Thayer v. State

• Citation: 376 S.E.2d 199,189 Ga.App. 321
• Decision Date: 01 November 1988
• Docket Number: 77024,Nos. 77023,s. 77023
• Parties: THAYER v. The STATE. HALL v. The STATE.
• Court: United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)

Page 199

376 S.E.2d 199

189 Ga.App. 321

THAYER v. The STATE.

HALL v. The STATE.

Nos. 77023, 77024.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Nov. 1, 1988.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 18, 1988.

Certiorari Denied Jan. 6, 1989.

Janet G. Scott, Jonesboro, Michelle G. Lundy, Peachtree City, for appellants.

Johnnie L. Caldwell, Jr., Dist. Atty., J. David Fowler, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.

BEASLEY, Judge.

Defendants, husband and wife, appeal their convictions on nine counts of violations of the Georgia Securities Act, OCGA § 10-5-12. Four counts involved violations of OCGA § 10-5-12(a)(1) where in a series of transactions involving instruments constituting securities within the meaning of the law, defendants failed to comply with the registration statement requirements of OCGA § 10-5-5 as to securities which were not exempt under OCGA §§ 10-5-8 or 9. The fifth count involved defendant Thayer not being registered as a dealer or salesman under OCGA § 10-5-3. The remaining four counts concerned violations of OCGA § 10-5-12(d)(1) under which it is unlawful for any person in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any security, directly or indirectly, to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud.

There are fifteen enumerations of error which may be broken down into six basic grounds. 1. There was no venue in Fayette County [enumerations of error one through five]. 2. The court erred in denying defendants' motion for change of venue based upon unfavorable pre-trial publicity [enumerations of error six and seven]. 3. The court erred in failing to sequester a witness for the State and in not requiring him to testify first [enumerations of error eight through ten]. 4. The district attorney was erroneously allowed to make prejudicial remarks, ask leading questions and bolster the testimony of the State's witnesses [enumerations of error eleven through thirteen]. 5. A witness for the state was erroneously permitted, over objection, to testify that in his opinion venue was proper in Fayette County [enumeration of error fourteen]. 6. Defendants were deprived of due process of law in that they were denied the right to a timely appeal [enumeration of error fifteen].

1. Because lack of venue would result in reversal of these appeals and an end of any proceedings in Fayette County, this is the first issue on our agenda. Prior to trial and by motion for directed verdict during trial, defendants sought dismissal on the ground that venue did not lie in Fayette County because neither of them had been in Fayette County and there was no basis for jurisdiction there. These motions were overruled.

"The proof of venue is an essential element in proving guilt in a criminal case." Bush v. Chappell, 225 Ga. 659, 660, 171 S.E.2d 128 (1969). Accord Newsom v. State, 183 Ga.App. 339(1), 359 S.E.2d 11 (1987). "[L]ike every other material allegation in the indictment it must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Royster v. State, 108 Ga.App. 269, 270(1), 132 S.E.2d 830 (1963); Dickerson v. State, 186 Ga. 557, 559(2), 199 S.E. 142 (1938). "Where venue is not established by the [S]tate, any ensuing judgment is void, although reversal of a conviction on this basis does not prevent retrial in a court where venue is proper and proven." Trogdon v. State, 176 Ga.App. 246, 247(1), 335 S.E.2d 481 (1985).

OCGA § 10-5-15 specifies venue for violations of the Georgia Securities Act of 1973 (OCGA Ch. 10-5): "For the purposes of venue for any ... criminal action under this chapter, any violation of this chapter ... shall be considered to have been committed in any county in which any act was performed in furtherance of the transaction which violated the chapter."

The defendants were never personally in Fayette County and the question is whether they performed any act in furtherance of the various illegal transactions with which they were charged in Fayette County. "An act is defined as 'that which is done or doing; the exercise of power or the effect of which power exerted is the cause; a performance; a deed.' Webster. 'Something done or established.' Bouvier." Green v. State, 109 Ga. 536, 540(1), 35 S.E. 97 (1899).

