Tex. Workforce Comm'n v. Wichita Cnty.

• Decision Date: 08 December 2016
• Docket Number: No. SC 95482,SC 95482
• Citation: 507 S.W.3d 919
• Parties: TEXAS WORKFORCE COMMISSION, Appellant v. WICHITA COUNTY, TEXAS, Appellee
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

507 S.W.3d 919

TEXAS WORKFORCE COMMISSION, Appellant

v.WICHITA COUNTY, TEXAS, Appellee

No. SC 95482

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fort Worth.

DELIVERED: December 8, 2016

KEN PAXTON, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS; CHARLES E. ROY, FIRST ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL; JAMES E. DAVIS, DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR DEFENSE LITIGATION; ROBERT O'KEEFE, DIVISION CHIEF OF TAX DIVISION; PETER E. LAURIE, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, TAX DIVISION ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE AUSTIN, TX, FOR APPELLANT.

MAUREEN SHELTON, CRIMINAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY; MEREDITH L. KENNEDY, CHIEF OF CIVIL DIVISION; JENNIFER PONDER & ANDREW F. WIPKE, ASSISTANT CRIMINAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS FOR WICHITA COUNTY WICHITA FALLS, TX, FOR APPELLEE.

PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; WALKER and MEIER, JJ.

OPINION

TERRIE LIVINGSTON, CHIEF JUSTICE

This appeal raises the question of whether an employee who is taking leave under the federal Family and Medical Leave Act¹ (FMLA)—which gives certain protections to individuals who are employed—may obtain unemployment benefits under the Texas Labor Code. We hold that such a person may not simultaneously enjoy the benefits of both statutes. We therefore overrule TWC's two issues and affirm the judgment of the trial court, which rests on the same conclusion.

Background Facts

The facts at issue are largely undisputed. Appellee Wichita County, Texas (the County) employed Julia White beginning in 2006. White went on FMLA leave for depression and anxiety beginning on August 16, 2011. Her accrued paid leave ran out on August 19, when she went on unpaid leave. After August 19, the County continued paying White's health insurance, but it did not pay her wages. During a meeting in September 2011, the County determined that it could not accommodate White's needs with a different position at that time.² But at that meeting, the County committed to follow the FMLA by protecting White's employment and by paying her health insurance premiums through November 2011.

White applied to appellant Texas Workforce Commission (TWC) for unemployment benefits on October 2. The County contested White's claim on the basis that she was still employed and therefore could not receive benefits. TWC reached an initial decision that White was entitled to benefits on October 25, finding that "[w]hile [she was] on an unpaid leave of absence [she was] considered unemployed." Eventually, an accommodating position became available, and White returned to work for the County in a different department, therefore ending her FMLA leave, on November 4, 2011.

The County appealed TWC's initial determination approving White's unemployment benefits and requested an administrative hearing. At the hearing, the following exchange occurred between the hearing officer and White:

Q. Now, Ms. White, when did you begin to work for Wichita County prior to filing your claim for benefits, ma'am?

A. June 5th, 2006, I think.

....

Q. Did you quit, were you laid off, or were you discharged from this position?

A. None of the above.

Q. What is your contention?

A. I was ... out sick. I was in the hospital and—

Q. We'll get into some details later, ma'am.

A.—I was off on F.M.L.A.

Q. Okay. We're going to get into the details ....

A. Okay.

Q. Let me ask you first, did you consider yourself [as] quit, discharged, or laid off? What would—

A. None, none.

Q.—you consider yourself?

A. None. I wasn't. That's what I was explaining, I was never—

Q. Are you still working for the [County] now?

A. Yes. I was out on—

Q. Have you gone back to work?

A.—F.M.L.A, uh-huh.

Q. You've gone back to work?

A. Yes, sir.

....

Q. Now, Ms. White, you're saying you still work for the [County], but you filed a claim as of October 2nd, 2011. If you weren't separated—

A. Yes, sir.

Q.—from the [County], why did you file the claim for benefits at that time?

A. I was out on ... Family Medical Leave, and I ... hadn't had a paycheck since August 20th, I think. I don't remember the exact date. And my doctor and my counselor told me that I needed to check with Texas Workforce. So I asked—

Q. Okay.

A. I called—do you want me to continue?

Q. Continue.

A. Okay. When I called to make my claim, I told the lady on the phone when she asked me the same questions you did, that I did not quit, I was not fired, I was not separated from the company, but I was still out on F.M.L.A., and I explained the situation. She put me on hold. She came back and she said, you know, they would send me the information.

