Textile Workers Union v. Brookside Mills, Inc.

• Decision Date: 29 June 1960
• Citation: 47 Tenn.App. 663,341 S.W.2d 758
• Parties: TEXTILE WORKERS UNION, etc. v. BROOKSIDE MILLS, INC. 47 Tenn.App. 663, 341 S.W.2d 758
• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals

Page 758

341 S.W.2d 758

TEXTILE WORKERS UNION, etc. v. BROOKSIDE MILLS, INC.

47 Tenn.App. 663, 341 S.W.2d 758

Court of Appeals of Tennessee, Eastern Section.

June 29, 1960 Certiorari Denied by Supreme Court Oct. 7, 1960.

[47 TENNAPP 664] Kramer, Dye, McNabb & Greenwood and E. H. Rayson, Knoxville, for appellant.

Creekmore, Buhl & Thomson, Knoxville, for appellees.

McAMIS, Presiding Judge.

Brookside Mills, Incorporated, appeals from the Chancellor's decree confirming a report of the Master allowing former employees of defendant certain amounts as 'vacation pay.' This is the third appeal in this case. Opinions in two appeals to the Supreme Court will be found at 203 Tenn. 71, 309 S.W.2d 371, and 326 S.W.2d 671. One of defendant's principal contentions on this appeal is that the Chancellor's construction of the term 'continuous service' is contrary to the opinion of the Supreme Court on the last appeal. The terms of the contract material to the dispute are set out in the opinion on the first appeal.

Defendant contends that any layoff for more than 30 days breaks the continuity of service required by the contract even though at the instance of defendant and due to economic conditions.

[47 TENNAPP 665] In resolving this issue, two other questions are presented. The first is whether confirmation of the Master's report is based on material evidence. If this question is answered in the affirmative, we must then determine whether the decree is contrary to the opinion of the Supreme Court on the second appeal. Tenn., 326 S.W.2d 671.

As to the first question, it appears that the amount allowed under the first report was based solely on seniority. The Supreme Court rejected seniority as the basis for computing vacation pay. The Chancellor thereafter ordered a reference to the Master 'to determine what amount defendant owes to the respective employees of the Brookside Mills during the period of time in question for vacation pay, such determination to be made in accordance with the previous decree of this Court as modified by the opinions and decrees of the Supreme Court.'

Pursuant to that order the Master, acting in collaboration with W. Ben Davis, an accountant employed by the Master as directed by a previous order of the Chancellor, reported the total amount due to be $34,875.15. This reduced the amount from $44,395.21 allowed by the first report. The second report was accompanied by a copy of the computation attached to the first report. The reductions are indicated by red lines as to individual employees, the corrected amounts being also indicated in red. This second report, dated November 4, 1959, is silent as to whether the Master, in arriving at the amount, relied upon the practice of defendant with regard to the effect of layoffs on classification of employees.

On defendant's exception to the report, the Chancellor entered an order remanding the case to the rules 'for [47 TENNAPP 666] the purpose of taking the evidence of W. Ben Davis so as to inquire into the extent of Mr. Davis' investigation prior to having made his original report to the Clerk & Master.'

Thereafter, the deposition of Mr. Davis was taken by complainants and he was cross-examined at length by defendant's counsel. It is earnestly insisted by defendant that the deposition fails to show that his computation of the amounts due employees as vacation pay was based upon or influenced by the practice of defendant, as revealed by its records, to disregard layoffs for economic reasons in determining whether employees fell within the 2% category or the 4% category or whether the period of continuous employment was less than 6 months, in which case no benefits would be due.

While the testimony of Mr. Davis is not as clear and satisfactory as we would like, we can not say the Chancellor erred in construing his testimony as showing that he looked to the records of defendant to determine in what category the employees were placed by defendant. He testified that the corrections made as a result of the Supreme Court holding were the 'result of a report submitted by Brookside Mills.' (Tr. p. 17.) We have examined that report and find that employees who had been off more than 30 days were left in the 4% category. As an illustration, Vina Bright Ford is shown to have been off from April 8, 1956, until July 19, 1956, but was left in the 4% column. If the Master's allowance due to the fact that he used only a 'spot check' method included employees who had not been classified by defendant it had an opportunity to develop that fact by cross-examination of Mr. Davis or by bringing forward its records. We would be most reluctant to remand the case again after [47 TENNAPP 667] two prior appeals so that these records could be introduced.

We conclude that evidence of classification by defendant is material evidence supporting the concurrent finding of the Master and Chancellor binding this Court on appeal. Black v. Love, etc. Coal Co., 30 Tenn.App. 377, 206 S.W.2d 432; Harriman Welding Supply Co. v. Lake City L. A. Co., Tenn.App., 330 S.W.2d 564.

We come then to the question of...