Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Younger

• Decision Date: 06 November 1953
• Docket Number: No. 15452,15452
• Citation: 262 S.W.2d 557
• Parties: TEXAS & P. RY. CO. v. YOUNGER.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 557

262 S.W.2d 557

TEXAS & P. RY. CO. v. YOUNGER.

No. 15452.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Fort Worth.

Nov. 6, 1953.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 4, 1953.

Samuels, Brown, Herman & Scott and William D. Campbell, Fort Worth, for appellant.

Davis, Spurlock & Schattman, and Joe Spurlock, Fort Worth, for appellee.

BOYD, Justice.

This is a suit by appellee C. B. Younger, under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, sections 51-60, Title 45, United States Code Annotated, against appellant the Texas and Pacific Railway Company for damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by appellee while working as a brakemen for appellant. Judgment was rendered for appellee for $17,875, and the company appealed.

Appellee alleged that he sustained personal injuries when a boxcar door fell on him as he and another brakeman were attempting to open the door for the purpose of unloading materials that had been transported in the boxcar; that his injuries were 'proximately caused, in whole or in part, by the negligence' of appellant and that such negligence was 'the proximate cause, in whole or in part,' of appellee's injuries; that the boxcar door was not in safe condition; that the hinges of the door were old, worn, defective and out of repair; that appellant failed to make a reasonable and proper inspection of the boxcar door; failed to advise appellee of the condition of the door and its parts and appurtenances; and failed to furnish appellee with safe equipment with which to do his work. The petition gave notice that appellee desired not to be limited to the specific acts of negligence set out therein, and there were general allegations of negligence on the part of appellant to the effect that the boxcar and door were in the exclusive possession and under the exclusive management and control of appellant; that the door would not have fallen and appellee would not have been injured had appellant exercised ordinary care, and that appellee could not point out the exact defect or defects or exactly what caused the door to fall, and that such information was in the exclusive possession of or available to appellant, and that in this connection appellant was 'guilty of negligence which proximately caused, in whole or in part,' the injuries sustained by appellee, and appellee specifically invoked the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

The jury found that the door was defective; that the defective condition of the door was negligence; that the appellant failed to make a proper and reasonable inspection of the door, and such failure was negligence; that appellant knew, or by the exercise of ordinary care should have known, prior to the accident, that the door was defective; that appellant failed to advise appellee of any defect in the door, and such failure was negligence; that each of such acts of negligence was a proximate cause, in whole or in part, of appellee's injuries; and that appellee was not negligent in any of the particulars inquired about.

Appellant's points of error involve the propositions that the court erred in including in the 'proximate cause' issues the words 'in whole or in part,' as follows: 'Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that such negligence, if any, was a proximate cause in whole or in part of the injuries, if any, sustained by the plaintiff?'; that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury's findings as to such negligence and proximate cause; that the court erred in overruling its objections to the argument of appellee's counsel; and that the verdict is excessive.

Section 51 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act provides that a railroad shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in interstate commerce, if the injury results, in whole or in part, from the negligence of any employee of the carrier or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars or other equipment.

Appellant objected that the use of the words 'in whole or in part' in the 'proximate cause' issues destroyed or diminished the court's prior definition of proximate cause and in effect told the jury that they were authorized to answer the issues favorably to appellee if they believed that the negligence inquired about was only in part a proximate cause of the injuries.

Whether it was error to include in the proximate cause issues the words 'in whole or in part,' which is a departure from the conventional and traditional manner of submitting such issues, raises a question that so far as investigation by counsel and ourselves reveals has never before been presented to any court. In the disposition of this interesting and important question we are controlled entirely by the Federal statute and adjudications by the Federal courts. While suits under the Federal Employers' Liability Act may be maintained in appropriate courts of any state, we are dealing with rights afforded the parties by the laws of the United States and not by state laws. Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 32 S.Ct. 169, 56 L.Ed. 327; Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 23 L.Ed. 833; Seaboard Air Line Railway v. Horton, 233 U.S. 492, 34 S.Ct. 635, 58 L.Ed. 1062; Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Kuhn, 248 U.S. 44, 52 S.Ct. 45, 76 L.Ed. 157.

