Texas Oklahoma Exp. v. Sorenson

• Decision Date: 05 October 1982
• Docket Number: No. 56273,56273
• Citation: 1982 OK 113,652 P.2d 285
• Parties: TEXAS OKLAHOMA EXPRESS, Petitioner, v. Leslie SORENSON and The Workers' Compensation Court, Respondents.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Page 285

652 P.2d 285

1982 OK 113

TEXAS OKLAHOMA EXPRESS, Petitioner, v. Leslie SORENSON and The Workers' Compensation Court, Respondents.

No. 56273.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

Oct. 5, 1982.

Original proceeding to review an order of the Workers' Compensation Court sitting en banc awarding compensation for permanent partial disability, Charles L. Cashion, Trial Judge.

AWARD SUSTAINED.

Looney, Nichols, Johnson & Hayes by Yvonne Sparger Nichols, Oklahoma City, for petitioner.

Guy Secor, Oklahoma City, for respondents.

LAVENDER, Justice:

Leslie Sorenson, Claimant, filed a Workers' Compensation claim against Texas Oklahoma Express, Respondent, alleging an accidental injury to his left arm on April 16, 1980. He further alleged reinjury to his left arm while in the employ of Respondent. Respondent admitted occurrence of Claimant's accident on June 20, 1980, leaving the only contested issue the nature and extent of disability. Upon hearing, the trial court held that Claimant had suffered an accidental injury to his left hand. The trial court found that Claimant had a 25% permanent partial disability to his left hand prior to April 16, 1980, and on that date sustained an additional 35% permanent partial disability to the left hand. Respondent appealed to the court en banc which affirmed the trial court, from which ruling Respondent appeals to this Court.

Respondent alleges that the trial court's order is incorrect and should be reversed because it makes no finding relative to any injury to Claimant's left arm. This claim of error is based upon the fact that Claimant's Form 3 filed with the Workers' Compensation Court alleges Claimant sustained an injury to his left arm on April 16, 1980, whereas, all of the evidence at the trial, and the findings of the trial judge referred only to an injury to Claimant's left hand. If the erroneous description of the injured member in the Form 3 was error at all, it was harmless error and no basis for reversal. The Workers' Compensation Court is a court of record with authority to adopt reasonable rules and regulations within its respective areas of responsibility which, when approved by the Supreme Court, "if not inconsistent with law, shall be binding in the administration of the Workers' Compensation Act." ¹ Among the Rules so adopted on July 4, 1978, effective August 15, 1978, is Rule 21, which provides:

"An objection to testimony offered by oral examination in open court must be made at the time the testimony is sought to be elicited. An objection to testimony offered by deposition must be interposed at the time the deposition is offered or at the deposition hearing. An objection to medical testimony offered by verified or declared report, if on the grounds that 1) it is based on inaccurate or incomplete history or is otherwise without probative value, or 2) it does not properly evaluate claimant's impairment or disability, as the case may be, in accordance with the Workers' Compensation Act, must be interposed at the same time it is offered into evidence. Unless an objection is timely made, it shall be deemed waived. Any legally inadmissible evidence that stands admitted without objection shall be regarded as admitted as part of the proof in the case."

Rules and regulations enacted by administrative agencies pursuant to the powers delegated to them have the force and effect of law. ² Rules of court properly promulgated, and not exceeding the limitation of the court's rulemaking power, likewise have the force of law. ³

No objection was made by Respondent during any of the proceedings below either because of the erroneous designation of the injured member in the Form 3, or to the evidence which was all directed toward Claimant's hand injuries, rather than to injuries to the arm. Neither has Respondent shown any prejudice resulting therefrom. Errors which are not prejudicial to the complaining party furnish no grounds for reversal on appeal. ⁴ The apprehensions expressed by Respondent that the ruling of the trial court will not be res judicata of any future claims by Claimant relating to past injury to Claimant's arm are rendered illusory by reason of the fact that except for the mis-characterization of the member injured in the Form 3, no reference appears anywhere in the entire record to any injury to Claimant's arm. The case before us is thus clearly distinguishable from cases cited by Respondent wherein the possibility of an actual injury remains undisposed of in the findings and order of the trial court, thus posing a threat to future litigation relating to the same.

