Texas Co. v. Parker

• Decision Date: 12 May 1931
• Docket Number: 7 Div. 732.
• Citation: 136 So. 845,24 Ala.App. 365
• Parties: TEXAS CO. v. PARKER.
• Court: Alabama Court of Appeals

136 So. 845

24 Ala.App. 365

TEXAS CO. v. PARKER.

7 Div. 732.

Court of Appeals of Alabama

May 12, 1931

Rehearing Denied June 16, 1931.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Etowah County; Woodson J. Martin, Judge.

Action for damages for personal injuries by B. D. Parker against the Texas Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Certiorari denied by Supreme Court in Texas Co. v. Parker (7 Div. 69) 136 So. 846.

Bradley Baldwin, All & White, of Birmingham, and O. R. Hood, of Gadsden, for appellant.

Dortch Allen & Dortch, of Gadsden, for appellee.

RICE, J.

Appellee sued appellant for damages on account of injuries received by him in an explosion which took place in a gasoline filling station located in Gadsden.

The case was tried before a jury, and a verdict was returned for the plaintiff in the amount of $750. From the judgment rendered thereon, this appeal is prosecuted.

There were two counts, only, of the complaint, submitted to the jury.

These counts set up, briefly, that defendant (appellant) had equipped the premises where the explosion occurred for a filling station, where the public was invited to come and buy gas and oil, and that on a certain date plaintiff (appellee) went there to obtain gas and oil, etc., and was injured by an explosion; that his injuries and damages were proximately caused by the negligence of the defendant in causing alterations in the equipment to be made negligently, so as to allow gas fumes to escape, rendering the premises dangerous etc.

There are no questions presented as to the pleadings; in fact, no question as to anything, other than as to the propriety, vel non, of the trial court's refusal to give at appellant's request the general affirmative charge in its favor. And error in this regard is argued by appellant to rest upon the sole ground of the total failure of the evidence to afford an inference that appellant, or its authorized agents or servants, were in any way responsible for the condition of said premises which caused, proximately appellee's injuries.

As stated by appellant's counsel: "Two questions must be answered to decide this case. First, what act or omission caused the plaintiff's injuries? And, second, whose act or omission caused them?"

It was shown that appellant had let, under a written lease, the premises in question, to one W. W. Fox, for the admitted purpose of being operated as a place for the sale of appellant's products-gas, oil, etc. And appellant would escape liability on the familiar principle that the lessee, in possession, and not the landlord, is responsible for injuries, etc., unless brought about by latent defects, etc., caused to third persons by defects in the premises, etc. Morgan v. Sheppard, 156 Ala. 403, 47 So. 147; Hallock v. Smith, 207 Ala. 567, 93 So. 588.

But it is just as well understood, in fact admitted by counsel for appellant in this case, that "where a landlord voluntarily at the tenant's request undertakes to make repairs, he is liable for injuries which may result from the negligent manner in which the work is done, even though not bound to make such repairs." Bains v. Dank, 199 Ala. 250, 74 So. 341; Spangler v. Hobson, 212 Ala. 105, 101 So. 828.

Answering the first of the questions stated hereinabove, we observe that there seems no doubt that appellee's injuries were caused by the...