Terry v. Rice, Cause No. IP00-0600-C K/H (S.D. Ind. 4/18/2003)
| Decision Date | 18 April 2003 |
| Docket Number | Cause No. IP00-0600-C K/H. |
| Parties | RITA D. TERRY and RITA D. TERRY as the Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF DONALD RAY TERRY, Plaintiffs, v. DENNIS RICE, individually and as SHERIFF OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, NORRIS STEPHENS, and ROBERT COUDRET, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
On Sunday, April 12, 1998, Donald Ray Terry ("Donald") died after he hanged himself in the Montgomery County Jail in Crawfordsville, Indiana. Donald's mother, plaintiff Rita D. Terry has filed this action both individually and as the personal representative of Donald's estate. She alleges that Donald's suicide resulted from the defendants' deliberate indifference to the serious risk that he would commit suicide, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Mrs. Terry has asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants Sheriff Dennis Rice, Jail Nurse Norris Stephens, and Chief Deputy Sheriff Robert Coudret in their individual capacities, and against Sheriff Rice in his official capacity for these alleged constitutional violations.
Defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims, arguing in essence that none of them had any actual knowledge that Donald was a suicide risk in March and April 1998, so that they could not have been deliberately indifferent to such a risk. If the facts are as defendants claim, they will be entitled to judgment in their favor. But in deciding such a motion for summary judgment, of course, the court does not decide a case based on the actual facts. Instead, the court must view conflicting evidence through a lens that requires the court to give the non-moving party the benefit of all conflicts in the evidence and the benefit of any reasonable favorable inferences. Viewed through that lens, the evidence submitted by plaintiff Mrs. Terry would allow a jury to find that Sheriff Rice, Chief Deputy Coudret, and Nurse Stephens all knew that Donald was a suicide risk and acted with deliberate indifference to that risk. The right of a prisoner/detainee to be free from deliberate indifference to a serious risk of suicide was well established in 1998, so qualified immunity is not available here.
Also, a reasonable jury could find against Sheriff Rice in his official capacity because the Sheriff's Department did not have in place a needed policy aimed at identifying and protecting suicidal inmates. Defendants' motion for summary judgment is therefore denied.
Evidence is admissible for purposes of summary judgment to the same extent that such evidence is admissible at trial. See Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738, 742 (7th Cir. 1997) (). Defendants have raised a number of objections to evidence that Mrs. Terry has submitted in opposition to summary judgment.
On March 21, 1998, about three weeks before he succeeded in committing suicide, Donald deliberately cut his wrist at the jail and then fought with jailers. Sheriff Rice and Chief Deputy Coudret then transferred Donald to the Indiana Department of Correction's Reception and Diagnostic Center (RDC) for "safekeeping." Six days later, defendants Coudret and Rice had Donald transferred back to the jail, ostensibly because the cost of the RDC stay was prohibitive for the county. Exhibit B consists of Indiana Department of Correction records from Donald's six-day stay at the RDC from March 21-27, 1998. The records include the RDC psychiatric evaluations and related materials indicating that RDC officials viewed Donald as a suicide threat and put him on a suicide watch.
Defendants argue that the entire exhibit is hearsay and not subject to any exception. This objection is overruled. The documents are being offered for the truth of matters asserted in them. However, the documents are admissible pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(B). The first page of Exhibit B is a Certification of Records bearing the seal of the Indiana Department of Correction and the signature and attestation of the keeper of the records. The records are of a public agency, are required to be maintained, and address matters required by law to be observed. To the extent the records include hearsay-within-hearsay statements by Donald relevant to his then-existing mental, emotional, or physical conditions and/or for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment, such statements are admissible under Rule 803(3) and (4).
Defendants next argue that the March 12, 1998 letter by Dr. Abbert in Exhibit E and the February 23, 1998 chart notes of Dr. Surakanti in Exhibit F are inadmissible hearsay. These objections are sustained.
Dr. Abbert's 1998 letter was addressed to Judge Ault of the Montgomery Superior Court concerning Donald's court mandated psychiatric evaluation. It is a certified copy, stamped by the clerk of the court. Defendants argue that this is inadmissible hearsay. Plaintiff responds by pointing out that the letter is authenticated pursuant to Rule 902(4) of the Federal Rules Evidence. She also argues that it is admissible pursuant to Rule 703 because Dr. Morgan, one of plaintiff's experts, relies on the letter. See Fed.R.Evid. 703 (). Rule 703, however, does not allow an expert witness to cure so easily the hearsay problem for what is otherwise inadmissible evidence. Rule 703 provides in part: "Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect." Fed.R.Evid. 703. At this point, defendants' objection is sustained.
Defendants also object to Dr. Surakanti's chart notes on hearsay grounds. The notes were produced by defendants as a part of Donald's prison record. See Wegner Aff. ¶ 3. They are barely legible and contain no identification that would indicate whose writing it is. See, e.g., Pl. Ex. F at 24. Defendants have made a proper hearsay objection, and plaintiff has failed to address it by suggesting an applicable exception. The objection is therefore sustained. The fact that defendants produce a document does not mean it is admissible against them.
Exhibit K consists of portions of Donald's medical records from Wabash Valley Hospital at various times from 1990 to 1998. Defendants argue that these are hearsay and inadmissible. These documents fall squarely within the Rule 803(6) exception to hearsay for records of regularly conducted activity. The first page of Exhibit K is a certification signed by the custodian of the records satisfying the elements of the business records exception. Also, to the extent that the records contain hearsay in the form of statements made by Donald, those statements are admissible as statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis. See Fed.R.Evid. 803(4). Defendants' hearsay objection is overruled. The court notes defendants' argument that they had no notice of these matters, but that argument goes to substantive relevance rather than defendants' hearsay objection.
Exhibits D, G, and L through P are documents from Donald's prisoner file at the Montgomery County Jail. Donald had spent time in the jail on a number of prior occasions, and had even attempted suicide there in 1989. The records in question reflect that suicide attempt and other incidents, and the documents were produced by defendants. See Wegner Aff. ¶ 3. Some of the documents are observation reports addressed to Sheriff Rice. Defendants argue that these documents contain inadmissible hearsay.
The documents in these exhibits are admissible under Rule 803(6) as business records if "1) the acts recorded therein were reported by a person with knowledge, 2) it was the regular practice of the prison as a regularly conducted business activity to record such acts, 3) the acts were recorded at or near the time of their occurrence, and 4) the documents are properly authenticated `unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.'" Wheeler v. Sims, 951 F.2d 796, 802 (7th Cir. 1992) (), quoting Fed.R.Evid. 803(6). A "prison is clearly a `business'" for purposes of Rule 803(6). Wheeler, 951 F.2d at 802 n. 5. These reports were prepared during the relevant time frames and "are the types of official business records prison authorities keep in the usual course of running" a jail, and "they certainly constitute records of regularly conducted activity in the business of operating a . . . correctional facility." Id. at 805. Furthermore, defendants themselves submitted as evidence some of the very documents they seek to exclude. See Rice Supp. Aff. Exs. 1-2. These hearsay objections are overruled.
Exhibit R is a letter from Karen McGinnis, the Assistant Superintendent of the Indiana Department of Correction. Defendants have objected to the submission of this letter on hearsay grounds. That objection is sustained.
In her letter, McGinnis states that Pl. Ex. R. In response to defendants' objection, plaintiffs argue that this falls within the Rule 803(10) exception, which states that the absence of a "matter of which a record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any form, was regularly made and...
To continue reading
Request your trial