Thayer v. Pressey
| Decision Date | 25 January 1900 |
| Citation | 56 N.E. 5,175 Mass. 225 |
| Parties | THAYER et al. v. PRESSEY et al. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Causten Browne, F. P. Goulding, and Geo. S. Toft, for plaintiffs.
Herbert Parker, C. C. Milton, and Chandler Bullock, for defendants.
This case is reserved for our consideration on the bill and a demurrer which goes to the merits of the whole case. Ellen F Pressey, hereinafter called the 'defendant,' as she alone defends on the issues now raised, is the daughter and sole heir of John C. Howe, late of Worcester, deceased, and is the duly-appointed administratrix of his estate. As his legal representative, she was paid about $67,000 by the treasurer of the United States, under an act of congress passed in April, 1898, which is as follows: 'Be it enacted,' etc., 'that the secretary of the treasury be, and he is hereby, authorized and directed to pay to the legal representatives of John C. Howe, deceased, sixty-six thousand nine hundred and seven dollars, out of any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated, the same being compensation in full for the use by the United States, to wit, in 66,907,313 cup anvil cartridges, of the invention secured to John C. Howe and his assigns by letters patent of the United States issued to him August 16, 1864, and No 43,851, during the entire term of said letters patent, as appears in the findings of law and of fact made by the United States circuit court for the district of Connecticut in the case of Forehand and others versus Porter, reported in volume fifteen of the Federal Reporter, at page two hundred and fifty-six, and as further appears in the findings of fact made by the court of claims, after full testimony and full hearing in congressional case numbered one, entitled Forehand and others versus The United States, heard on reference of the matter to said court of claims by the committee on claims of the senate under and pursuant to the act of March third one thousand eight hundred eighty-three, commonly known as the Bowman act, said findings of fact having been certified to the committee on claims of the senate by said court on the twenty-sixth day of April, one thousand eight hundred eighty-nine.' This money, less $10,752, paid by order of the court on account of expenses, is on deposit to her credit in the defendant bank, and the plaintiffs contend that by virtue of an assignment and certain contracts it is charged with a trust in their favor for the sum of $25,500, expended in preliminary litigation and in prosecuting the claim before congress, and also for two-thirds of the balance as the share to which they are entitled under the assignment and contracts, less the amount of said payments made by order of the court, making the amount of their present claim $42,352. The last of these contracts was executed on June 15, 1894, by the defendant herself. Her father died August 13, 1892, and she was appointed administratrix on October 18, 1892. The assignment and contracts set out in the bill, with the accompanying averments, present a case of strong equities in favor of the plaintiffs, unless the existence of the statutes and decisions on which the defendant relies so affects their conduct as to prevent their recovery. The defendant contends that the assignment and contracts under which the plaintiffs claim are void under Rev. St. U.S. § 3477, which is as follows: This statute is a re-enactment from the act of February 26, 1853 (St. 1853, c. 81), which is entitled 'An act to prevent frauds upon the treasury of the United States,' and which had frequently been considered by the supreme court of the United States. In Spofford v. Kirk, 97 U.S. 484, 24 L.Ed. 1032, it was held that a duly-accepted order given by the holder of a claim against the United States in favor of a third person, upon one whom he had employed to collect the claim, and afterwards transferred to a purchaser for value, who took it in good faith, could not be enforced against the drawer upon the fund. Mr. Justice Strong, in giving the opinion, said: Notwithstanding this strong general language, the court has since recognized exceptions to its universal inclusiveness. In Goodman v. Niblack, 102 U.S. 559, 26 L.Ed. 231, it is said that the mischiefs intended to be remedied by the statutes are: 'First, the danger that the rights of the government might be embarrassed by having to deal with several persons instead of one, and by the introduction of a party who was a stranger to the original transaction; second, that by the transfer of such a claim against the government to one or more persons not originally interested in it the way might be conveniently opened to such influences in presenting the claim before the departments, the courts, or in congress as desperate cases, when the reward is contingent on success, so often suggest.' The court then says that 'both of these considerations, as well as a careful examination of the statute, leave no doubt that its sole purpose was to protect the government, and not the parties to the assignment.' It was decided in this case that a voluntary assignment of a claim against the United States with other property by an insolvent debtor, with preferences, was valid, notwithstanding the statute. It had previously been held in Erwin v. U. S., 97 U.S. 392, 24 L.Ed. 1065, that the statute did not apply to assignments by operation of law, and that such claims passed by an assignment in bankruptcy. The doctrine that 'the object of the statute was to protect the government, and not the claimant, and to prevent frauds upon the treasury,' has been strongly stated in numerous other cases. See Trust Co. v. Shepherd, 127 U.S. 494, 8 S.Ct. 1250, 32 L.Ed. 163; Bailey v. U. S., 109 U.S. 432, 3 S.Ct. 272, 27 L.Ed. 988; Hobbs v. McLean, 117 U.S. 567, 6 S.Ct. 870, 29 L.Ed. 940. Accordingly, while the government may always disregard an assignment of a claim against it, there is a class of cases in which claims against the United States have been included in assignments and transfers, and have passed from the assignor to the assignee with full effect between the parties, as incident to the general subject of the contract. Hobbs v. McLean, 117 U.S. 567, 6 S.Ct. 870, 29 L.Ed. 940, was a case where one having a contract with the United States to furnish army supplies made an agreement with others whereby they were to become partners with him, and have a share in the money to be received from the United States. It was held that such a transfer of an interest in the claim was valid as between the parties, and was not within the statute. In Trust Co. v. Shepherd, 127 U.S. 494, 8 S.Ct. 1250, 32 L.Ed. 163, the United States government was a lessee of real estate, and liable to pay rent, and on an assignment of the lease and the rent under it it was held that there was nothing in this statute which invalidated the transaction as between the parties, the government having chosen to recognize the assignment. In Barrow v. Milliken, 20 C. C. A. 559, 74 F. 612, it was decided by the circuit court of appeals, while considering this statute, that a sugar planter might mortgage and pledge his crop, and his claim for a bounty to be received from the United States, in such a way as to be effectual against himself and others claiming under him, although the claim had not been presented and allowed. The plaintiff in Jernegan v. Osborn, 155 Mass. 207, 29 N.E. 520, was the owner of one-sixteenth part of the ship Europa, whose owners sustained losses by reason of services rendered by the ship in assisting in the rescue of 900 seamen in the Arctic Seas. Afterwards he sold his interest in the ship to...
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