Texas Co. v. Ingram

Decision Date11 March 1933
Citation64 S.W.2d 208
PartiesTEXAS CO. et al. v. INGRAM.
CourtTennessee Supreme Court

Roberts & Roberts and William Green, all of Nashville, for plaintiffs in error.

Walter S. Faulkner, of Lebanon, and C. L. Cummings, of Murfreesboro, for defendant in error.

FAW, Presiding Judge.

The three plaintiffs in error, viz., the Texas Company, James L. Roberts, and W. L. Foutch (hereinafter called defendants), have appealed in error to this court from a judgment of the circuit court of Rutherford county for $5,000 and costs against them and in favor of the defendant in error, Mrs. Kate Jones Ingram (hereinafter called plaintiff).

The judgment thus brought up for review was rendered upon the verdict of a jury in an action brought on January 1, 1931, by the plaintiff, Mrs. Ingram, to recover damages for personal injuries suffered by her on January 24, 1930, in a collision between two automobiles, one of which was driven by the plaintiff and the other by defendant W. L. Foutch.

The fact that there was a collision between two cars driven by the plaintiff and the defendant Foutch, respectively, at the time and place stated in the plaintiff's declaration, and that the plaintiff was injured as a result of the collision, is not now denied by the defendants; but the character and extent of plaintiff's injuries and the liability of the defendants therefor are matters of serious controversy.

The collision occurred on a highway bridge which spanned Stone's river near the village of Walter Hill on the highway connecting the towns of Murfreesboro and Lebanon. Plaintiff lived in Wilson county, and was on her way to Murfreesboro in Rutherford county, where her mother resided. She was driving an "old model" Ford car, and was accompanied by her infant son, Wade Hill Ingram, about four years of age. Defendant Foutch was driving a Chevrolet roadster, which had a small "slip-on" truck body attached, and was traveling from Murfreesboro towards Lebanon. He was alone, and the truck he was driving was not loaded.

The bridge is described in the record as a "one-way bridge," as it was too narrow to permit the passage of more than one automobile at the same time, and the ends of the bridge are distinguished by referring to one as the Murfreesboro end and to the other as the Lebanon end, meaning, of course, the ends nearest Murfreesboro and Lebanon, respectively.

The bridge was 300 feet long, and the two cars collided at a point 46 feet from the Murfreesboro end of the bridge.

As defendant Foutch followed the highway approaching the bridge, he descended a hill for a distance of probably 100 yards, with the bridge and any automobiles thereon within the range of his vision, and then, after traversing a sag below the level of the bridge for a short distance, turned to his left, almost at an angle of ninety degrees, onto the bridge.

According to the testimony of defendant Foutch, the plaintiff, Mrs. Ingram, with ample time and opportunity to stop her car, drove it against the car of defendant Foutch after the latter had stopped, and the plaintiff's own negligence was the proximate cause of her injuries; but we need not dwell on the testimony of defendant Foutch with respect to the manner in which the collision occurred, for he is contradicted by the testimony of Mrs. Ingram and her witness Morgan Green, and, as the verdict implies that the jury accepted the testimony most favorable to the plaintiff, we must, under well-settled rules, likewise accept it as the truth of the case, and discard all countervailing evidence.

With reference to the circumstances immediately attending the collision, the plaintiff, Mrs. Ingram, testified as follows:

"Q. Now describe to the Court and jury what happened? A. Well, the truck just ran in on the bridge, and I was there with my car, and it ran against my car and threw me against the steering wheel.

"Q. Is that a double passage bridge, or a single passage bridge? A. It is single.

"Q. Do you know how long that has been a single passage bridge? A. I don't know, sir.

"Q. Well, about how long, ten or twelve years? A. Yes, sir, ever since I have been coming along there.

"Q. How long have you been coming along there? A. Oh, ten or twelve years.

"Q. Has it been anything but a single passage bridge? A. No, sir.

"Q. When you saw him coming what did you do; did you do anything to stop your car? A. Yes, sir, I did everything I could to stop my car.

"Q. With what violence or force did he strike, did he run into you? A. I don't understand you.

"Q. With what violence did he run into you? A. It ran into me fast and hard.

"Q. Well, what was the result? A. Well, it threw me against the steering wheel and tore my car up, and threw my baby through the windshield.

"Q. Did it break the windshield? A. Yes, sir.

"Q. What part of his body went through the windshield, Mrs. Ingram? A. His head.

"Q. You mean the glass of the Ford car? A. Do I mean the glass?

"Q. Yes? A. Yes, I mean the windshield, the glass.

