Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Knouff

• Decision Date: 12 March 1925
• Docket Number: (No. 173.)
• Parties: TEXAS EMPLOYERS' INS. ASS'N v. KNOUFF.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

271 S.W. 633

TEXAS EMPLOYERS' INS. ASS'N v. KNOUFF.

(No. 173.)

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Waco.

March 12, 1925.

Rehearing Denied April 23, 1925.

Appeal from District Court, McLennan County; James P. Alexander, Judge.

Suit by Neita Knouff against the Texas Employers' Insurance Association to set aside a decision of the Industrial Accident Board. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Lawther, Pope, Leachman & Lawther, of Dallas, and Nat Harris, of Waco, for appellant.

Spell, Naman & Penland, of Waco, for appellee.

GALLAGHER, C. J.

Miss Neita Knouff, appellee herein, was, on and prior to September 27, 1921, an employee of the Goldstein-Migel Company, which company carried an insurance policy obligating appellant to pay to its employees the compensation provided by our Workmen's Compensation Act (Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. Supp. 1918, arts. 5246-1 to 5246-91), in case they sustained injury in the course of their employment. Appellee sustained such injuries on said date. Her employer had actual notice of the accident, and that some injury to appellee resulted therefrom, immediately after the occurrence. Within 30 days thereof formal notice of such accident and injury was given and claim for compensation therefor filed with the Industrial Accident Board. Appellant, without waiting for a hearing on said claim, began to pay to appellee compensation at the rate of $8.65 per week. Such payments do not seem to have been continuous week by week. On July 7, 1922, appellant and appellee entered into a compromise settlement agreement. Said agreement recited in substance that the facts and circumstances connected with and surrounding the infliction of the injuries suffered by appellee made the liability of appellant uncertain and indefinite and incapable of being satisfactorily established; that appellant had been paid compensation for 26 weeks at $8.65 per week, together with medical and hospital expenses; that it was mutually agreed between the parties that the provisions of the act permitting compromise agreement and settlement of liability applied, and that appellee agreed to settle and compromise her claim for the sum of $600, in addition to the amounts theretofore received by her thereon; that the same was subject to the approval of the Industrial Accident Board, and when approved and such payments made by appellant and accepted by appellee, that appellant's liability would be fully and finally compromised, settled and satisfied. Among the affidavits submitted with said agreement was one by appellee, stating that she had read the same, was willing to abide thereby in view of the report of physicians submitted therewith; that she realized her condition was uncertain as to the extent of disability, and for that reason desired such adjustment made. Said affidavit contained a request to the Board to approve the agreement. This compromise agreement was filed with the Industrial Accident Board on July 13, 1922. It does not appear that any hearing prior thereto had been had on appellee's claim for compensation theretofore filed with the Board. Two of the members of the Board approved said agreement by an "o. k." indorsement entered thereon. Whether any further order was made in this connection does not appear. Appellant paid said sum of $600 to appellee, and she accepted the same and signed an indorsement on the check by which the same was paid that she released and forever discharged appellant from any further claim resulting or to result from such injury.

Thereafter, on November 27, 1922, appellee, by her attorney, filed with the Industrial Accident Board a petition, reciting that she had agreed to said compromise and settlement upon the express representation and agreement by appellant that it would pay all medical and hospital bills incurred by her, and especially a certain amount due for chiropractic treatments which she alleges she had taken at the suggestion and with the approval of appellant; that appellant had failed to pay for said treatments; that she would not have entered into said agreement nor accepted the sum paid her thereunder but for such express agreement that said particular claim would be paid, an itemized and verified account of which she attached to her said petition. She prayed that the cause be reopened, that said compromise settlement be set aside and said account allowed, and for such other and further relief as she might be entitled to receive. She supported her said petition with her own affidavit fully sustaining the same, and to some extent amplifying the allegations thereof.

