Terwilliger v. Hennepin County
| Decision Date | 17 April 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. CX-95-1872,CX-95-1872 |
| Citation | 561 N.W.2d 909 |
| Parties | Michelle Denais TERWILLIGER, as trustee for the heirs and next of kin of Patrick Denais, Decedent, Respondent, v. HENNEPIN COUNTY, d/b/a Hennepin County Mental Health Center, et al., Petitioners, Appellants. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
Plaintiff's negligence action against Hennepin County and its employee for the alleged failure to hospitalize, to adequately monitor, and to properly treat a patient is not barred by statutory immunity under Minn.Stat. § 466.03, subd. 6 (1996), or by common-law official immunity.
Mackenzie & Hallberg, P.A., Mark Hallberg, Minneapolis, for Respondent.
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Michael B. Miller, Sr. Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, for Appellants.
Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc.
This matter presents the question of whether defendants Hennepin County, doing business as the Hennepin County Mental Health Center, and its employee, Dr. Keith Horton, a psychiatrist, are entitled to either statutory or official immunity for alleged negligence in treating a depressed patient who ultimately committed suicide in his home. We affirm the court of appeals' determination that the defendants are not entitled to statutory immunity under Minn.Stat. § 466.03, subd. 6 (1996), and hold further that official immunity is likewise inapplicable.
The plaintiff, Michelle Denais Terwilliger, is the duly-appointed trustee for the heirs and next-of-kin of the deceased, Patrick Denais. In 1993, Mr. Denais was 31 years old, was married, and had three children. He first became a patient of the Mental Health Center in February 1993, when he sought treatment for depression. He was assigned to Brian Morseth, a licensed social worker, with whom Mr. Denais met for counseling on approximately six occasions between his intake in February and his death in August 1993.
On July 20, 1993, after a phone conversation with Morseth, Mr. Denais came to the Crisis Intervention Center (part of the Mental Health Center) stating that he was experiencing increased depression, had thoughts of killing himself, and wanted to be hospitalized. He was seen and assessed by Jan Shackelford, an intervention center social worker who referred him to Dr. Robert Werner for an assessment of his need for hospitalization and prescription medications. Dr. Werner examined Mr. Denais that same day and noted that Mr. Denais had "fleeting" thoughts of suicide, but that he "feels responsible for family, has no specific plan or intention--feels he has good enough self control." Dr. Werner determined that Mr. Denais did not need to be hospitalized, and prescribed two medications for depression.
The following day, on July 21, 1993, Mr. Denais met with Morseth for counseling but had not yet started taking the medications prescribed by Dr. Werner. The next day, July 22, 1993, Mr. Denais met with and was evaluated by Dr. Keith Horton. During their meeting, Dr. Horton ascertained that Mr. Denais had not begun taking the prescribed medications and, after discussing this with Mr. Denais, re-prescribed the same medications. Dr. Horton also made an appointment to see Mr. Denais approximately one month later to determine how the medications were working. Dr. Horton noted in the medical records that he "understood" that Mr. Denais would continue to see Morseth at the Mental Health Center in the interim.
By the time Mr. Denais met with Morseth four days later on July 26, 1993, he had begun taking his medications, but was continuing to feel depressed and anxious. Morseth noted, however, "no suicidal plan or intent reported." On August 3, 1993, Mr. Denais cancelled his appointment with Morseth and five days later hanged himself in the bedroom of his home.
Plaintiff, Mr. Denais' widow, commenced this action in February 1995, naming both the county (doing business as the Hennepin County Mental Health Center) and Dr. Horton as defendants. Her complaint alleges that Dr. Horton and the county--acting through its agents and employees--were negligent in providing mental health care and treatment to Mr. Denais. "[B]y way of example," the complaint offers three specific allegations of negligence:
A. Defendant Hennepin County failed to hospitalize Patrick Denais on occasions when it knew or should have known that Patrick Denais was profoundly depressed and suicidal;
B. Defendant Hennepin County, acting through its agent and employees, failed to properly monitor Patrick Denais' condition after he was placed on medications and failed to provide appropriate support of therapy and counseling to treat Patrick Denais' severe depression and suicide potential;
C. Defendants acted or failed to act in other inappropriate ways.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim on the grounds that the defendants were entitled to statutory immunity for discretionary acts under Minn.Stat. § 466.03, subd. 6, and municipal hospital immunity under Minn.Stat. § 466.03, subd. 11. The trial court granted the defendants' motion based upon statutory immunity under Minn.Stat. § 466.03, subd. 6.
The court of appeals reversed, holding that "once the decision to treat has been made, the manner in which treatment is rendered is not absolutely immune from tort liability." Terwilliger v. Hennepin County Mental Health Ctr., 542 N.W.2d 675, 681 (Minn.App.1996). The court reasoned that while a "decision to provide mental health services to individuals, may be, at its broadest level, a policy-based decision, treatment itself does not often involve policy considerations." Id. at 679.
We must first consider whether the Mental Health Center is protected by statutory immunity from the claims asserted. The statute at issue provides that a municipality is immune from liability for "[a]ny claim based upon the performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty, whether or not the discretion is abused." Minn.Stat. § 466.03, subd. 6. The problem, of course, is whether the particular governmental act or acts at issue involve the exercise of discretion.
In answering this question, we are guided by prior cases interpreting the similar statutory language of the discretionary function exception in the State Tort Claims Act, Minn.Stat. § 3.736, subd. 3(b). See Cairl v. State, 323 N.W.2d 20, 22 (Minn.1982). In examining the extent of tort immunity preserved by the Act, we have explained,
[T]he discretionary function exception [to the State's liability for torts] is designed to assure that the courts do not pass judgment on policy decisions entrusted to coordinate branches of government. The discretionary function exception thus addresses separation of powers concerns by preventing tort actions from becoming a vehicle for judicial interference with executive and legislative policymaking.
* * * Planning level decisions are those involving questions of public policy, that is, the evaluation of factors such as the financial, political, economic, and social effects of a given plan or policy. Operational level decisions, on the other hand, involve decisions relating to the ordinary day-to-day operations of the government.
* * * The question is not whether the State's conduct resulted in a condition posing an unreasonable risk of harm; it is whether the conduct consisted of planning or policymaking decisions (protected) or operational level decisions (unprotected).
Holmquist v. State, 425 N.W.2d 230, 231-32 (Minn.1988) (citations omitted). We have also observed that the legislature did not intend the discretionary function exception to swallow the general rule of allowing recovery for those injuries negligently inflicted in the performance of government operations. See Cairl, 323 N.W.2d at 23. Accordingly, when "determining whether particular conduct is protected,...
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