Teufel v. Kaufmann

Decision Date15 December 1942
Docket Number45995.
Citation6 N.W.2d 850,233 Iowa 443
PartiesTEUFEL v. KAUFMANN.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Smith, Swift & Maloney and G. W. Vander Vennet all of Davenport, and Herbert G. Thompson, of Muscatine, for appellant.

Harold E. Wilson, Albee & Albee, and Tipton & Tipton, all of Muscatine, for appellee.

WENNERSTRUM Chief Justice.

The appellant was the plaintiff in an action brought to recover damages by reason of injuries received which resulted from a collision of a car driven by the appellee with a car in which the appellant was riding. The collision occurred at a country intersection. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the appellee. From an adverse ruling on appellant's motion for a new trial and exceptions to instructions he has appealed.

The evidence presented shows a variance in the testimony of the witnesses as to who first entered the intersection.

The claimed errors assigned on the part of the appellant are: (1) That the court failed to instruct the jury on the issue of imputed negligence; (2) that the court erred in overruling appellant's motion for a new trial wherein the question as to the necessity of instructing on the question of imputed negligence was set forth; (3) that the court did not define properly in its instructions the word "intersection"; (4) that the court erred in the giving of certain instructions which will be commented upon in part later.

I. It is the claim of the appellant that the court erred in that it failed to instruct the jury on the question of imputed negligence it being contended that this issue was raised by the pleadings. The evidence shows that the appellant and the driver of the car with whom he was riding at the time of the collision had used their respective cars on different occasions in going on hunting trips. It is further shown that they had not alternated in the use of their cars on the various hunting trips but even if that had been true that alone could not be the basis upon which it could be said that they were engaged in a joint adventure on the particular trip when the collision occurred.

In the case of Stingley v. Crawford, 219 Iowa 509, 512, 513, 258 N.W 316 318, we said: "The fundamental doctrine controlling this question of joint adventure or common enterprise is not controlled by the fact that the parties are going to the same place on the same mission, but by whether or not the complaining party bore such relation to his associate as that he had the right of control in some manner over the means of locomotion. Such seems to have been the rule in this state as shown by the cases of Lawrence v. Sioux City, 172 Iowa 320, 154 N.W. 494; Wagner v. Kloster, 188 Iowa 174, 175 N.W. 840; Stoker v. Tri-City Ry. Co., 182 Iowa 1090, 165 N.W. 30, L.R.A.1918F, 515; Stilson v. Ellis, 208 Iowa 1157, 225 N.W. 346; and Albert v. Maher Bros. Transfer Co., 215 Iowa 197, 243 N.W. 561."

Plaintiff did not request an instruction such as is contended for in his motion for a new trial and in this court. In the absence of a request for such an instruction we hold that there is no reversible error under the facts in this case.

II. In one of the instructions which was in part descriptive of the intersection and the incidents that occurred at the time of the collision, the trial court, in commenting as to an intersection, said: "Now what is meant by the word 'intersection'? The law defines the meaning as being the area within the lateral boundary lines of * * * highways which join."

It is the contention of the appellant that the trial court erred in defining the word "intersection" as it did, asserting that the court should have given the statutory definition of intersection which is found in Chapter 134, Section 1, subsection 51, Acts of the 47th G. A. (Code, Section 5000.01, par. 51).

This statutory definition so far as it is applicable to the question before us is as follows: "'Intersection' means the area embraced within * * * the lateral boundary lines of the roadways of two highways which join one another at, or approximately at, right angles, * * *."

In the case of Hupp v. Doolittle, 226 Iowa 814, 285 N.W. 247, this court commented upon the instruction wherein the word intersection was incorrectly defined. In that case we held that in connection with the defining of the word "intersection" the statutory definition of "roadway", found in subsection 47 of section 1 of Code, section 5000.01, should have been given. It will be observed...

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