, but that he was arrested on the basis of an investigative alert, with probable cause. Plaintiff's prosecution, based on the arrest in question, and the subsequent charge of first-degree murder remains pending. Plaintiff's amended complaint includes an allegation of false arrest against Chicago Police Detective Garza, Chicago Police Officer Fidler, and two John Does because they issued and approved the investigative alert.

LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Lodholtz v. York Risk Servs. Group, Inc. , 778 F.3d 635, 639 (7th Cir.2015) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). The factual allegations in the claim must be sufficient to raise the possibility of relief above the "speculative level." E.E.O.C. v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc. , 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir.2007) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). The Court "construe[s] all well-pleaded facts and draw[s] all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." See Vesely v. Armslist LLC, 762 F.3d 661, 664 (7th Cir.2014).

A plaintiff may plead himself out of court under Rule 12(b)(6) by alleging and thereby admitting the elements of an affirmative defense. See United States Gypsum Co. v. Ind. Gas Co., Inc. , 350 F.3d 623, 626 (7th Cir.2003).

DISCUSSION

In their motion to dismiss, Defendants make multiple arguments regarding individual Defendants and Claims, and one argument (statute of limitations) that has the capacity to dispose of the case, as a whole. As such, the Court addresses the timeliness of Plaintiff's suit first.

I. Statute of Limitations

Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff's amended complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that Plaintiff's claims are time-barred as a matter of law. The Seventh Circuit recently has been very clear in its assessment of the limitations periods: "[O]n the subject of the statute of limitations .... [w]hat a complaint must plead is enough to show that the claim for relief is plausible. Complaints need not anticipate defenses and attempt to defeat them. The period of limitations is an affirmative defense.... We have held many times that, because complaints need not anticipate defenses, Rule 12(b)(6) is not designed for motions under Rule 8(c)(1)." Richards v. Mitcheff , 696 F.3d 635, 637–38 (7th Cir.2012) (internal citations omitted); see also United States Gypsum Co. v. Indiana Gas Co. , 350 F.3d 623 (7th Cir.2003) ; United States v. Northern Trust Co. , 372 F.3d 886 (7th Cir.2004) ; Xechem, Inc. v. Bristol–Myers Squibb Co. , 372 F.3d 899 (7th Cir.2004). In Richards , the Court concluded by reminding judges to "respect the norm that complaints need not anticipate or meet potential affirmative defenses." Id. at 638.

Despite these admonitions, the Seventh Circuit also has consistently reaffirmed that a plaintiff may plead himself out of court by alleging facts that are sufficient to establish a statute-of-limitations defense. See Cancer Found., Inc. v. Cerberus Capital Mgmt., LP , 559 F.3d 671, 675 (7th Cir.2009) (dismissal is appropriate where it is "clear from the face of the amended complaint that it [was] hopelessly time-barred"); Andonissamy v. Hewlett–Packard Co. , 547 F.3d 841, 847 (7th Cir.2008) (stating that "[a] statute of limitations defense, while not normally part of a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), is appropriate where the allegations of the complaint itself set forth everything necessary to satisfy the affirmative defense, such as when a complaint plainly reveals that an action is untimely under the governing statute of limitations") (internal quotations omitted); U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Ind. Gas Co., Inc. , 350 F.3d 623, 626 (7th Cir.2003) ("A litigant may plead itself out of court by alleging (and thus admitting) the ingredients of a defense"); Xechem, Inc. v. Bristol – Myers Squibb Co. , 372 F.3d 899, 901 (7th Cir.2004) ("Only when the plaintiff pleads itself out of court—that is, admits all the ingredients of an impenetrable defense—may a complaint that otherwise states a claim be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6)."); see also Baldwin v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. o f Greater Chicago , 487 Fed.Appx. 304, 2012 WL 5278614, at *1 (7th Cir.2012) ("A plaintiff whose allegations show that there is an airtight defense has pleaded himself out of court, and the judge may dismiss the suit on the pleadings....") (quoting Richards , 696 F.3d at 637 ).

In the present case, Plaintiff has pled facts necessary to raise a statute of limitations inquiry, leaving the Court to consider whether Plaintiff's claims are time-barred. Where a plaintiff has pled facts which arguably establish an affirmative defense and both sides have briefed the issue, practical considerations—such as discovery costs, attorneys' fees, and judicial efficiency—provide courts with ample reasons to resolve a dispositive point of law early in a case, whether the parties have briefed the question as a 12(b)(6) or a 12(c) issue. In either case, a court's decision rests on the pleadings and whether a plaintiff has affirmatively pled herself out of court.

The length of the limitations period for a § 1983 action is determined by reference to state law personal injury torts. Owens v. Okure , 488 U.S. 235, 240–41, 249–50, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989) (quoting and clarifying Wilson v. Garcia , 471 U.S. 261, 280, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985) ). In Illinois, the pertinent limitations provision requires a would-be plaintiff to bring suit within two years of a cause of action's accrual. 735 ILCS 5/13–202 ; Jenkins v. Vill. of Maywood , 506 F.3d 622, 623 (7th Cir.2007). The limitations clock on an action brought pursuant to § 1983 for false arrest and excessive force begins to run at the time the that claimant was arrested or injured. See Washington v. Summerville , 127 F.3d 552, 556 (7th Cir.1997) ("the statute of limitations on [plaintiff's false arrest and excessive force] claims began to run when he knew or should have known that his constitutional rights had been violated—the date of his arrest"); Hudson v. Cassidy , 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88653, 2006 WL 3524420, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 5, 2006) (excessive force is immediately felt and an excessive force claim accrues immediately).

For Plaintiff,...