Texas Liquor Control Bd. v. Longwill

• Decision Date: 22 June 1965
• Docket Number: No. 7639,7639
• Citation: 392 S.W.2d 725
• Parties: TEXAS LIQUOR CONTROL BOARD, Appellant, v. Robert E. LONGWILL, d/b/a Club Apache, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 725

392 S.W.2d 725

TEXAS LIQUOR CONTROL BOARD, Appellant, v. Robert E. LONGWILL, d/b/a Club Apache, Appellee.

No. 7639.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Texarkana.

June 22, 1965.

Rehearing Denied July 20, 1965.

Waggoner Carr, Atty. Gen., Howard M. Fender and Brady S. Coleman, Asst. Attys. Gen., Austin, for appellant.

Horace G. Goodrich, Dallas, for appellee.

CHADICK, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from the judgment rendered by a district court in a proceeding to set aside the order of the Administrator of the Texas Liquor Control Board cancelling a private club registration permit. The Texas Liquor Control Board's second motion for rehearing is granted and both opinions of their court heretofore filed are withdrawn and the following opinion ordering reversal and rendition of the trial court judgment is substituted.

The Administrator of the Texas Liquor Control Board on the 14th day of April, 1964, following a hearing, ordered the permit of Club Apache canceled. An appeal from this action of the Administrator was perfected to a district court of Dallas County. In the course of the District Court hearing the Judge presiding said: 'I am going to go with the Attorney General and rule that that part of the statute giving a Trial de novo as unconstitutional. Now, then, we have an examination into whether or not the administrator had substantial evidence before him when he made his ruling or whether he acted arbitrarily, unreasonably, or capriciously, are those the words generally used?' At the end of the hearing a decree was entered 'that the Administrator's order canceling the license and privilege to do business of plaintiff * * *, is a nullity, and * * * said action of the administrator of the Liquor Control Board of the State of Texas be and it is hereby set aside and held for naught'.

The Texas Legislature in 1961 created a regulatory and licensing system for private clubs where alcoholic beverages are stored and consumed by an act which is codified as Article 666-15(e) of the Texas Liquor Control Act (Vernon's Ann.Texas Penal Code). The directions pertaining to review on appeal contained in Subdivision 7a of the Article appear to be in conflict. The subdivision provides that on appeal from the Texas Liquor Control Board's (or its Administrator's) ¹ order canceling a permit trial in the District Court shall be de novo under the rules regulating ordinary civil suits, that the court will consider only such evidence as would be proper if the case on appeal was one appearing in the first instance in the district court, and that the Substantial Evidence Rule shall have no application in the proceedings of the district court. These directions clearly command that 'a full civil trial on the facts as well as the law' will be had in the district court, in the sense that a de novo trial is defined in such case as Zurich General Accident & Liability Ins. Co. v. Rodgers, 128 Tex. 313, 97 S.W.2d 674 (1936); S. Shultz & Bro. v. W. S. Lempert, 55 Tex. 273 (1881); and Lone Star Gas Co. v. State, 137 Tex. 279, 153 S.W.2d 681 (1941).

However, paragraph (d) of Subdivision 7a reading as follows: 'The order, decision or ruling of the Board of Administrator may be suspended or modified by the District Court pending a trial on the merits, but the final judgment of the District Court shall not be modified or suspended pending appeal' assumes and impliedly directs that the orders of the Board or Administrator are to continue in effect during the appeal process unless suspended or modified by the District Court pending a trial on the merits. Giving effect to this provision is inconsistent with a trial de novo as just discussed according to Southern Canal Co. v. State Board of Water Engineers, 159 Tex. 227, 318 S.W.2d 619 (1958), where Chief Justice Calvert said: 'The sine qua non of a de novo trial as that term is used to describe a retrial of a matter or controversy theretofore tried by another tribunal is the nullification of the judgment or order of the first tribunal and a retrial of the issues on which the judgment or order was founded. When jurisiction of the second tribunal attaches, the judgment or order of the first tribunal is not merely suspended, but is nullified. Examples of that type of trial are dound in our statutes applicable to appeals from Justice Court judgments and from awards made by the Industrial Accident Board.' Very recently in Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Falkner, Tex., 369 S.W.2d 427 (1963), citing Southern Canal Co. supra as authority, it was said: 'An appeal under the substantial evidence rule negatives any idea that the Board's order approving the application is vacated or nullified by the filing of the appeal. Southern Canal Company v. State Board of Water Engineers, 159 Tex. 227, 318 S.W.2d 619'.

