Texas Cent. & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Weideman

• Decision Date: 26 January 1901
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals
• Parties: TEXAS CENT. & N. W. RY. CO. v. WEIDEMAN.<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL>

62 S.W. 810

TEXAS CENT. & N. W. RY. CO. v. WEIDEMAN.¹

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas.

January 26, 1901.

Appeal from district court, Ellis county; J. E. Dillard, Judge.

Action by C. F. Weideman against the Texas Central & Northwestern Railway Company. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Frost, Neblett & Blanding, for appellant. Fears & Whipple, for appellee.

TEMPLETON, J.

The appellee was engaged in loading cotton seed on a car situated on a side track on appellant's road at Jeffries station, when a train of cars was backed on the side track and against the car that was being loaded. Appellee was in the car at the time, and, as a result of the concussion of the cars, was thrown down and injured. He was loading the car with the knowledge and consent of the company. The train was backed against the car appellee was in without appellee knowing what was being done. It was negligence on the part of the servants of the company to back the train against the car without notifying appellee of the fact. Appellee was acting at the time as a person of ordinary prudence would have acted under the circumstances. He sued the company, and recovered judgment for $1,100, which amount is no more than sufficient to compensate him for the injuries received.

The appellant complains of the charge of the court in many respects, but we think that none of the complaints are well founded. The objections are directed to the verbiage rather than the spirit of the charge, and no substantial or material defect is pointed out. It would serve no useful purpose for us to enter upon a detailed statement and discussion of the questions raised by the appellant, and we will content ourselves with the observation that, in our opinion, the charge of the court fairly and fully instructed the jury as to the law of the case, and rendered unnecessary the giving of any of the special charges requested by the appellant.

There was testimony tending to show that appellee was feigning some of the injuries claimed by him to have been sustained as a result of the accident. Appellant requested a special charge, which was refused, to the effect that if the jury found that appellant was malingering as to some of his alleged injuries, then they should find for appellant as to such injuries. The charge given authorized a recovery only as to the injuries actually received, and was sufficiently full to meet the issues presented by this evidence. It was unnecessary, if...