Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Rabideau
| Decision Date | 17 July 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 06-19-00017-CV,06-19-00017-CV |
| Parties | TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Appellant v. ALAN L. RABIDEAU, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2 Williamson County, Texas
Before Morriss, C.J., Burgess and Stevens, JJ.
After Round Rock police officer Bryce Branzell stopped Alan L. Rabideau for speeding in Williamson County1 and initially decided that he was going to let Rabideau off with a warning, Branzell reportedly smelled alcohol on Rabideau's breath and noticed Rabideau's eyes were bloodshot. Branzell investigated further and ultimately arrested Rabideau for driving while intoxicated (DWI). Rabideau refused Branzell's request to provide a breath or blood specimen. As a result, the Texas Department of Public Safety (the Department)2 suspended Rabideau's driver's license. In Rabideau's requested hearing on the suspension, an administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that Rabideau's driver's license was subject to suspension for 180 days.3 Next, Rabideau appealed to the County Court at Law No. 2 of Williamson County (the CCL), which reversed the ALJ's decision.4 Now, the Department appeals to this Court, challenging the CCL's reversal of the ALJ's decision and asserting that there was substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's decision. We reverse the CCL's judgment and render judgment reinstating the ALJ's decision, because (1) substantial evidence supported the trial court's finding of reasonablesuspicion and (2) Rabideau did not preserve a complaint that there was an unreasonable delay in the DWI investigation. Those reasons lead us to the ultimate conclusion that there was no constitutional violation arguable on appeal that prejudiced Rabideau's substantial rights.
At the administrative hearing, admitted without objection were a copy of Branzell's offense report and a statutory warning signed by Rabideau in which he acknowledged that, after his arrest, he refused Branzell's request for a breath and blood specimen. Branzell and Officer Michael Childress also testified.
The evidence showed that, around 10:00 p.m. on December 19, 2017, Branzell observed a motorcycle traveling at a high rate of speed on North Mays Street in Round Rock, and he confirmed with his in-car radar that it was travelling fifty-one miles per hour in a thirty-five-mile-per-hour zone. Branzell began following the vehicle and observed it make an unusual, but not illegal, right turn at a red light at the intersection of East Palm Valley Boulevard. After pulling the vehicle over, Branzell determined that the driver was Rabideau, who provided him with a voided Texas driver's license and a paper Montana driver's license. After providing Rabideau's information to dispatch, Branzell was prepared to give him a warning ticket and release him.
However, when he returned to the motorcycle and told Rabideau that he was giving him a warning, Branzell smelled metabolized alcohol on his breath and noticed that his eyes were bloodshot.5 Although Rabideau denied consuming any alcohol, he did not explain the smell of alcohol on his breath. He also said that he had taken prescription pain pills and muscle relaxersfor injuries to his back and legs, but would not disclose when he took those medications. Branzell decided to investigate Rabideau for DWI and called for backup, which arrived after several minutes. Branzell did not administer any field sobriety tests until after Officer Childress, who responded to the backup call, arrived on the scene.6
Prior to his arrest, Branzell did not see Rabideau stagger, stumble, or fall. However, Rabideau remained seated on his motorcycle until he was arrested. Rabideau's speech was not impaired and was consistent with sobriety. He also appropriately pulled his motorcycle over in response to Branzell's emergency lights.
We review the ALJ's decision under a substantial evidence standard. See Mireles v. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 9 S.W.3d 128, 131 (Tex. 1999). Under the substantial evidence standard, the ALJ's decision may not be reversed unless the appellant's substantial rights "have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are:"
TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2001.174(2). The issue on appeal is whether there is some reasonable basis to support the ALJ's decision, not whether it made the correct decision. See Mireles, 9 S.W.3d at 131. We may not substitute our judgment for that of the agency. Id. (citing TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2001.174). We must affirm the ALJ's decision if there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support it, even if the preponderance of the evidence is against it. Id. We presume that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's findings, inferences, conclusions, and decisions, and it is Rabideau's burden to prove otherwise. See Stagg v. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 81 S.W.3d 441, 443 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.) (citing City of El Paso v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 883 S.W.2d 179, 185 (Tex. 1994)).
TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 724.042.
In its decision, the ALJ found that the Department had proven each of those four elements. On appeal, Rabideau does not challenge the ALJ's findings that there was reasonable suspicion to stop him for speeding, that he was placed under arrest and was requested to submit to the taking of a specimen, or that he refused that request. Neither does he challenge the ALJ's finding that there was probable cause to arrest him for operating his motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated. Rather, Rabideau contends that his constitutional right to be free from a warrantless search was violated because there was not reasonable suspicion to detain him to investigate whether he was driving while intoxicated, and there was an unreasonable delay in initiating the investigation.
Rabideau first argues that there was not reasonable suspicion to believe he was driving while intoxicated, and therefore his detention was unlawful. "A traffic stop made for the purpose of investigating a traffic violation must be reasonably related to that purpose and may not beprolonged beyond the time to complete the tasks associated with the traffic stop." Lerma v. State, 543 S.W.3d 184, 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (citing Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 63-64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)). During the stop, the officer may obtain certain information from the driver, may run a computer check on that information, and "is permitted to ask the driver and passengers about matters unrelated to the purpose of the stop, so long as the questioning does not measurably extend the duration of the stop." Id. (citing Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009)). However, whether the official tasks of the traffic stop have ended, the officer may continue the detention if he develops reasonable suspicion that the driver or an occupant of the vehicle is involved in illegal activity. Id. at 191 (citing Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333).
"Reasonable suspicion exists if the officer has specific, articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him [or her] to reasonably conclude that a particular person actually is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity." Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (citing Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527, 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)). In determining whether there is reasonable suspicion, we use an objective standard that disregards the subjective intent of the officer and looks solely to whether an objective basis for the detention exists. See id. at 492; Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527, 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). The facts must create some reasonable suspicion that some activity out of the ordinary is occurring or has occurred, some suggestion to connect the detainee with the unusual activity, and some indication that the unusual activity is related to crime. Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We make our determination by considering the totality of the circumstances. Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 488-89; Garcia, 43 S.W.3d at 530.
The facts of this case are similar to those in Shakespeare v. State, No. 03-00-00707-CR, 2001 WL 421003 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 26, 2001, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for...
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