"Q. Well, go ahead, I want to get all the facts so the jury will know them, you know. How badly did it break the glass in the windshield? A. It broke all, except some pieces in the car, as I remember it.

"Q. Where was the baby sitting at the time of the impact? A. At my side.

"Q. At your side? A. Yes, sir.

"Q. Was it a double seated or a one seated Ford car? A. My car?

"Q. Yes. A. It was a '26 Ford Touring car.

"Q. And you were under the steering wheel? A. Yes, sir.

"Q. And he was by your side? A. Yes, sir.

"Q. I see, you told the Court it tore up your car; tell how it injured your car, if you will, please; where did it hit your car? A. Hit the front and right fender and shoved my car against the bridge banisters.

"Q. I will ask you to state whether or not, as it appears now, that bridge was iron? A. Yes, sir.

"Q. Or steel, I believe they call it? A. Steel or iron one.

"Q. You say it threw your car against it? A. Yes, sir."

We also quote from the testimony of the plaintiff's witness, Morgan Green, as follows:

"Q. Mr. Green, did you see the collision between the two cars, one driven by Mrs. Ingram here, last — that was in January, two years ago? A. Yes, sir, I saw it.

"Q. Where did it happen, on what pike, and what particular place? A. On the Lebanon and Murfreesboro Pike, on the bridge over Stone's River out there near Walter Hill.

"Q. You were on the pike that day, yourself, traveling? A. Yes, sir.

"Q. Which way were you traveling? A. I was behind Mr. Foutch.

"Q. Behind Mr. Foutch? A. Behind Mr. Foutch, I was going towards Lebanon.

"Q. Traveling towards Lebanon? A. Yes, sir.

"Q. Did you see him as he approached and also as he entered upon the bridge across Stone's River? A. Yes, sir.

"Q. To which you have just referred? A. Yes, sir.

"Q. How far behind him were you? A. Well, I was pretty close; not over 10 or 15 yards, I wouldn't think.

"Q. How were you traveling, Mr. Green? A. I was in a car.

"Q. How was Mr. Foutch traveling, in what kind of car? A. He was in a Chevrolet roadster with a pick-up body on the rear end of it.

"Q. As he approached this south entrance to this bridge, what was his rate of speed, in your opinion? A. I think around 35 miles an hour.

"Q. Did you see him then as he entered upon the bridge? A. Yes, sir.

"Q. State whether or not he had to make the curve just before and as he entered upon the bridge? A. Yes, he did.

"Q. To his left going towards Lebanon? A. Yes.

"Q. Now, before he reached the bridge, did you see the car driven by Mrs. Ingram at any point? A. Yes, I saw it on the bridge.

"Q. It was on the bridge; where was the Ingram car, at what point, on this bridge, at the time that Foutch entered upon it, entered into the south approach? A. Well, I would think that it was approximately halfway across.

"Q. The Ingram car was coming this way? A. Yes.

"Q. Towards Murfreesboro? A. That is right.

"Q. Now, about what point, then, would you say — Did you see the two cars go together? A. I did.

"Q. Well, was it a head-on, or how was that; how did they come together? A. Well, it was almost a head-on; it had to be; it was a one-way bridge, but the Ingram car had pulled over to the right as far as it could, and the other car did the same, and they almost hit at angles there.

"Q. Now, what do you say, did you notice, did the Foutch car slacken or slow up its speed at any time? A. Well, I said a while ago that it was going 35 miles an hour as it approached the bridge; he slowed up some before he turned on the bridge.

"Q. After he turned on, did he slow up that you could tell? A. It didn't seem to me that he slowed up any at all after he turned on the bridge before he hit this car.

"Q. As he made his turn and as he went on the bridge, he didn't slow up, did he? A. It didn't seem to me that he slowed up.

"Q. How fast was he going at that time, in your judgment? A. I would think, I don't know, but twenty or twenty-five — twenty miles an hour, I expect.

"Q. Could you notice or did you notice whether or not as he entered onto this bridge, or at any other time, that Mrs. Ingram speeded up or slowed down her car? A. Slowed down some.

"Q. And turned to her right? A. Turned to her right.

"Q. Now, as you approached this bridge, as Foutch approached it, and you behind him there at the distance you have given, was there anything that obstructed your view, to keep you from seeing the Ingram car on that bridge and coming across? A. Not that I know of.

"Q. Was there anything to obstruct Foutch's view that you saw? He had the same view that you had? A. Not that I know of, outside of anything that might have been on the side of his car.

"Q. Well, what did you do...

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