Texas Dept. of Public Safety v. Stockton

• Decision Date: 13 June 2001
• Docket Number: No. 04-00-00479-CV,04-00-00479-CV
• Citation: 53 S.W.3d 421
• Parties: (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2001) TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Appellant v. Frank Melbourne STOCKTON, Appellee
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 421

53 S.W.3d 421 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2001)

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Appellant v. Frank Melbourne STOCKTON, Appellee

No. 04-00-00479-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, San Antonio

June 13, 2001

From the 288th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 1999-CI-15165 Honorable Peter Michael Curry, Judge Presiding

Sitting Phil Hardberger, Chief Justice, Catherine Stone, Justice, Paul W. Green, Justice

Opinion

Stone, Justice

In this appeal we are asked to determine whether a dismissal of a DWI proceeding after a favorable ruling on a speedy trial motion is an "acquittal," thus entitling the defendant to expunction of records concerning the DWI charge and a related license revocation. We answer this question in the negative, and hold that expunction is not permitted in this case.

Factual and Procedural Background

Frank Stockton was arrested for DWI and appeared in court with his attorney, ready for trial on six different occasions. The State was allowed to reset the cause twice, and the remaining three times the State announced it was not ready. On the third trial date, the trial court granted a motion for speedy trial in Stockton's favor. Stockton thereafter requested that all references to the DWI arrest and charge, including the earlier suspension of his driver's license for refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test, be expunged from the records of the Texas Department of Public Safety. The State did not oppose the expunction of the underlying DWI charge, but did raise its opposition to the expunction of other records, including the suspension of Stockton's license, from DPS's records. DPS did not participate in the original expunction hearing. Stockton's request for expunction of all records was granted.

DPS filed a motion for new trial, claiming it had not received notice of the expunction trial, and opposing the expunction of Stockton's driver's license suspension. DPS was subsequently granted a hearing on its motion for new trial. The motion for new trial was initially denied, but later granted. At the new trial, DPS argued against the expunction of Stockton's administrative license revocation from DPS records. DPS asserted that Stockton's dismissal pursuant to his speedy trial motion did not equate to an acquittal. The trial court rejected DPS's arguments and entered a final order of expunction. DPS now appeals the expunction order.¹

Standard of Review

Both parties agree about the sequence of events and that the DWI proceeding was dismissed pursuant to Stockton's motion for speedy trial. The only question is a legal question. Therefore, we review this legal issue de novo. See Spiller v. Spiller, 901 S.W.2d 553, 556 (Tex. App. San Antonio 1995, writ denied) (stating that "[a] trial court's conclusions of law are always reviewable"). Conclusions of law will be upheld on appeal if the judgment can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence; they will not be reversed unless they are erroneous as a matter of law. See id.

Discussion

The Code of Criminal Procedure provides that records relating to the suspension of a driver's license may not be expunged except as provided in Sections 524.015 or 724.048 of the Transportation Code. See Tex Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 55.06 (Vernon Supp. 2000). Both sections of the Transportation Code state that DPS shall remove any reference to a driver's license suspension in the event of an acquittal of a criminal charge upon which the suspension was based. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 524.015(b) & 724.048(c) (Vernon 1999). The question for this court to decide is whether the granting of a motion for speedy trial, resulting in a dismissal of the criminal case, is equivalent to an acquittal for purposes of expunction of a driver's license suspension from the records of the Texas Department of Public Safety.

This court has ruled that the dismissal of a criminal case is equivalent to an acquittal only after jeopardy attaches. See Texas Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Stacy, 954 S.W.2d 80, 81-82 (Tex. App. San Antonio 1997, no writ) (ruling that it is only after jeopardy attaches that a dismissal can be tantamount to an acquittal and finding a dismissal for insufficient evidence did not function as an acquittal for purposes of precluding suspension of a driver's license for DWI); 37 Tex. Admin. Code § 17.13(c) (1999) (Texas Dep't of Public Safety, Administrative License Revocation). Jeopardy attaches only after all parties have announced ready and the defendant has pled to the charging instrument. See Stacy, 954 S.W.2d at 82 (citing State v. Torres, 805 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)). Stacy also dealt with a driver's license suspension for DWI. This court upheld the license suspension even though the prosecutor had dismissed the criminal charge because there was insufficient evidence. See Stacy, 954 S.W.2d at 82. This court declined to treat the dismissal as an acquittal. See id.

In cases involving the issue of speedy trial, some courts have seemingly termed this type of dismissal as an acquittal,² while some have not.³ None specifically state it is or is not. However, the Texas Administrative Code explicitly states that "any discharge or dismissal brought about by a failure to bring a cause of action to speedy trial within the time required by the state or federal constitutions ... shall not be regarded as an acquittal" for purposes of removing "references to the suspension from the defendant's computerized driving record." 37 Tex. Admin. Code § 17.13 (1999) (Texas Dep't of Public Safety, Administrative License Revocation). This is a clear disposition of the issue at hand.

Stockton contends that jeopardy attached because the State did not appeal the speedy trial dismissal and the State could not refile these charges against Stockton. However, the State could have refiled the charges. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 101 (1978) (ruling that the prosecution may if it wishes, reinstate the proceedings after the granting of a motion for speedy trial, but must ordinarily seek reversal of the trial court's decision); Easley v. State, 986 S.W.2d 264, 270 (Tex. App. San Antonio 1998, no pet.) (ruling that the State would be free to refile charges once the trial court dismissed the case pursuant to a speedy trial motion). A judgment of the trial court granting a motion for speedy trial does not create a situation where jeopardy has attached just because the State elects not to appeal. The requirements of all parties announcing ready and the defendant pleading to the charging instrument, have not occurred. See Stacy, 954 S.W.2d at 81.

Stockton additionally argues that under the doctrine of virtual representation, DPS is bound by the...