Thacker v. Pikeville Med. Ctr.
| Decision Date | 10 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2021-CA-1360-MR |
| Parties | DONNA THACKER APPELLANT v. PIKEVILLE MEDICAL CENTER, INC.; ABIGAIL HATFIELD, D.O.; KENTUCKY EMPLOYERS' MUTUAL INSURANCE; AND MICHAEL MCCLAIN, D.O. APPELLEES |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: GLENN MARTIN HAMMOND PIKEVILLE, KENTUCKY
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE ABIGAIL HATFIELD, D.O.: STEPHEN S. BURCHETT MICHAEL G. ERENA LEXINGTON, KENTUCKY
BEFORE: LAMBERT, MAZE, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
Donna Thacker has appealed from the October 19, 2021, summary judgment of the Pike Circuit Court dismissing, with prejudice, her medical malpractice claim against Abigail Hatfield, D.O., for damages she sustained during a procedure while Hatfield was a medical student. We affirm.
Thacker underwent a surgical procedure to her right shoulder at the Pikeville Medical Center (PMC) on September 10, 2019, during which she claimed to have been injured while the general endotracheal anesthesia was being administered. One year later, Thacker filed a complaint in the Pike Circuit Court seeking damages from PMC, Michael McClain, D.O. (Dr McClain), and Hatfield, who at the time of the procedure was a student at the University of Pikeville's Kentucky College of Osteopathic Medicine. PMC and Dr. McClain moved to dismiss Thacker's complaint pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 12.02(f) for her failure to state a cognizable claim or for a more definite statement pursuant to CR 12.05 as the complaint did not contain sufficient factual allegations to support her assertions that any of the defendants could be found negligent. Hatfield joined in this motion. The court denied the motion to dismiss, but it granted the motion for a more definite statement and provided Thacker time to file an amended complaint. She filed the amended complaint on March 30, 2021, alleging that Dr McClain and Hatfield were responsible for administering the anesthesia and were negligent. Later, Kentucky Employers' Mutual Insurance (KEMI) intervened in Thacker's action to assert a workers' compensation subrogation claim against the defendants.
In August 2021, Hatfield filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of Thacker's claims against her. She argued that, because she was a medical student and was following the instructions and directions of Dr. McClain at the time of the procedure, she was exculpated from any liability. In addition, she stated that she did not owe Thacker a duty of care as a medical student and could not be held to an elevated standard of care. Finally, Hatfield argued that public policy supported not imposing a doctor's duties on medical students as they must be properly trained to successfully perform their jobs. In response, Thacker argued that disputed facts remained to be decided, which would preclude summary judgment.
By order entered October 19, 2021, the circuit court granted Hatfield's motion for summary judgment, concluding that no genuine issues of material fact existed and agreeing with her argument that, in assisting Dr. McClain, Hatfield was "akin to a nurse who assists a doctor during a procedure and follows the doctor's orders[.]" As Thacker had not alleged that Hatfield had deviated from Dr. McClain's orders, the court found that her execution of these orders relieved her from any responsibility or liability in this case, citing City of Somerset v. Hart, 549 S.W.2d 814, 817 (Ky. 1977). Therefore, the court dismissed Thacker's and KEMI's claims against Hatfield with prejudice. Thacker's claims against PMC and Dr. McClain remained pending. The court made the summary judgment final and appealable pursuant to CR 54.02(1), and this appeal now follows.
On appeal, Thacker contends that the circuit court improperly entered summary judgment in Hatfield's favor, arguing that it was premature, that some liability attached to Hatfield, and that Hatfield had a duty to her. Hatfield disputes these arguments in her brief.
Our applicable standard of review is set forth in Patton v. Bickford, 529 S.W.3d 717, 723 (Ky. 2016):
With this standard in mind, we shall consider Thacker's arguments.
For her first argument, Thacker contends that the entry of summary judgment regarding Hatfield's lack of liability was premature because there was no evidence in the record that Dr. McClain had provided the directions or orders that harmed her, or that Dr. McClain was responsible for her injuries or for any of Hatfield's actions. We do not agree with Thacker's assertions regarding the lack of evidence that Hatfield was not acting solely under Dr. McClain's guidance. As Hatfield points out, in his answer to the amended complaint, Dr. McClain admitted that "he was responsible for administering and monitoring the anesthesia to [Thacker] and the care associated therewith." We agree with Hatfield that this constitutes a judicial admission, which causes Thacker's argument that there was no evidence to fail.
[A] judicial admission is conclusive, in that it removes the proposition in question from the field of disputed issue, and may be defined to be a formal act done in the course of judicial proceedings which waives or dispenses with the necessity of producing evidence by the opponent and bars the party himself from disputing it; and, as a natural consequence, allows the judge to direct the jury to accept the admission as conclusive of the disputed fact.
Sutherland v. Davis, 286 Ky. 743, 151 S.W.2d 1021, 1024 (1941). Therefore, we find no merit in Thacker's argument that summary judgment was premature.
Next, Thacker argues that some liability properly attaches to Hatfield, which we shall consider in conjunction with her argument that Hatfield owed a duty to her. In order to establish a negligence claim, a plaintiff must prove, Pathways, Inc. v. Hammons, 113 S.W.3d 85, 88-89 (Ky. 2003) (citing Mullins v. Commonwealth Life Insurance Co., 839 S.W.2d 245, 247-48 (Ky. 1992)). Thacker asserts that there was insufficient discovery taken to support a finding as to any proportionate share of her liability, that "[m]edical students who are at the point of acting as doctors, under supervision, are typically sued in actions brought by patients for medical negligence or malpractice[,]" that Hatfield was a medical intern or resident at the time the procedure took place, and that, because she had been engaging in patients' medical care, she should be held liable for any harm that she caused if it breached her standard of care. We disagree.
Rather, we agree with Hatfield's argument that, under Kentucky law, a medical student under the direction of a physician is not independently liable to a patient for medical malpractice.
Hatfield first cites to Sameuls v. Willis, 133 Ky. 459, 118 S.W. 339 (1909), a malpractice action brought against a surgeon after a sponge had been left inside of a patient. The former Court of Appeals indicated that the surgeon had "sent down a trained nurse and followed next day with a medical student as assistant." Id. at 340. As Hatfield points out, the medical student was not named as a defendant in...
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