Texas Creosoting Co. v. Hartburg Lumber Co.

• Decision Date: 24 April 1929
• Docket Number: (Motion No. 8376; No. 931-5029.)
• Citation: 16 S.W.2d 255
• Parties: TEXAS CREOSOTING CO. et al. v. HARTBURG LUMBER CO.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

16 S.W.2d 255

TEXAS CREOSOTING CO. et al. v. HARTBURG LUMBER CO.

(Motion No. 8376; No. 931-5029.)

Commission of Appeals of Texas, Section B

April 24, 1929.

Error to Court of Civil Appeals of Ninth Supreme Judicial District.

On motion for rehearing. Motion overruled.

For former opinion, see 12 S.W.(2d) 169.

E. E. Easterling, W. R. Easterling, and Holland & Cousins, all of Beaumont, for plaintiffs in error.

Gordon, Lawhon, Davidson & Sharfstein, of Beaumont, and W. N. Foster, of Conroe, for defendant in error.

SHORT, P. J.

The motion for rehearing has been filed by the plaintiffs in error in this case. It challenges the correctness of the original opinion in affirming the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals, based upon its findings of fact and conclusions of law, that the defendant in error has proven a legal title to the land described in its petition, to which the plea of not guilty referred in the several answers of the several plaintiffs in error. It also challenges the correctness of that portion of our original opinion to the effect that the record contains legal evidence tending to prove the existence in defendant in error of an equitable title to said land, which might have been considered sufficient by the trial court on which to base a finding of fact that Dyer, as trustee of the estate of Orville McAlvine, deceased, in payment of the purchase money for the land, used funds belonging to said estate, and had H. W. Benton, the common source of title, to execute the deed in the name of C. T. Noble, who afterwards executed a deed conveying the land to Dyer, in pursuance of a scheme by Dyer to defraud the beneficiaries of the trust, which fact, if established, would, in connection with other facts, be sufficient upon which to base the legal conclusion that defendant in error was the owner of the equitable title to the land involved.

As to the matter first mentioned, the motion presents nothing which has not been carefully considered and sufficiently discussed in the original opinion. As to the other matter, the motion does present a new contention. This contention is that since the petition of the defendant in error, in so far as relates to title, is in the statutory form of trespass to try title, there was no pleading legally sufficient to permit the trial judge, trying the case without a jury, to consider any testimony introduced except that which supports the claim of the defendant in error that it was the owner of the legal title to the land involved. It is due the plaintiffs in error that this new contention be discussed by us.

The issue raised by the pleadings we have mentioned, under the testimony, is one of fee-simple title. There are two kinds of fee-simple title to real estate, legal and equitable. A legal title, under the pleadings we have mentioned, can, generally speaking, only be proven by valid written instruments. An equitable title may be proven by parol evidence legally sufficient to establish lawful ownership in the person asserting such ownership, under the facts of a given case, where the pleadings present an issue of title only, provided the evidence connects the claimant with the legal source of the title, as in this case with H. W. Benton, the agreed common source.

The allegation in the petition that the plaintiff was "seized and possessed" of the land "owning and holding it by fee-simple title" was broad enough to permit the trial judge, trying the case without a jury, to consider any competent testimony which, in his opinion, tended to establish the truth of this allegation. The phrase "fee-simple title" includes either or both, a legal title and an equitable one. It is the duty of the Court of Civil Appeals to sustain the judgment of the trial court upon any principle of law which is supported by sufficient legal evidence. This duty the Court of Civil Appeals, as we have held in our original opinion, discharged by affirming the judgment rendered by the trial court. It is likewise the duty of the Supreme Court to affirm the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals, when the conclusion reached by that court is a correct one, even though the reasons upon which the conclusion has been reached are not approved. However, in this case we approve the opinion rendered by the Court of Civil Appeals without qualification. In our original opinion we only suggested that the testimony might have been considered sufficient by the trial judge to establish the fact that the defendant in error held the land by an equitable title, in which event the conclusion reached by the Court of Civil Appeals would be correct, even though the reason upon which the conclusion is based could not be approved. That the testimony, mention of which is made in the original opinion, was competent and might have been properly considered by the trial judge in the rendition of his judgment under the pleadings we have heretofore mentioned, is amply supported by authority.

The Supreme Court, speaking through that pre-eminent jurist, Judge Gaines, in Edwards v. Barwise, 69 Tex. 84, 6 S. W. 677, in discussing this identical question, under this identical situation, said: "Should the petition be in the statutory form as in the present case, he (meaning the plaintiff) will be permitted to adduce any competent parol evidence in order to establish his title, although the fact proposed to be established by such evidence be not specially pleaded." In Mayes v. Manning, 73 Tex. 43, 11 S. W. 136, it is said by the same court, speaking through another pre-eminent jurist, Judge Henry: "Plaintiff stated his title in his pleadings only in general terms, not specifying in any manner how it was derived. On the trial he was correctly permitted to prove facts constituting a resulting trust in his favor amounting substantially to the equitable title." The Supreme Court in ...