So they sent the information, and that's how—I mean, I explained every time ....

Later in the hearing, White stated, "I want to clarify that ... I still was employed by the County, just in unpaid status."

After the hearing, the TWC Appeal Tribunal issued a written opinion affirming the initial determination and ordering the County's account billed for White's benefits. The Appeal Tribunal found that the Texas Unemployment Compensation Act³ entitled White to benefits; the opinion stated that White "was separated from her last employment when [she] went on a medical leave ^{[4 ]}... and the employer could not make any accommodations based on the claimant's restrictions." The County further appealed this decision to the TWC commissioners, who adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Appeal Tribunal and affirmed the decision.

The County sought judicial review of the final administrative decision by filing a petition in the trial court.⁵ In its petition, the County pled, "[T]he decision of the TWC is not supported by law because ... White did not separate from her employment with Wichita County and is therefore disqualified from benefits." TWC answered the suit by asserting a general denial and by pleading that substantial evidence supported TWC's decision. White also filed an answer in which she asserted a general denial.

The County moved for summary judgment, asserting that the final administrative decision made by TWC was incorrect. The County argued, "[T]he undisputed evidence indicates that White was neither unemployed nor eligible to collect unemployment benefits ...." The County further contended, in part,

White was never unemployed ; consequently, White was ineligible to receive unemployment benefits ....

... Receiving paid insurance premiums and an employer holding a position open for the employee's return pursuant to the FMLA are not hallmarks of unemployed persons.

....

... Taking FMLA leave does not cause an employee to become unemployed; rather, the employee is eligible to return to the same position. FMLA protects an employee's job.

The County does not dispute that White was entitled to take FMLA leave. White had a serious health condition .... While on FMLA, White was an employee of the County .... White was never terminated from her employment with the County.

TWC also filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that even though White's employment with Wichita County had not been formally terminated and although she may not have been "unemployed" under a common understanding of that term, when she was on FMLA leave, she was "unemployed" as the labor code defines that term because she did not perform services for wages. Regarding the interplay between unemployment benefits and FMLA leave, TWC contended,

FMLA and the [Texas] Labor Code's unemployment benefits provisions serve different functions. The FMLA protects a person's job when he or she cannot work, and the Labor Code provides a means for unemployed individuals to support themselves. Those functions are not incompatible. This case shows that they are, in fact, complementary; FMLA protected Ms. White's job while she was not working, and she was able to "care for her own welfare" while not working by filing a claim for unemployment benefits. [The County's] policy argument that FMLA leave should prevent Ms. White from receiving unemployment benefits is not persuasive. [Emphasis added.]

The County filed a response and contended that "FMLA leave and unemployment benefits are mutually exclusive" when considering the "provisions and purposes" of the federal and state laws. The County argued, "This proceeding revolves around a singular issue: an employed individual was permitted to receive unemployment benefits."

The trial court granted the County's motion for summary judgment and reversed TWC's decision to grant unemployment benefits to White. TWC brought this appeal.

The FMLA and Texas's Unemployment Laws

In TWC's first issue, it contends that the trial court's judgment is erroneous because White was qualified for unemployment benefits under the labor code despite enjoying the protection (and health insurance benefits) of her employment under the FMLA. TWC asserts that "no court, in any jurisdiction, has ruled on the question of whether the [FMLA] precludes the receipt of unemployment benefits under state law." The County contends that the "issue of whether the [labor code] and [FMLA] are mutually exclusive is an issue of first impression." Based on our research, we agree with TWC and the County that the question of whether FMLA leave precludes simultaneous compensation under a state unemployment law is an issue of first impression.⁶

In a summary judgment case, the issue on appeal is whether the movant established that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c) ; Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding , 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). Cases that turn on questions of law, rather than questions of fact, are amenable to summary judgment. Rhone–Poulenc, Inc. v. Steel , 997 S.W.2d 217, 222 (Tex. 1999). We review a summary judgment de novo. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim , 315 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. 2010).

We also review statutory construction issues de novo. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co. v. White , 490 S.W.3d 468, 484 (Tex. 2016). In construing and applying a statute, our primary objective is to give effect to the legislature's intent as expressed in the statute's language. Id. We rely on the plain meaning of the text unless doing so would...