Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Jackson

• Decision Date: 19 November 1924
• Docket Number: (No. 589-4057.)
• Citation: 265 S.W. 1027
• Parties: TEXAS EMPLOYERS' INS. ASS'N v. JACKSON.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

265 S.W. 1027

TEXAS EMPLOYERS' INS. ASS'N v. JACKSON.

(No. 589-4057.)

Commission of Appeals of Texas, Section A.

November 19, 1924.

Error to Court of Civil Appeals of Seventh Supreme Judicial District.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by J. B. Jackson against the Texas Employers' Insurance Association. Judgment for defendant was reversed by Court of Civil Appeals (253 S. W. 348), and defendant brings error. Judgment of Court of Civil Appeals reversed, and that of county court affirmed.

Lawther, Pope & Leachman, of Dallas, for plaintiff in error.

Arch Dawson, of Wichita Falls, for defendant in error.

BISHOP, J.

Defendant in error, J. B. Jackson, filed suit in the county court of Wichita county against the Texas Employers' Insurance Association, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, to recover damages. In his petition he alleges the injury sustained by him in substance as follows: That he was sent by his employer, who was a subscriber under said act, with a truck, on September 4, 1921, to a lease about 50 miles northwest of Wichita Falls, to get a load of material to be delivered to another oil field in Wichita county; that while en route to said lease a rain storm came up, caught him out in the open prairie, and thoroughly soaked and wetted his clothing; that upon arriving at the lease about 10 o'clock at night of said day, he was compelled to sleep in a dilapidated shed, and that during the night another severe rain came up and wetted his clothing; that said two wettings caused him to have a cold next morning, which weakened his resistance and made him easily susceptible to the inroads of disease from other exposure; that the next day, after having loaded a rig on his truck and having performed strenuous labor which caused him to perspire freely, another rain storm overtook him and completely soaked and drenched him, while on the return trip for a second load; that the last wetting, together with the two previous soakings, caused a severe case of pneumonia, resulting in incapacity for work for some period of time, confinement in a hospital, incurring doctor bills, etc.

The trial court sustained a general demurrer to the petition, and defendant in error having refused to amend, the cause was dismissed. On appeal the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the cause, holding that, though the injury complained of was not an accidental injury, same was within the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act defining "injury" and "personal injury," and for this reason the petition stated a good cause of action.

Plaintiff in error presents two assignments of error as follows:

"First. The Court of Civil Appeals erred in holding that the purpose of the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act, and the scope thereof, is not limited to accidental injuries.

"Second. The Court of Civil Appeals erred in holding that getting wet in a rain was an `injury' or `personal injury' as defined in subdivision 5, § 1, part 4, of the amendment of 1917 (subdivision 5, art. 5246-82, Vernon's Texas 1918 Supp.)."

When the Thirty-Third Legislature in 1913 (Acts 33d Leg. c. 179 [Vernon's Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1914, arts. 5246h-5246zzzz]) first enacted the Workmen's Compensation Act, it provided (part 2, § 7 [art. 5246qqq]) for an "Industrial Accident Board" and defined the duties thereof. It provided that all employers who were subscribers under said act should "within eight days after the occurrence of an accident resulting in a personal injury to an employee" make a report thereof in writing to said Board and keep a record of all injuries, fatal or otherwise, received by their employés in the course of their employment. It did not specifically define the character of injuries for which compensation would be allowed, but in its emergency clause (part 4, § 7) recited that:

"There now being no adequate law on the statutes to protect the rights of industrial employees who may be injured in industrial accidents, and the beneficiaries of such employees who may be killed in such accidents, creates an emergency," etc.

In the case of Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 108 Tex. 109, 185 S. W. 560, in passing upon the validity of this act, Chief Justice Phillips uses this language:

"Here the character of injuries, or wrongs, dealt with by the act becomes important. Notwithstanding the breadth of some of its terms, its evident purpose was to confine its operation to only accidental injuries, and its scope is to be so limited. Its emergency clause declares its aim to be the protection by an adequate law of the rights of employees injured in `industrial accidents' and the beneficiaries of such employees as may be killed `in such accidents.' * * * The injuries, or wrongs,...