Terwilliger v. Home of Hope, Inc., 96-C-1042-H.
| Decision Date | 21 May 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-C-1042-H.,96-C-1042-H. |
| Citation | 21 F.Supp.2d 1294 |
| Parties | Dale Jean TERWILLIGER on behalf of herself and all other employees of Home of Hope, Inc. similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. HOME OF HOPE, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Oklahoma |
Gerald Robert Lee, Pryor, OK, for Plaintiffs.
Steven Ernest Holden, Terry Scott O'Donnell, Karen Marie Grundy, Best, Sharp, Holden, Sheridan, Best & Sullivan, Brian E. Dittrich, Mills & Whitten, Tulsa, OK, for Defendants.
Mark Lawton Jones, Office of Atty. Gen., Oklahoma City, OK, for Oklahoma Dept. of Human Services, amicus.
D. Kevin Ikenberry, Stephen L. Andrew & Assoc., Tulsa, OK, for Gatesway Foundation, Inc., amicus.
This matter comes before the Court on a motion for summary judgment (Docket # 55) by Defendant Home of Hope, Inc. ("Home of Hope") and a motion for summary judgment contained in three volumes (Docket # 57, 58, 59) by the remaining Plaintiffs in this suit. Home of Hope seeks summary judgment regarding the claims for overtime compensation and use of the companionship services exemption by these Plaintiffs. A hearing was held in this matter on April 10, 1998. The Court also viewed two homes of Home of Hope clients on April 24, 1998.
Summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact," Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Windon Third Oil & Gas Drilling Partnership v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 805 F.2d 342, 345 (10th Cir.1986), and "the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law," Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In Celotex, the Supreme Court stated:
[t]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.
477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment must offer evidence, in admissible form, of specific facts, Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e), sufficient to raise a "genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (). "Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
Summary judgment is only appropriate if "there is [not] sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Id. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The Supreme Court stated:
[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.
Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Thus, to defeat a summary judgment motion, the nonmovant "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ( ) (citations omitted).
In essence, the inquiry for the Court is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Id. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In its review, the Court construes the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Boren v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 933 F.2d 891, 892 (10th Cir.1991).
For purposes of this motion, the Court accepts as true the following facts agreed to by the parties:
1. This case arises out of a dispute regarding overtime wages originally filed by Plaintiff, Dale Jean Terwilliger, on November 12, 1996, on behalf of herself and all other similarly situated employees at Home of Hope.
2. On June 18, 1997, Plaintiff's counsel filed an Amended Complaint on behalf of 50 employees who wished to participate in this litigation.
3. Based on the companionship services exemption found at 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15), certain personnel in the Supported Living Program, including Habilitation Training Specialists ("HTS") personnel and House Managers, were not paid for overtime incurred during the relevant time.
4. Home of Hope's Supported Living Program provides services for adult clients with developmental disabilities.
5. The Plaintiffs involved in this lawsuit were employed in Home of Hope's Supported Living Program either as HTS personnel or House Managers during the period of time from June 30, 1994 to July 1, 1996.
6. The job duties of an HTS worker include assisting clients with developmental disabilities with daily living needs, as well as providing incidental training and other support as needed.
7. The job duties of a house manager including supervising small groups of other HTS personnel working in the client's home, as well as providing assistance to individual clients with daily living needs and training.
8. Home of Hope's Supported Living Program has been in existence since 1989.
9. The services that Home of Hope provides to its clients are governed by a series of contracts with the Oklahoma State Department of Human Services ("DHS"). These contracts require that individuals receiving services provided for by the contracts receive those services in a home owned or leased by the individual.
10. The majority of Home of Hope's clients in its Supported Living Program are former residents of the Hissom Memorial Center.
11. The clients currently range in age from approximately twenty-years old to fifty-years old, with an average age of thirty-nine.
12. The purpose of Home of Hope's Supported Living Program is to provide supervision, habilitation, protection, incidental training and assistance with the activities of daily living to these clients in their own homes.
13. At the time of filing of the motions, there were forty-five clients in the Supported Living Program residing in twenty-seven homes. Ten of the twenty-seven homes, or thirty-seven percent, have a single client.