These incompatible directions of Subdivision 7a appear to be equally material and seem to require the district court when hearing the appeal to treat the order of the Board of Administrator as being simultaneously both valid and null. In this case is the de novo trial in the District Court to be one in which the district court examines the proof before it to decide whether or not the evidence reasonably supports the Administrator's order cancelling Club Apache's private club registration permit, or is the trial to be novo as that term is defined in Zurich General Accident & Liability Ins. Co. v. Rodgers, 128 Tex. 313, 97 S.W.2d 674? A solution is to be found in the approach suggested in Scott v. Texas State Board of Medical Examiners, Tex., 384 S.W.2d 686 (1964), where it is said: 'The validity of a full de novo appeal requirement turns on the nature of the act of the administrative agency contemplated by the statute to which the appeal requirement refers.'

Before enactment of Art. 666-15(e) in 1961 the courts on several occasions held that cancellation of a Liquor Control Board Permit by the Board or its Administrator was an administrative function, and that on appeal from the agency proceeding to the District Court the reasonableness of the order was the question to be determined. Review of the agency order in the District Court, these cases hold, is governed by the 'Substantial evidence Rule', that is, the evidence adduced in the reviewing court is to be examined to determine if it reasonably supports the order in question. See Texas Liquor Control Board v. Warfield, 110 S.W.2d 646 (Tex.Civ.App.1937 no writ); Texas Liquor Control Board v. Jones, 112 S.W.2d 227 (Tex.Civ.App.1937 no writ); Texas Liquor Control Board v Lanza, 129 S.W.2d 1153 (Tex.Civ.App.1939, writ dism'd, Judg. cor.); Lowe v. Texas Liquor Control Board, 255 S.W.2d 252 (Tex.Civ.App.1952 no writ); and Texas Liquor Control Board v. Raspante, 308 S.W.2d 136 (Tex.Civ.App.1957 no writ). In State v. Bush, 151 Tex. 606, 253 S.W.2d 269 (1952), a case where application for renewal of a retailer's permit to sell wine and beer had been denied, the Supreme Court said:

'The filing of an application for a license and the hearing and action thereon is not a civil or criminal cause. The power and authority granted to the Board, Administrator and County Judge with regard to issuance, denial, cancellation or supervision of such permits is merely the exercise of an administrative function and duty imposed by the Act. Jones v. Marsh, 148 Tex. 362, 224 S.W.2d 198; State v. De Silva, 105 Tex. 95, 145 S.W. 330; Bradley v. Texas Liquor Control Board, Tex.Civ.App., 108 S.W.2d 300, no writ history; Texas Liquor Control Board v. Jones, Tex.Civ.App., 112 S.W.2d 227, no writ history; Texas Liquor Control Board v. Floyd, Tex.Civ.App., 117 S.W.2d 530, no writ history.' (Emphasis added).

Subdivisions 7 and 10 of Art. 666-15(e) lists the grounds upon which the Board may cancel or suspend private club registration permits. Subdivisions 7 reads:

'7. The Board or Administrator may cancel or suspend for a period of time not exceeding sixty (60) days, after notice and hearing, any Private Club Registration Permit or any renewal of such Private Club Registration Permit, upon finding that the permittee club has:

'(a) Sold, offered for sale, purchased or held title to any liquor whatsoever so as to constitute an open saloon as defined in Section 3 of the Texas Liquor Control Act.

'(b) Refused to allow any authorized agent or representative of the Texas Liquor Control Board or any peace officer to come upon the club premises for the purposes of inspecting alcoholic beverages stored on said premises or investigating compliance with this Act or any provision of the Texas Liquor Control Act.

'(c) Refused to furnish the Board or its agent or representatives when requested any information pertaining to the storage, possession, serving or consumption of alcoholic beverages upon club premises.

'(d) Peritted or allowed any alcoholic beverages stored on club premises to be served or consumed at any place other than on the club premises.

'(e) Failed to maintain an adequate building at the address for which said Private Club Registration Permit was issued.

'(f) Caused, permitted or allowed any member of a club in a dry area to store any liquor on club premises except under the locker system.

'(g) Caused, permitted or allowed any person to consume or be served any alcoholic beverages on the club premises at any time on Sunday between the hours of 1:15 a. m. and 1:00 p. m., or any other day at any time between the hours of 12:15 a. m. and 7:00 a. m.

'(h) Violated any provision of the Texas Liquor Control Act or this Act.'

while Subdivision 10 is in this language, to-wit:

'Any permittee who violates or assists, aids or abets any violation of this Act or any provision thereof shall subject such permit to suspension or cancellation in accordance with the provisions of the Texas Liquor Control Act.'

This, Subdivision 10, can refer only to Art. 666-12 of the Texas Liquor Control Act, empowering the Board to cancel or suspend permits when it is found that any of a long list of...