Terry v. Puget Sound Nat. Bank
Citation | 80 Wn.2d 157,492 P.2d 534 |
Decision Date | 06 January 1972 |
Docket Number | No. 42064,42064 |
Parties | , 10 UCC Rep.Serv. 173 Larry TERRY and Sam Daniels, Appellants, v. PUGET SOUND NATIONAL BANK, a national banking corporation, Respondent. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Washington |
Tanner & Burgess, Jack E. Tanner, Tacoma, for appellants.
Eisenhower, Carlson, Newlands, Reha, Elliott & Henriot, Ronald A. Roberts, Tacoma, for respondent.
Plaintiffs, partners in a Tacoma barber shop, have maintained a partnership checking account with the defendant, Puget Sound National Bank, since October, 1964. The signatures of both partners were required for withdrawal from the account. Mr. Nash, a long time employee of plaintiffs, was occasionally left alone and in charge of the barber shop. He had no formal managerial responsibilities and no authority to write partnership checks. Between September 16, 1968, and January 3, 1969, Mr. Nash forged plaintiffs' signatures on numerous checks. Defendant bank honored these checks. In early January of 1969, plaintiffs discovered the forgeries. This action was then commenced to recover the monies paid.
The bank asserted plaintiffs' negligence as an affirmative defense under § 3--406 and § 4--406, Uniform Commercial Code, being RCW 62A.3--406 and RCW 62A.4--406. 1 On appeal from a jury verdict and judgment for defendant plaintiffs contend that the affirmative defense should not have been submitted and that the bank should have been held liable as a matter of law.
The record shows that the check blanks were left in an unlocked drawer on the barbershop premises, easily accessible to Mr. Nash. Plaintiffs never inquired of one another about missing check blanks. For about 4 years, on a regular monthly basis, defendant sent statements and cancelled checks to plaintiffs' place of business. See RCW 62A.1--201(38). Plaintiffs regularly examined the cancelled checks and bank statements upon receipt. The monthly statements sent in October, November and December of 1968 were intercepted by Mr. Nash, and not received by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs did not inquire of the bank nor discuss between themselves this unusual absence of statements and cancelled checks. It was only when they received notice in late December that the account was overdrawn that they went to the bank and then discovered the forgeries.
These facts constitute substantial evidence of negligence on the part of the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs suggest that negligence is insufficient to support the affirmative defense afforded by these statutes in a forgery case, since forgery is a crime involving specific criminal intent. The statutory language contradicts this assertion. Under the statutes, the customer is precluded from asserting his unauthorized signature against the bank when he has failed to exercise reasonable care. Criminal activity is not a measure; negligence substantially contributing to the unauthorized signature is plainly sufficient. The issues of negligence and substantial contribution to the forgeries were properly submitted to the jury. The verdict will not be disturbed on this ground.
Plaintiffs also argue that they were entitled to a directed verdict in that they had established by their evidence a lack of ordinary care on the part of the bank as a matter of law, thus preventing application of the affirmative defense afforded by RCW 62A.3--406 and 62A.4--406. RCW 62A.4--406(3). However, plaintiffs would be entitled to a directed verdict only if there is no evidence or reasonable inference therefrom to support the bank's position that it had acted in good faith and with reasonable care. See e.g., Wick v. Irwin, 66 Wash.2d 9, 400 P.2d 786 (1965). We have reviewed the record and find therein testimony which, if believed by the jury, would establish that the bank had cashed no checks not bearing the names of both plaintiffs; that the tellers checked the signatures against the formal signature card until they were familiar with Mr. Nash and with the signatures; and that the forgeries were so skillful as to escape detection. The record does not support plaintiffs' assertions to the contrary. Under these circumstances, the...
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