Tex-Cal Land Management, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd.

• Decision Date: 21 February 1978
• Docket Number: TEX-CAL,R,AFL-CI
• Citation: 144 Cal.Rptr. 149,77 Cal.App.3d 794
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 98 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2662, 84 Lab.Cas. P 55,142 LAND MANAGEMENT, INC., Petitioner, v. AGRICULTURAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent; UNITED FARM WORKERS OF AMERICA,eal Party in Interest. Civ. 3395.

Page 149

144 Cal.Rptr. 149

77 Cal.App.3d 794, 98 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2662,

84 Lab.Cas. P 55,142

TEX-CAL LAND MANAGEMENT, INC., Petitioner, v. AGRICULTURAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent UNITED FARM WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, Real Party in Interest.

Civ. 3395.

Court of Appeal, Fifth District, California.

Feb. 21, 1978.

For Opinion on Hearing, See 156 Cal.Rptr. 1, 595 P.2d 579.

Joseph Herman, George E. Preonas, Bette Bardeen, Karen Garver, Keith A. Hunsaker, Jr., Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, Los Angeles, for petitioner.

Harry J. Delizonna, Gen. Counsel, Manuel M. Medeiros, Davis, Marian Kennedy, Staff Counsel, Edwin F. Lowry and Gary Williams, Legal Counsel, Sacramento, for respondent.

Jerome Cohen, Sanford N. Nathan, Thomas Dalzell, III, Deborah Wiener Peyton, W. Daniel Boone, Glenn Rothner, E. Michael Heumann, II, Linton Joaquin, Salinas, for real party in interest.

OPINION

FRANSON, Associate Justice.

INTRODUCTION

This review has its genesis in events which occurred at petitioner's agricultural properties in Kern County between September 15, 1975, and October 3, 1975. The United Farm Workers of America, AFL-CIO (UFW), filed several unfair labor practice charges against petitioner with the Agricultural Labor Relations Board (Board) alleging that petitioner had denied access to UFW organizers on several occasions, had assaulted organizers lawfully attempting to take access to petitioner's property and had included certain employees in a layoff because of their support for the UFW union. Four of the charges were consolidated into a complaint issued by the Board's Fresno regional director on November 7, 1975. A hearing was held before an administrative law officer (ALO) of the Board on December 1 through December 4, 1975.

On February 11, 1976, the ALO issued his decision and recommendation to the Board finding that petitioner had committed various unfair labor practices and had not committed others. Both petitioner and the general counsel for the Board filed exceptions to the ALO's decision. On February 15, 1976, the Board issued its decision adopting the ALO's findings, conclusions, and recommendation in part and overruling them in part. Based upon its findings, the Board ordered petitioner to cease and desist from engaging in the unfair labor practices found to have occurred and ordered petitioner to take certain affirmative actions to remedy the effects of its unlawful conduct.

Before we can review the merits of the Board's order, we must decide two fundamental issues going to the very heart of the agricultural labor relations law: (1) the constitutionality of the adjudicative powers vested in the Board by virtue of Labor Code section 1160.3, and (2) the constitutionality and nature of the judicial review of Board orders provided by Labor Code section 1160.8. Because these are questions of first impression, an extended discussion is called for.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ADJUDICATIVE POWERS OF THE BOARD

The Agricultural Labor Relations Act (ALRA) (Lab. Code, § 1140 et seq.) is a legislative attempt to regulate labor-management relations at California farms in much the same way as the National Labor Relations Act (NRLA) (29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq.) governs its industrial counterparts. The ALRA is a comprehensive labor relations statute which seeks ". . . to ensure peace in the agricultural fields by guaranteeing justice for all agricultural workers and stability in labor relations" and ". . . is intended to bring certainty and a sense of fair play to a presently unstable and potentially volatile condition in the state" (Stats.1975 (Third Ex. Sess.) ch. 1, § 1, p. 4013).

Labor Code section 1140.2 expresses the policy behind the act:

"It is hereby stated to be the policy of the State of California to encourage and protect the right of agricultural employees to full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of their employment, and to be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. For this purpose this part is adopted to provide for collective-bargaining rights for agricultural employees."