The victim Dobozy's contact with defendants was initiated when he received in the mail a Clayton County newspaper which contained an advertisement for C & S Venture Capital. He called the telephone number listed in the advertisement, left a message and was subsequently called back by Charles Thayer who identified himself as Charles Hall. Several conversations ensued and in response to Dobozy's inquiries a letter was sent to him in Fayette County by way of Federal Express. The letter written by Charles Hall contained information purporting to describe the history and manner of operation of C & S, but in fact most of the material was either false or misleading. Dobozy decided to invest and delivered $2,500 in Cobb County where the C & S office was located. He received by Federal Express a certificate of deposit evidencing his investment. Dobozy received numerous telephone calls in Fayette County from Charles Hall which resulted in his investing money in various other opportunities, including an investment contract consisting of an interest in rights to a fishing lure patent, a short-term note which was supposed to yield $2,000 profit in fifteen days and an investment contract for $10,000 in a house-moving project which promised a return of $25,000. All the face-to-face encounters occurred in Cobb County or locations other than Fayette County. Even after defendant Thayer was arrested, Dobozy received a Western Union Mailgram in Fayette County from "Charles" which stated although he was "tied up for 30 days," he would send "both agreements on our business."

The State contends that, by placing the advertisements in the newspaper soliciting business which was received by Dobozy in Fayette County, by numerous telephone calls to Dobozy's home which sought to, and did, obtain money from him, and by sending the letter with information and the purported certificate of deposit to Dobozy, defendants performed acts in furtherance of the transactions as described in OCGA § 10-5-15. Georgia authority supports this very liberal and far-reaching construction of the term "act."

Rose v. State, 4 Ga.App. 588, 598(2) & 599(3), 62 S.E. 117 (1908) [disapproved by R.M. Rose Co. v. State, 133 Ga. 353, 65 S.E. 770 (1909), on the basis of the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution, not the grounds here discussed], held that, with regard to a letter soliciting the sale of liquor, venue lay where the letter was delivered and received. Analogy was offered as to one standing in one jurisdiction and shooting a person in another jurisdiction, venue being properly found where the bullet took effect; the same result would follow from the mailing of a letter containing poison. The court also relied upon cases from other states and jurisdictions in which the crime was punishable where the letter was received: a threatening letter, or one based upon false pretense or fraudulent representation or in the case where a postmaster was mailed a letter soliciting him to violate his official duty.

In Carter v. State, 143 Ga. 632, 639(3), 85 S.E. 884 (1915), venue was found to be in the county where a telegram was received. The court held the telegraph company was the sender's agent, that the company's delivery was his and he was constructively present with his agent in its delivery. The court reasoned that when an absent party procures something to be done within the limits of a particular jurisdiction he is amenable to its jurisdiction because of his "act by procuration."

Both of these cases were cited in Overcash v. State, 111 Ga.App. 549, 550(2), 142 S.E.2d 306 (1965), when this court declared that venue lay in the county where an obscene telephone call was received. They were also relied upon in Bowler v. State, 145 Ga.App. 633, 635(2), 244 S.E.2d 142 (1978), a securities violation case involving the Act of 1957. Bowler contended that there was no venue in DeKalb County because he never went there or sent an agent to the county. Noting that part of the scheme to defraud was to mail the offering circular and an application to prospective customers and, after receiving payment, to mail the certificate to the purchaser, it was held that "venue of a crime committed by mail is at the point where the matter transmitted by mail is delivered and takes effect." The court further observed: "the essence of the offense was the communication to prospective customers of representations known to appellant to be false. When the representations were communicated to persons in DeKalb County, the scheme to defraud was then and there employed." Id. at 636, 244 S.E.2d 142.

Predicated on the reasoning of the above cases, defendants did deliberately perform acts which they intended to have effect in Fayette County, in furtherance of the transactions with which they were charged there. The victimization occurred there. The various acts of communication were incomplete in the statutory sense, until they took effect when they were received. Defendants utilized the communication facilities as their agents, activating them for delivery of the messages. Thus the Halls were constructively present in the county as described in Carter, supra. They cannot complain that the protection of the venue statute was not afforded, Platt v. Minn. Mining, etc., Co., 376 U.S. 240, 245, 84 S.Ct. 769, 11 L.Ed.2d 674 (1964), for they chose to act in such a manner that their acts would reach fruition in Fayette County. Thus, there was evidence to sustain venue in Fayette County.

2. Prior to trial defendants filed a motion for change of venue based upon unfavorable and prejudicial pretrial publicity foreclosing a fair and impartial jury. The motion was denied after an unrecorded hearing. Defendants contend that the hearing was premature and the failure to make a voir dire record showed that trial counsel was...