No substantive right of any party to such suits may be impaired by any local statute, rule of decision, or forms of local practice. Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22, 44 S.Ct. 13, 68 L.Ed. 143; Maty v. Grasselli Chemical Co., 303 U.S. 197, 58 S.Ct. 507, 82 L.Ed. 745; Brady v. Southern R. Co., 320 U.S. 476, 64 S.Ct. 232, 88 L.Ed. 239; Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Stapeton, 279 U.S. 587, 49 S.Ct. 442, 73 L.Ed. 861. This immunity extends to the pleadings, and a state's rule that a pleading will be construed strictly against the pleader has no application in a suit in the state court under this Act. Brown v. Western Ry. of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294, 70 S.Ct. 105, 94 L.Ed. 100. And what constitutes negligence for the statute's purposes is a federal question, and it does not vary in accordance with different conceptions of negligence under state laws, and we are governed by federal decisional law in formulating the concept of negligence. Dice v. Akron, C. & Y. R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 72 S.Ct. 312, 96 L.Ed. 398; Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 69 S.Ct. 1018, 93 L.Ed. 1282.

As to allegations of negligence and proximate cause, a complaint substantially in the language of the statute is sufficient. Southern Ry. Co. v. Peters, 194 Ala. 94, 69 So. 611; Lewis v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 131 Minn. 122, 154 N.W. 945. It has been held that the complaint need not allege that the plaintiff's injury was proximately caused by the negligent act, or that the injury proximately resulted therefrom, when the language of the statute is used, because the statute does not so express it; and that where the complaint alleged that the injury was 'caused from and resulted in whole or in part from said defect in the appliances', it was not subject to demurrer on the ground that it did not allege 'that the defect proximately contributed in whole or in part to plaintiff's injury.' Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. Smith, 256 Ala. 220, 54 So.2d 453, 458. See also Reynolds v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 251 Ala. 27, 36 So.2d 102. It is sufficient to say that the defendant was guilty of negligence 'contributing to plaintiff's injuries'. Lock v. Chilcago, B. & Q. R. Co., 281 Mo. 532, 219 S.W. 919, 922. If the injury results in whole or in part from the negligence of another employee, the railroad is liable under the express terms of the act. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Skaggs, 240 U.S. 66, 36 S.Ct. 249, 60 L.Ed. 528; Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Stapleton, supra.

In Eglsaer v. Scandrett, 7 Cir., 151 F.2d 562, 565, the court said: 'Perhaps the reconciliation of the earlier accepted, * * * idea, of 'proximate cause' as the direct or efficient cause of the accident * * * and the conception of proximate cause which now obtains, is to be found in the enlarging phrase of the statute. It provides that if the railroad's negligence 'in part' results in the injuries or death, liability arises. Under the old concept of proximate cause, that cause must have been direct, the complete, the responsible, the efficient cause of the injury. Contributing and remotely related causes were not sufficient. Now, if the negligence of the railroad has 'causal relation,'-if the injury or death resulted 'in part' from defendants' negligence, there is liability.

'The words 'in part' have enlarged the field or scope of proximate causes-in these railroad injury cases. * * *'

'* * * It seems that it would have been an incorrect statement of the law to have advised the jury that before they could find for plaintiff they must find that negligently permitting the steam to escape was the proximate cause, for the reason that it might have been only partly the cause, and still the plaintiff be entitled to recover. * * *' St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Bateman, 112 Okl. 86, 240 P. 110, 112. An instruction that if the defect complained of 'contributed to cause' the injury defendant would be liable, was approved in Wolfe v. Payne, 294 Mo. 170, 241 S.W. 915, 917; affirmed Davis v. Wolfe, 263 U.S. 239, 44 S.Ct. 64, 68 L.Ed. 284; and the court said: '* * * it was sufficient that plaintiff prove the existence of the defective grabiron and that it was in part the cause of plaintiff's injury. * * *'

In the instant case, the court defined proximate cause as '* * * a cause which in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new and independent cause, produces an event and without which the event would not have happened; and for an act or ommission to become a proximate cause of an injury, it must have been reasonably anticipated by a reasonably prudent person, in the exercise of ordinary care, that such injury or some similar injury would follow as a natural consequence. There may be more than one...