Teske v. State
Decision Date | 14 April 1987 |
Docket Number | 6 Div. 217 |
Citation | 507 So.2d 569 |
Parties | Charles TESKE v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Joseph W. Hudson, Jasper, for appellant.
Don Siegelman, Atty. Gen., and James F. Hampton and J. Anthony McLain, Special Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee.
The appellant, Charles Teske, was indicted, by separate indictments, for the offense of assault in the first degree, as proscribed by § 13A-6-20, Code of Alabama 1975, with his elderly parents being the victims. He was convicted by a jury and sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment for each offense, with the sentences to run concurrently.
The only issue we find necessary to address is whether the record supports the conclusion that Teske knowingly and intelligently waived his Sixth Amendment right to representation by counsel at trial, as required by the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2541, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). In regard to this issue, the record reflects the following:
The judgment entry further shows that the court adjudged Teske as "being capable of making reasonably intelligent, voluntary and conscious decisions and of exercising freedom of choices," and found that Teske "is prepared to exercise such alternatives as are legally his." On August 22, 1986, after the jury had rendered its verdict on August 19, Teske was asked by the trial court if he wanted an attorney to represent him on appeal. Teske replied affirmatively, so the court appointed standby counsel, Mr. Hudson. The appointment order showed that Mr. Hudson was appointed on August 22 for sentencing and appeal. Three days later, at sentencing, Mr. Hudson was present.
From the colloquy quoted above, it appears that Teske affirmatively sought to exercise his right to proceed pro se, which the Faretta Court recognized as being guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, and to thereby waive his constitutional right to counsel. "It is undeniable that the State cannot force a lawyer upon a defendant in a criminal trial, where the defendant has voluntarily and intelligently elected to proceed without counsel." Clark v. City of Mobile, 357 So.2d 675, 676 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 357 So.2d 680 (Ala.1978) (citing Faretta ). However, the following principles must be observed:
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (footnotes omitted, emphasis added). These principles are equally applicable to asserted waivers of the right to counsel in state criminal proceedings. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 515, 82 S.Ct. 884, 889, 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962). In the later case of Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541, wherein the Court held that an accused does have a constitutional right to proceed without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so, the Court observed the following:
While some courts interpret these principles to require that a trial court expressly admonish a defendant of the dangers and pitfalls of self-representation, others construe these principles to require only that it appear from the record as a whole that a defendant's waiver of counsel and decision to represent himself were knowing and intelligent and these other courts held that the focus of the inquiry is not on the information revealed by the court but on the knowledge of the accused, as shown by the circumstances surrounding the waiver. 2 W. LaFave and J. Israel, Criminal Procedure §§ 11.3(b), 11.5(c) (1984) See also People v. Longwith, 125 Cal.App.3d 400, 408, 178 Cal.Rptr. 136, 140 (1981) ( ). The Alabama courts appear to follow this latter interpretation. See e.g., King v. State, 55 Ala.App....
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...'"by a preponderance of the evidence, that he did not intelligently and understandingly waive his right to 59 counsel."' Teske v. State, 507 So.2d 569, 571 (Ala.Crim.App.1987), quoting Moore v. 355 U.S. 155, 161-62, [78 S.Ct. 191, 2 L.Ed.2d 167] (1957). The Supreme Court in Carnley v. Cochr......
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