Texas Rice Land Co. v. McFaddin, Wiess & Kyle Land Co.

• Decision Date: 12 November 1924
• Docket Number: (No. 577-4041.)
• Citation: 265 S.W. 888
• Parties: TEXAS RICE LAND CO. v. McFADDIN, WIESS & KYLE LAND CO. et al.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

265 S.W. 888

TEXAS RICE LAND CO. v. McFADDIN, WIESS & KYLE LAND CO. et al.

(No. 577-4041.)

Commission of Appeals of Texas, Section A.

November 12, 1924.

Error to Court of Civil Appeals of Ninth Supreme Judicial District.

Suit by the Texas Rice Land Company against the McFaddin, Wiess & Kyle Land Company and others. Judgment for plaintiff was reversed by the Court of Civil Appeals (253 S. W. 916), and plaintiff brings error. Judgment of Court of Civil Appeals affirmed.

E. E. Easterling and Orgain & Carroll, all of Beaumont, for plaintiff in error.

E. L. Nall, Oliver J. Todd, and C. W. Howth, all of Beaumont, for defendants in error.

GERMAN, P. J.

The Texas Rice Land Company, herein designated plaintiff, instituted this suit in the district court of Jefferson county, Tex., January 3, 1916. The case went to trial against W. P. H. McFaddin, W. W. Kyle, P. H. Wiess, and Mrs. Ruth Branham, who will be designated herein as defendants. The purpose of the suit was to recover the rental value, for the years 1901, 1902, and 1903, of 440 acres of land in Jefferson county, being an undivided interest in the David Cunningham survey The claim by plaintiff was that for those years the possession of said land was wrongfully withheld from its predecessor in title, the American Oil & Refining Company, by the McFaddin, Wiess & Kyle Land Company, a partnership composed of W. P. H. McFaddin, V. Wiess, and W. W. Kyle. Judgment was rendered in the trial court in favor of plaintiff for the sum of $83,212.60. This judgment was reversed by the Court of Civil Appeals for the Ninth District, and judgment was rendered in favor of the defendants. The opinion was written by Special Chief Justice Foster, and is to be found in 253 S. W., pages 916 to 929. The opinion is not only an able one, but contains an accurate and faithful statement of the facts and an illuminating discussion of the law applicable to the questions involved. We have carefully reviewed the propositions presented by plaintiff in error, as well as the evidence and the law applicable, and are thoroughly convinced that the result reached by the Court of Civil Appeals is correct, and after a thorough discussion of the case with the Supreme Court we are authorized to state that the court is in accord with us in this conclusion. Without lending approval to each and all of the propositions of law set forth in the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals, yet the decision of the case, as to result, can be very satisfactorily rested upon the opinion of that court, and we will only briefly state reasons for concurring therein.

In January, 1901, W. P. H. McFaddin took possession of the Cunningham survey of land, and asserted title thereto in his own name as against the Chaison heirs, under whom plaintiff claims. In February following Charles J. Chaison and the other Chaison heirs filed suit against McFaddin to recover title and possession of said land, being styled Chaison v. McFaddin, No. 2694. On January 2, 1904, the American Oil & Refining Company, having acquired the interest and right of the Chaison heirs, intervened in this suit, and in addition to suing for the land sought to recover of W. P. H. McFaddin and others rentals for the years 1901, 1902, and 1903. Charles J. Chaison was the president and practically the sole owner of the American Oil & Refining Company. November 17, 1911, the Texas Rice Land Company, plaintiff herein, as owner of all the title and rights of the Chaison heirs and of the American Oil & Refining Company, intervened in this suit, and sued to recover of W. P. H. McFaddin rentals for the years 1901, 1902, and 1903, as well as for other years. In all of these pleadings the original trespass and ouster is alleged to have been by McFaddin.

There were two trials of this case, the first in 1909 and the other in 1912. In each of these trials W P. H. McFaddin testified that from January 14, 1901, to July of that year he claimed possession of the land under the deed to a one-half interest therein made to him by the Hyde heirs. This one-half interest in the survey has never been owned by the plaintiff. He further testified that from July, 1901, through the years 1902, 1903, and 1904, the possession of the land was held by him as the representative of and for the McFaddin-Wiess Canal & Irrigation Company under written leases from the Glieses heirs, whose title the plaintiff now holds, having been recovered by it from the Glieses heirs, under a claim of limitations, by judgment of March 4, 1912, in said cause No. 2694. The Court of Civil Appeals in its opinion in said case of Chaison et al. v. McFaddin et al., reported in 159 S. W 69, finds that the undisputed testimony established the facts of possession as testified to by McFaddin. It was therefore held in that case (in accordance with instructions of the trial court and verdict of the jury) that plaintiff herein, Texas Rice Land Company, was not entitled to recover anything for rentals as against McFaddin, for the reason that any cause of action for possession prior to July, 1901, was barred by limitations, and for the further reason that McFaddin was not individually liable for rentals for the remainder of the year 1901, and for 1902 and 1903, because during that period the possession was that of the McFaddin-Wiess Canal & Irrigation Company, a corporation.

In the present suit defendants pleaded the statute of limitations, and also contended that plaintiff's right to recover rentals for the years 1901, 1902, and 1903 had been litigated and determined adversely to it by the judgment of March 4, 1912. To avoid the plea of limitations, the plaintiff makes the following contentions:

(1) That for the years 1901, 1902, and 1903 possession of the land in controversy was held by the partnership of McFaddin, Wiess & Kyle Land Company, and not by W. P. H. McFaddin individually.

(2) That, by fraudulent and deceitful conduct on the part of the partnership of McFaddin, Wiess & Kyle Land Company, the fact of the possession of the land for the year mentioned by the partnership, instead of by McFaddin individually and by the corporation, was kept concealed from plaintiff, and it did not discover that the possession was really held by the partnership until less than two years prior to the filing of this suit.

In response to special issues, the jury found that the partnership of McFaddin, Wiess & Kyle Land Company held possession of the land in controversy for the years 1901, 1902, and 1903. They further found that said partnership fraudulently concealed from plaintiff and its predecessors in title the fact that they held possession of the land during such time, and that, by reason of such fraudulent concealment, the plaintiff did not learn of the possession by the partnership until less than two years before the filing of the suit. They also answered that the plaintiff and its predecessors in title exercised ordinary diligence to discover who was in possession of the land for the years named. The Court of Civil Appeals has held that —

"The evidence is legally insufficient to show reasonable diligence on the part of appellee [plaintiff] to discover its cause of action against the partnership or the members as partners."

With this holding we agree. For the purposes of this case we may assume that it is the rule in this state that the fraudulent concealment of a cause of action, although the cause of...