Texas & N. O. Ry. Co. v. Parry
Decision Date | 23 January 1929 |
Docket Number | (No. 1144-5097.) |
Citation | 12 S.W.2d 997 |
Parties | TEXAS & N. O. RY. CO. v. PARRY et al. |
Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Action by Mrs. Emma Parry and another against the Texas & New Orleans Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed by Court of Civil Appeals , and defendant brings error. Reversed and remanded.
Baker, Botts, Parker & Garwood and Garrison & Watson, all of Houston, for plaintiff in error.
Ewing Werlein and Devereaux Henderson, both of Houston, for defendants in error.
This suit was originally instituted in the district court of Harris county, Tex., by Mrs. Emma Parry and her husband, defendants in error in this court, against the Texas & New Orleans Railway Company, plaintiff in error, for the recovery of damages because of the alleged negligence of the railway company in allowing a rubber matting on the platform or step of one of its passenger coaches to become worn and defective. It is alleged in substance that Mrs. Parry was attempting to alight from a coach belonging to the railway company, and that she caught her foot in this defective matting on the platform or step of said coach, and was thereby caused to fall from said platform down the steps to the ground, said fall resulting in the injuries complained of. The railway company answered by general denial, and especially pleaded that the injuries were the proximate result of the plaintiff's own negligence, and contributory negligence. The case was tried before a jury on special issues. On the verdict of the jury on such issues, judgment was rendered for Mrs. Parry and husband against the railway company for $20,000. This judgment was duly appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals for the Sixth District, which court affirmed the judgment of the district court, and the case is now before this court on writ of error granted on application of the railway company.
By proper assignments of error the railway company contends that the judgments of the district court and of the Court of Civil Appeals should be reversed on account of the misconduct of the jury, in mentioning and discussing, while deliberating on the amount of the damages, the fact that the attorneys would get a part of the recovery, and also in mentioning and discussing the fact that the railway company had a fund set aside to pay such claims as the one on trial, and also in discussing certain other matters not necessary to mention here. We are of the opinion that the trial court committed error in not granting a new trial on account of the undisputed fact that, after the jury had agreed on answers to special issues which rendered the railway company liable to the plaintiff in damages, but before the jury had agreed on the amount of the damages, it was stated in the presence and hearing of at least several members of the jury, by some member or members thereof, in effect, that the attorneys would get a part of the judgment, and that the railway company had a fund set aside to pay for such accidents as is involved in the case on trial. Practically all of the jurors who tried the case were sworn as witnesses on the trial of the issue of misconduct on the hearing of the motion for new trial. The testimony is very voluminous and covers 43 pages of the transcript, and no good purpose would be served by repeating it here. The juror S. J. Ammons was offered as a witness by the railway company, and he testified in substance that the jury first agreed on answers to the question which submitted the issues of the liability of the railway company for the injuries complained of, and that, while they were considering the amount to be awarded, there was mention made about attorneys' fees, and also some one said there was a certain amount set aside for these accidents. This witness states that the matter of attorneys' fees was mentioned several times.
The witness Ammons also testified, in part, as follows:
Nearly if not all of the other jurors were offered as witnesses by the plaintiff in the trial court, and the substance of their testimony is to the effect that the matter of attorneys' fees was mentioned only once, and that the juror who mentioned it was called down by the foreman and told that they could not consider that...
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