14. Six of the homes, or twenty-two percent of the total, are owned by the client or his or her legal guardian.
15. Typically, there are no more than two clients residing in each of the remaining seventeen homes.
16. The client can affect changes in staff at his or her home at any time for any reason. Many of the Plaintiffs in this lawsuit, for example, have been replaced in a particular home at the request of a client.
17. The client can change providers from Home of Hope to another agency at any time. In the event of a change in providers, the home stays with the client.
18. The client chooses the paint and decor of his or her own house, and no two houses are alike.
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., hourly workers must be compensated at a rate one-half times the regular rate for hours worked in excess of forty hours per workweek. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).1 An exemption to this general rule is found in the provision dealing with "companionship services." This exemption states that the overtime requirements in § 207 do not apply to:
any employee employed in domestic service employment to provide companionship services for individuals who (because of age or infirmity) are unable to care for themselves (as such terms are defined and delimited by regulations of the Secretary).
29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15). Thus, to be covered by this exemption, employees must be engaged in "domestic service employment" and must perform "companionship services."
Initially, the Court notes that exemptions from the FLSA must be narrowly construed. A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493, 65 S.Ct. 807, 89 L.Ed. 1095 (1945). Moreover, as the Tenth Circuit has stated:
[a]n employer who asserts he is exempt from the Act "has the burden of establishing the exemption affirmatively and clearly." The Act constitutes humanitarian and remedial legislation. Exemptions must be narrowly construed and are limited to those establishments plainly and unmistakably within the terms and the spirt of the exemption invoked."
Schoenhals v. Cockrum, 647 F.2d 1080, 1081 (10th Cir.1981) (citation omitted).
As noted above, to fall within the companionship services exemption, an employee must first be classified as a domestic service employee. "Domestic service employment" includes "persons who are frequently referred to as `private household workers.'" 29 C.F.R. § 552.101(a). The term "domestic service employment" is defined in the regulations as "services of a household nature performed by an employee in or about a private home (permanent or temporary) of the person by whom he or she is employed." 29 C.F.R. § 552.3.2 "However, a dwelling house used primarily as a boarding or lodging house for the purpose of supplying such services to the public, as a business enterprise, is not a private home." H.R.Rep. No. 93-913, at 74 (1974), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 2811. Thus, the determinative factor in domestic service employment is that the employment must occur in a "private home."
Plaintiffs contend that they did not perform services in the private homes of Home of Hope clients and thus are not covered by the companionship services exemption. In determining whether a living arrangement is a "private home," instead of an institution or business enterprise, courts look to several factors concerning the residence. These factors include: (1...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Coke v. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd.
...that have considered § 552.109(a) have accorded it Chevron deference. See, e.g., Johnston, 213 F.3d at 561-62; Terwilliger v. Home of Hope, Inc., 21 F.Supp.2d at 1299 n. 2. But Coke is correct that none of these prior cases carefully considered the question before us now: Does Mead, which p......
-
Stansbury v. Dr. Lee Faulkner & Physicians of Hearts, P. L. L.C.
...to determine from the record whether more than 20% of his time was spent performing those duties); Terwilliger v. Home of Hope, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1301-02 (N.D. Okla. 1998) (precluding summary judgment when plaintiffs claimed they met the 20% threshold and submitted affidavits stati......
-
Gay v. Extended Family Concepts
...of Tulsa, Inc., 891 F.Supp. 574, 579 (N.D.Okla. 1995). Other courts consider similar factors. See, e.g., Terwilliger v. Home of Hope, 21 F.Supp.2d 1294, 1299-1300 (N.D.Okla.1998) (finding there was a "private home" because company providing services had no ownership interest in the home, re......
-
Coke v. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd.
...any cases where the subject employees were employed by the individual client, rather than by an agency." Terwilliger v. Home of Hope, Inc., 21 F.Supp.2d 1294, 1299, n. 2 (N.D.Ok.1998). In regard to Plaintiffs argument that Congress did not intend to remove "enterprise coverage" to those emp......