The Legislature modeled the ALRA on the NLRA. The ALRA requires the Board to follow "applicable precedents" of the NLRA (Lab. Code, § 1148). Chapter 2 of the California act creates the Board. Chapter 6 empowers the Board to adjudicate claims of unfair labor practices. Section 1160.2 authorizes the Board to issue complaints stating charges; the person charged is entitled to file an answer and appear in person and give testimony. The Board may take further testimony or hear argument (Lab.Code, § 1160.3). If the preponderance of the testimony indicates that the charge is true, the Board is to state its findings of fact and issue a remedial order (id.). ¹

It is clear from the provisions of chapter 6 that the Board is empowered to act as a judicial tribunal so far as its right to adjudicate agricultural labor disputes. Its findings are like those of a court. (Cf. People v. Western Air Lines, Inc. (1954) 42 Cal.2d 621, 632, 268 P.2d 723; Southern Calif. Edison Co. v. Railroad Com. (1936) 6 Cal.2d 737, 749, 59 P.2d 808.) The specified procedure, the determination of controverted facts between private litigants, and the decision based thereon all underscore the judicial character of the Board. (Cf. People v. Western Air Lines, Inc., supra, 42 Cal.2d at p. 631, 268 P.2d 723; Pacific Telephone, etc., Co. v. Eshleman (1913) 166 Cal. 640, 650, 137 P. 1119.)

The California Constitution provides:

"The powers of state government are legislative, executive, and judicial. Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others except as permitted by this Constitution." (Art. III, § 3.)

"The judicial power of this State is vested in the Supreme Court, courts of appeal, superior courts, municipal courts, and justice courts. All except justice courts are courts of record." (Art. VI, § 1.)

Under these sections the Legislature is powerless, in the absence of a constitutional provision authorizing the same, to confer judicial functions upon a statewide administrative agency. (Standard Oil Co. v. State Board of Equalization (1936) 6 Cal.2d 557, 559, 59 P.2d 119; Laisne v. Cal. St. Bd. of Optometry (1942) 19 Cal.2d 831, 834, 123 P.2d 457.) Thus, only a constitutionally authorized administrative agency can exercise judicial power. We therefore must look to the state Constitution to see if the Legislature was authorized to create the Board and to vest it with judicial power.

We find such authority in article XIV, section 1. It provides: "The Legislature may provide for minimum wages and for the general welfare of employees and for these purposes may confer on a commission legislative, executive, and judicial powers." (Emphasis added.) This provision seems clear and unambiguous. It literally authorizes the Legislature to enact any law which it seems necessary for the general welfare of employees a carte blanche grant of power over employees in the context of employment relations in California. Since it cannot be disputed that the collective bargaining purpose of the ALRA fits squarely within the "general welfare" language of the amendment, this should end the constitutional inquiry.

Petitioner, however, challenges this interpretation of article XIV, section 1, by arguing that the history of the amendment shows that the framers intended only to give the Legislature power to authorize a commission to enact minimum wage laws and to regulate hours and conditions of work and did not intend to confer authority on the Legislature to enact laws pertaining to self-representation and collective bargaining by employees. In short, petitioner asserts that the ALRA is outside the original intent of the framers of article XIV, section 1.

Article XIV, section 1, was enacted in 1970 as a revision of former article XX, section 171/2 which provided "The Legislature may, by appropriate legislation, provide for the establishment of a minimum wage for women and minors and may provide for the comfort, health, safety and general welfare of any and all employees. No provision of this Constitution shall be construed as a limitation upon the authority of the Legislature to confer upon any commission now or hereafter created, such power and authority as the Legislature may deem requisite to carry out the provisions of this section." (Emphasis added.)

Article XX, section 171/2 was adopted in 1914. The reasons for its adoption are set forth in the California Constitutional Revision Commission Background Study No. 3, October 1968, at page 8, as follows:

"In 1913 a statute was passed in California creating the Industrial Welfare Commission. There were indications that the Commission would recommend minimum wages for women and children. Concern arose as to the constitutionality of the minimum wage provision, probably as conflicting with the article IV special law provisions and as contrary to the rule against delegation of legislative or judicial power. A number of other states had enacted somewhat similar legislation which was being tested in the courts. To assure that the minimum wage provision would not conflict with the Constitution this Section was placed on the ballot and adopted by the electors in 1914."

The 1914 ballot literature shows that article XX, section 171/2 was intended by the electors to give constitutional authority to the Legislature to enact laws pertaining to wages paid, hours worked, conditions of work, and the general welfare of the women and children employed in industry.

In 1970 as the result of the work of the Constitutional Revision Commission, article XX, section 171/2 was...