Thai v. Mapes

Citation412 F.3d 970
Decision Date21 June 2005
Docket NumberNo. 04-1857.,04-1857.
PartiesHein Quoc THAI, Appellant, v. Terry MAPES, Appellee.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

Frank L. Burnette, II, argued, Des Moines, Iowa, for appellant.

Robert P. Ewald, AAG, argued, Des Moines, Iowa, for appellee.

Before BYE, HANSEN, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

HANSEN, Circuit Judge.

An Iowa state court jury convicted Hein Quoc Thai of second degree murder and terrorism, and the court sentenced Thai to 50 years of imprisonment. After failing to obtain state court relief on direct appeal and in postconviction proceedings, Thai filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000), in the United States District Court. The district court1 dismissed his application and granted a certificate of appealability. After careful review, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I. Background.

In August 1995 Thai was arrested in connection with a murder at the Café DiVang in Des Moines, Iowa. An investigation revealed that a Vietnamese group was responsible and that Thai was one of several people at the scene. Witnesses reported that Thai had possessed a .38 caliber revolver and had instructed the owner of the establishment not to call the police. At the police station after Thai's arrest, Detective Dennis O'Donnell read Thai his Miranda2 rights with the help of a translator, Police Cadet Phoukham Tran. Detective O'Donnell also gave Thai a written copy of his Miranda rights, written both in English and in error-filled Vietnamese. Thai verbally indicated that he understood his rights, but he was not explicitly asked whether he chose to waive them. As the interview proceeded, Thai made statements which were later introduced at trial against him.

Although Thai initially denied any involvement in the murder, Detective O'Donnell told Thai that several witnesses had placed him at the scene with a gun. Thai indicated that he was afraid of what the members of the group (some of whom were sitting in the police station and had seen Thai go into the interrogation room) might do to him if they learned that he had talked to the police. Detective O'Donnell responded that he would protect Thai and that nothing bad would happen to Thai if Thai agreed to talk, and Thai thereafter made a statement. Several times during the interrogation, Thai answered Detective O'Donnell's questions in English and without waiting for a translation, indicating that he did understand some English.

Before trial, Thai's lawyer sought to suppress the statements that Thai had made in interrogation, arguing that Thai had not been aware of his rights and that he had been unfairly manipulated by the tactics used in interrogation. At the suppression hearing, an expert testified that there is a cultural distrust of the police in Vietnam and that there were several serious mistakes on the Vietnamese-language Miranda form, rendering the written form ineffective to communicate to a suspect his constitutional rights. However, the same expert testified that the transcript of the Vietnamese translation of the verbal reading of the Miranda warning was ninety-nine percent accurate. At the same hearing, Detective O'Donnell admitted that he had told Thai that witnesses had seen him inside the Café, even though O'Donnell had no such information at the time. The state court denied the suppression motion.

The state court jury convicted Thai of second degree murder and terrorism. On direct appeal, Thai argued that he did not make a knowing and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of Thai's statements taken in interrogation on the further ground that the statement was induced by a promise of leniency from Detective O'Donnell. The Iowa Court of Appeals rejected both arguments and affirmed, concluding that Thai's Miranda waiver was valid. In recounting the evidence before the trial court, the Iowa Court of Appeals erroneously stated that the expert had testified that the written Miranda form was ninety-nine percent correct, even though the testimony had been that the written form was incorrect, but the transcript of the Vietnamese portions of the interview had been ninety-nine percent accurate. The court reasoned that the "warning sufficiently conveyed the information required by Miranda." State v. Thai, 575 N.W.2d 521, 524 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997). The state court of appeals also held that under Iowa law a waiver of Miranda rights need not be express; a waiver may be implied where a suspect chooses to speak after being clearly informed of his rights. Id. In this case, "Thai's answers to the detective's questions indicate Thai chose to waive his rights." Id. The state court of appeals also concluded that Detective O'Donnell's statements to Thai that witnesses had told the officers that they had seen Thai, though perhaps untrue at the time, did not factor into Thai's decision to waive his Miranda rights. Id. at 524-25, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Finally, the court held that the record on Thai's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was insufficient for review on direct appeal. Id. at 525, 86 S.Ct. 1602. The Supreme Court of Iowa denied his application for further review.

In 1999 Thai presented his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a petition for postconviction relief in the Iowa District Court, again arguing that he had been provided the ineffective assistance of counsel when his counsel failed to object to the admissibility of his confession because the confession was a product of Detective O'Donnell's promise of leniency. Thai testified at his postconviction relief hearing that he had understood Detective O'Donnell's willingness to protect Thai as a promise that, if Thai talked, then Thai would be set free and would not be prosecuted. The Iowa District Court denied postconviction relief, and Thai appealed. Reviewing the postconviction petition, the Iowa Court of Appeals found that Detective O'Donnell's statements did not constitute a promise of leniency, and therefore his trial counsel had no duty to raise the issue. Thai v. State, Nos. 0-749, 00-491, 2001 WL 22989 (Iowa Ct.App. Jan.10, 2001). The Iowa Court of Appeals also noted that Thai's trial counsel had testified at the postconviction relief hearing that he would not have pursued promise of leniency as a ground for suppression because he thought that a Miranda argument was a stronger suppression ground. The Supreme Court of Iowa denied further review.

Thai filed a § 2254 application for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court in December 2001. In addition to his Miranda and ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Thai also argued that the deferential review accorded state court convictions pursuant to § 2254 did not apply to his case because of two factual errors made by the state courts. First he pointed to the erroneous finding of the Iowa Court of Appeals on direct appeal that the Vietnamese translation of the written Miranda form was ninety-nine percent accurate, even though the testimony had actually been that the written form had been riddled with errors. He also pointed to the finding of the Iowa District Court considering his petition for postconviction relief that his trial court counsel had made a tactical decision not to pursue the theory of promise of leniency. The chief magistrate judge, in a very detailed and thorough Report and Recommendation, recommended that the application be denied. The district court, itself conducting an independent, careful, and thorough review, adopted the recommendation and dismissed the § 2254 application. The district court first determined that § 2254(d) applied despite any alleged factual errors by the Iowa courts because neither error affected the application of § 2254(d). The court found that the factual error by the Iowa Court of Appeals on direct appeal regarding the written Miranda form was not material because the verbal warning had been sufficient to communicate Thai's constitutional rights. As to the alleged factual error made by the state postconviction motion court, the district court was not convinced that there was any factual inconsistency, but even if there was, it was immaterial because the state court had also held that there had been no promise of leniency. The district court also held that the Iowa state courts did not render judgments that were contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law when they determined that Thai had validly waived his Miranda rights and that Thai did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel.

The district court granted a certificate of appealability on all of the issues for which Thai requested the certificate. Thai makes the same arguments before this court, and we consider them in turn.

II. Standard of Review.

A district court may grant an inmate's § 2254 application for habeas corpus on a claim "adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings" only if the state court decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or if the state court adjudication "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding," § 2254(d)(2). We will find that the state court's decision was contrary to clearly established federal law "if the state court applie[d] a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases," or "if the state court confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite [that of the Court]." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000).

Thai seeks a de novo review of the state court determinations,...

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