Respondent next contends that the order of the trial court is erroneous and must be reversed because the trial judge conducted a physical examination of Claimant's hand and wrist in open court, observing that Claimant had lost about half of the range of motion flexing his hand, and a little more than half of the hyperextension with sideways deviation slightly restricted, on the basis of which the trial judge, arguably, might have arrived at his findings regarding disability. In support, Petitioner cites 85 O.S.Supp.1978, § 17 A. Respondent further urges that the medical report of Dr. M. pertaining to Claimant's disability did not conform to the requirements of Rule 20 ⁵ of the Rules of the Workers' Compensation Court, and could not therefore have been properly considered by the trial court in arriving at its findings concerning Claimant's disability. However, Respondent made no objection in open court to the evidence elicited either by way of the in-court physical examination by the trial judge or to the admissibility of Dr. M.'s medical report as is required under Rule 20, supra. The evidence now sought to be challenged by Respondent on appeal cannot, therefore, be espoused as reversible error.

Respondent next contends that what is now 85 O.S.1981 § 3.6, insofar as it requires as a conditional prerequisite to the appeal of a decision of the Workers' Compensation Court a written undertaking to the claimant "to the effect that the appellant will pay the amount of the award rendered therein, together with interest thereon at the rate of eighteen percent (18%) per year from the date of the award by the judge of the Court and all costs of the proceeding, ..." is "a penalty provision, inhibiting the right of appeal and denying Petitioner equal protection of the law as guaranteed by the Oklahoma and United States Constitution."

It is not the right or the power of the legislature to prescribe interest rates on judgments of courts of record which is challenged by Respondent who concedes such right and power was fully recognized in Western Natural Gas Co. v. Cities Service Gas Co. ⁶ Rather, it is the disparity between the interest rate made applicable to Workers' Compensation awards as compared with the interest rate applicable in the case of other judgments, and the requirement of the undertaking to assure payment of the award as a condition to maintaining an appeal from such award (as distinguished from a supersedeas bond as a condition to superseding a judgment on appeal in the case of other judgments) which are challenged on constitutional grounds.

Statutes frequently require the giving of a bond or other security by or on behalf of the appellant or plaintiff in error to perfect an appeal or error proceeding so as to effect an absolute security to the other parties to be affected by the appeal. Generally, the giving of such bond is jurisdictional. ⁷

85 O.S.1981, § 42 in pertinent part provides:

"If payment of compensation or an installment thereof due under the terms of an award, except in case of appeals from an award, be not made within ten (10) days after the same is due by the employer or insurance carrier liable therefor, the Court may order a certified copy of the award to be filed in the office of the court clerk of any county, which award whether accumulative or lump sum shall be entered on the judgment docket of the district court, and shall have the same force and be subject to the same law as judgments of the district court. Any compensation awarded and all payments thereof directed to be made by order of the Court shall bear interest at the rate of eighteen percent (18%) per year from the date ordered paid by the Court until the date of satisfaction thereof."

Thus, a Workers' Compensation award unpaid ten days after due becomes upon a certified copy being entered on the judgment docket, in effect, a judgment of the same quality and standing as judgments of the district court, ⁸ except for the following: The Workers' Compensation judgment bears interest at the rate of 18% per annum under 85 O.S.1981, §§ 3.6, 42; judgments of courts of record except the Workers' Compensation Court bear interest at the rate of 12% per year, except judgments against the State of Oklahoma or its political subdivisions which bear interest at the rate of 10% per year. ⁹ Generally, no appeal bond or undertaking which assures the payment of the principal amount of the judgment is required as a condition to appeal from the judgments of the district court, unless the judgment is sought to be superseded. ¹⁰ On the other hand, as we have pointed out, judgments of the Workers' Compensation Court may not be appealed by employer or insurer without the filing of such an undertaking (excepting municipalities or other political subdivisions of the State of Oklahoma).

In addressing this issue, we take into consideration not only the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, but also the pertinent provisions of the Oklahoma Constitution. ¹¹

In testing the validity of a state statute which differentiates in its treatment of one group of individuals compared with its treatment of another group as against the constitutional prohibition against taking property without due process of law, against denial of equal protection of the laws, and against the...