Said petition was heard by the Industrial Accident Board on April 12, 1923, at which time the Board made its findings thereon, among which was a specific finding that appellant, in failing to pay said bill for chiropractic treatments given appellee, had failed to fulfill its said compromise agreement. The order of the Board containing said findings declared that said agreement was for said reason of no binding force or effect; that appellee's claim for compensation for her said injuries was pending before said Board, and that the only effect of said agreement was to entitle appellant to credit for the amount paid appellee thereunder. The Board in said order fixed certain compensation for appellee, and directed that all amounts paid theretofore on account of her claim for compensation for her said injuries be credited thereon.

Appellee in due time thereafter gave the required notice that she was not willing and did not consent to abide by said final ruling, decision, and award of said Board. In describing the same in said notice, no mention was made of so much thereof as affected the former compromise agreement and settlement, but only so much thereof as declared her entitled to receive the compensation therein awarded was recited. Appellee, in due time, filed this suit to set aside said final ruling and decision of the Board. Her petition contained the usual averments in such cases. The final ruling and decision of the Board sought to be set aside was described therein only by the date thereof. No mention of any payments by appellant was made in said petition, and a lump sum settlement on the basis of weekly payments of $8.65 per week for 401 weeks was sought.

Appellant filed a plea to the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that the compromise settlement was final, and that the Industrial Accident Board had no jurisdiction to set the same aside. Appellant also pleaded said compromise settlement in bar of any recovery by appellee. The court overruled appellant's said plea to the jurisdiction, and sustained an exception to said plea in bar. The case was submitted to a jury on special issues. No issue with reference to said compromise settlement was submitted, but apparently the action of the Board in declaring that the same had not been fully complied with and was of no binding force and effect was treated as final and not before the court for review or adjudication. The findings of the jury, so far as material to this appeal, were that appellee was injured as alleged; that she had given notice of such injuries and had filed a claim for compensation therefor, as required by law; that such injuries resulted in permanent total incapacity, and that a failure to award a lump sum settlement of compensation due her on account of such injuries would work manifest hardship and injury to her. The court rendered judgment on the verdict of the jury in favor of appellee, for herself and for the use and benefit of her attorneys, in the proportions provided by law, for $2,065.44. The judgment recited that said sum was arrived at by calculating compensation at the rate of $8.65 per week for 401 weeks, discounting the same at the rate of 5 per cent. per annum, and deducting the amount of $861.98 previously paid by appellant to appellee. The case is before us for review on appeal.

The evident purpose of the Legislature in creating the Industrial Accident Board, and confiding to it the administration of the Workmen's Compensation Act, was to afford to the injured employee a forum in which he can present his claim for compensation, have its merits determined and appropriate relief speedily awarded. No provision is made for terms or sessions of said board. In contemplation of law, it is always open to receive, hear, and determine complaints. The statutory directions with reference to procedure before it are few and simple. The services of an attorney in presenting and prosecuting a claim for compensation before it are not indispensable. Its methods are informal and speedy, and therefore peculiarly appropriate in administering said act and affording the relief provided thereby. Our Supreme Court has declared such act to be a remedial statute, to be liberally construed, with a view to accomplishing its purpose and promoting justice. Lumbermen's Reciprocal Assn. v. Behnken, 112 Tex. 103, 112, 246 S. W. 72, 74, 28 A. L. R. 1402.

The jurisdiction of the Board over all the issues arising in the course of the administration of said act is original and primary. Its final rulings, decisions, and awards are binding and conclusive, unless set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction in the manner prescribed by the terms of the act. When a suit to set aside a final ruling or decision is properly brought, then and then only does the court in which such suit is brought become invested with authority and jurisdiction to hear and determine the issue involved in said ruling or decision. In such cases it acts instead of the Board, and determines the rights and liabilities of the parties according to the provisions of said act. The trial is de novo, the burden is on the party claiming compensation, and the jurisdiction to hear and determine all the issues and afford appropriate relief within the terms of the law is as broad as the jurisdiction conferred on the Board in its original hearing of such...